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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vancat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantum sive confitentum.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THE LIBERALISTIC VIEW OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL QUESTION.

Lecture on The Public School Question, as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen. By Francis E. Abbot. Boston, 1876.

TWO lectures on the Public School question were delivered last February (1876) in Boston Horticultural Hall, the first by the illustrious Bishop McQuaid in support of the rights and liberties of all American citizens in the matter of education, the second by a Mr. Francis E. Abbot, who appeared before the public a week later as the champion of what is usually styled the *liberal* theory, viz., of a theory which ignores parental rights, and tends to transform the state into a Moloch, to which the children of the people ought to be sacrificed.

That a bishop of the Catholic Church should undertake to speak aloud in favor of public rights and popular liberties, is not a new thing, and was to be expected; nor is it surprising that his opponent, who is a man of the liberalistic school, should endeavor to stifle both right and liberty; for the history of modern times and a sad experience have taught us that liberalism is not synonymous with liberality, but rather with despotism. In the present case, what surprises us is, that a man who respects himself could have come forward before an intelligent audience with an array of reckless and blundering assertions, as Mr. Abbot did, without considering that what he was going to say had been most thoroughly refuted, just a week before, in the same hall, by the eminent lecturer who had preceded him. The fact, however, of his venturing

to engage in the arduous task, admits of an excellent explanation. He knew that there was in Boston, as well as elsewhere, a class of thinkers who can gobble down absurdities, relish sophistry, and applaud everything that opposes the Catholic Church on any subject whatever, and especially on education. He knew, also, that he was not alone, but acted as the representative of the freethinkers of the country, who would back him up, whether right or wrong, for the triumph of the cause which they are pledged to support. So he boldly undertook to deliver his lecture on *The Public School Question as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen*. This lecture embodies all the specious arguments of the self-styled liberals; but, unfortunately for the lecturer, it shows only one thing, viz., that the Catholic view of the school question is irrefutable, whilst the secularistic view has no ground on which to stand, except sophistry, declamation, and misrepresentation.

Who is this Mr. Abbot who ventures to join issue with a Catholic bishop? Mr. Francis E. Abbot is the editor of "*The Index*, a weekly (Masonic) paper *devoted to free and rational religion*," as we read in an advertisement printed at the end of his lecture. Its programme is as follows:

"*The Index* aims to increase general intelligence with respect to religion; to foster a nobler spirit and quicken a higher purpose both in society and in the individual; to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition, freedom for slavery, character for creed, catholicity for bigotry, love for hate, humanitarianism for sectarianism, devotion to universal ends for absorption in selfish schemes; in brief, to hasten the day when free religion shall take the place of dogmatism and ecclesiasticism throughout the world, and when the welfare of humanity here and now shall be the aim of all private and public activities. In addition to its general objects, the practical object to which *The Index* is specially devoted, is THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIBERALS OF THE COUNTRY for the purpose of securing the more complete and consistent secularization of the political and educational institutions of the United States."

This programme helps us to understand why Mr. Abbot thought it his bounden duty to come forward with his lecture on the public school question. Americans, according to this American sage, are ignorant, superstitious, degraded; they know not right from wrong, nor freedom from slavery; they have no character, no love, no noble spirit, but only creed, hatred, and selfish schemes. Hence it was the duty of Mr. Abbot "to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition;" for he is anxious "to hasten the day when free religion," that is, Freemasonry, "shall take the place of dogmatism and ecclesiasticism throughout the world."

Such are the ideas, and such the objects, of the man whose lecture we propose to analyze.

THE EXORDIUM.—The lecture begins thus:

"It is my duty this afternoon to speak to you about the 'public school question as viewed by the liberal American citizen,' terms which I understand to indicate merely the point of view occupied by those who look at this question in the light of well-recognized American principles, and with reference to the interests of the whole people and their self-chosen government, as distinguished from the point of view occupied by those who look at it in the light of other than American principles and with reference to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church."

In these few lines we find two false assertions. First, it may be a convenient thing and a clever rhetorical trick, before an American audience, to speak highly of "American principles;" but what are these? We know of American policy, of American views, and of American fashions; but we do not think that there can be any strictly American principles. Principles are dictates of reason confirmed by the experience of ages; they are a common property and an inheritance, not a product of American ingenuity. Principles are old, and America is still young. America may invent, as she does, new mechanical contrivances and other useful and excellent things, but we do not see that she has yet patented any new principle. Still less can we admit that the *liberal* American citizens of the stamp of Mr. Abbot have any specially American principles of their own, for we know that their liberalism is a virtual denial of the popular principles on the maintenance of which the order, peace, and prosperity of this free country ultimately depend. Hence it is that Mr. Abbot and his liberal friends of *The Index* consider the American people as ignorant, wrong, superstitious, for they know that our people are not yet ready to adopt these pretended "American" principles. Unless Mr. Abbot can prove that the American people hold un-American principles, we are obliged to conclude that Mr. Abbot's principles, as opposed to those of the people, are themselves un-American.

It is a well-known fact that the first settlers of this country brought over from their old land, and planted in this soil, the principles of *Christian* civilization. Their schools were religious, and they continued to be intensely so even after the Revolution. In these later years, every new accession of population from Europe has contributed to strengthen the religious feelings of the country. The country is Christian. Freethinkers, as compared with the rest of the citizens, are a ridiculous minority. It is true that they make much noise, and pretend to represent American thought, but the people do not indorse them, and look upon them as unprincipled men, roguish politicians, the tools of Satan, and the leprosy of American society. The mass of American citizens is even now, with few exceptions, as much Christian in religion as it is republican in government. As Christians, our citizens intend to

educate their children in their religious faith; as republicans, they will not allow the public servants of the state freely to invade their rights and curtail their liberties. These, if any, are the recognized American principles. It is therefore the merest nonsense to speak of "well-recognized American principles" in connection with the odious and un-American thesis that Mr. Abbot undertakes to defend. He would have shown a greater love of truth, and would have been more readily believed, had he told his hearers that his view of public education was connected, not with American principles, but with the Bismarckian schemes and with the infamous machinations of secret societies.

What he adds about fostering "the interests of the whole people and their self-chosen government," is a puerility, if not an impertinence. Our people are able to protect their own interests without the kind help of Mr. Abbot or other self-appointed tutors. To assume the contrary is to insinuate that the American people are incapable of living and thriving under a republican form of government, and that the sooner they give themselves a master the better. Our citizens, thanks to God, have no need of a master; but if they had, we have reason to believe that neither Mr. Abbot nor any of his free religionists would be consulted on the subject. "Free religion," as understood by free religionists, is a monstrosity; it may suit mere politicians or blind materialists, but it does not suit the popular taste, it does not supply the popular wants, and it destroys the very foundation of all civil and human society. Our citizens are not at all anxious "to hasten the day when the welfare of humanity *here and now* shall be the aim of all private and public activities," for they know that when that day comes, that is, when all thought of a better hereafter has vanished, the country will be a den of thieves, a sink of filth, and a lair of ferocious beasts ready to tear to pieces and devour one another.

Mr. Abbot assumes, in the second place, that those who oppose the godless schools "look at the question in the light of other than American principles, and with reference to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church." This is not only a false assumption, but also a mean and malicious calumny. The orator to whom Mr. Abbot strives to reply, declared in the most explicit and unmistakable terms, that Catholics "ask no favor, no privilege, no special prerogative, no right that they do not concede to others;" in other words, "they seek equal rights for all, favors for none." Now, is it fair in the face of such a declaration to assert that Catholics appeal to the interests of a party, a sect, or a church? Do we not concede the same rights to all parties, all sects, all so-called churches, without exception? Let us repeat it in the ears of honest Mr. Abbot: "We seek equal rights for all, favors for none."

On the other hand, who is it that looks on the public school question "in the light of other than American principles," but he who strives to monopolize the public schools for the benefit of free-thinkers? Who is it that "seeks the interests of a party and of a sect" (though not of a church), but Mr. Abbot, who labors so earnestly in his *Index* for the triumph of Freemasonry? It is the secularist, therefore, not the Catholic, that countenances un-American notions, and seeks the interest of a despotic sect.

He continues:

"There is a sectional, and there is also a national aspect of every great public issue. There is a partisan, ecclesiastical, and sectarian view of the school question, and also a universal, secular, and strictly non-sectarian view of it. It is the latter view alone that I hold, and I shall try to represent faithfully this afternoon all who hold it. That they are only a portion, though a very large portion of the entire population of the country, I of course admit; but that they look at this question in the light of their own interests as a party, and not in that of the equal interests of each and every inhabitant of the land, I emphatically deny."

We need hardly remark that this denial is as absurd as it pretends to be emphatic. The infidel schools may indeed serve the interests of a few infidel parents, but will they *equally* serve the interests of those who have a faith?

Here Mr. Abbot again assumes that the Catholic view of the school question is "partisan" and "sectarian," whilst he pretends that the secularist view is "universal" and "strictly unsectarian." This is mere twaddle. Every one knows that the word "*sect*" comes from the Latin *secta*, which is derived from *seco* (to cut off), or, as others teach, from *sector* (to follow): hence the word "sectarian" applies to the followers of any peculiar religious or irreligious system invented by individual thinkers in opposition to the common doctrines of the true and divinely instituted universal Church. Calvinists, therefore, Lutherans, Unitarians, Presbyterians, and all those who have wilfully separated from the universal Church, are sectaries. Free religionists, too, and the members of all Masonic societies, whatever their name, are sectaries, as they are cut off from the universal Church. But to say that we Catholics are sectaries, is to forget that catholicity means universality, and that there is a difference between the living branches of a tree and the dry sticks which are consigned to the fire. Catholicity and sectarianism are so incompatible, that all sects hate catholicity, though they are often friendly to one another.

As to the Catholic view of the public school question being "partisan," we need not answer again. The few words we have already quoted from Bishop McQuaid's lecture show that Mr. Abbot has no right to taunt us with such a charge. All partisan views are exclusive. Are our views exclusive? Quite the contrary. We seek "equal rights for all, favors for none." Not so

with the secularists. Mr. Abbot of course wants us to believe that the secularistic view of the public school question is neither partisan nor sectarian; but unfortunately we cannot believe against evidence. Is it not manifest, that the free religionists are a "sect," and that they look at the public school question in the light of their own interests as a party, and not in that of the equal interests of each and every inhabitant of the land? The thing is so evident, that no "emphatic denial" can make it doubtful.

And now, what does our lecturer mean, when he says that the secularistic view of the public school question is "universal?" Surely, he does not mean that such a view is universally received; for he himself confesses that only a portion of the entire population of the country holds it. He adds, indeed, that the secularists are "a very large portion" of our population; but this is not true, and, were it true, it would not justify the epithet "universal." What then is the real meaning of this epithet? It is clearly this, that the secularists intend to bring down *the whole country* to their low moral and intellectual level, without the least regard for the good of society, the duties of conscience, and the rights and liberties of the various religious denominations to which the mass of the people belong. This pretended universality of unbelief is nothing but the universal degradation of the American people, the universal disregard of our religious convictions, the universal supremacy of Freemasonry, the universal bondage of Christian families, the universal interference of the State with the sacred rights of individual conscience. This is what every thoughtful man understands to be the aim of the secularistic sect. Can Mr. Abbot reconcile this with "American principles?"

But our lecturer denies that the secularists are a sect. He says:

"In other words, I maintain, contrary to the plausible and ingenious misrepresentations sometimes put forward, that the secular party to this school question is not a *sect*, and cannot be justly so considered from the mere fact of its not embracing the whole population. If that fact alone were decisive, then unsectarianism is an impossibility so long as a difference of opinion exists among men. But what really makes a party partisan or sectarian, is the selfish endeavor to sacrifice the interests of the whole people to their own interests as a mere part of the people; while if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party. For instance, the Republican party, whatever its subsequent sins, was an organized national and non-partisan party during the War of the Rebellion, because it aimed at the true interests of the whole nation, including the very South which was in rebellion; and to-day the great body of honest men, who are opposed to the army of corruptionists in politics, is an unorganized national and non-partisan party, because it aims at establishing politics on the basis of common honesty, which is really the equal interest of all. Precisely in the same manner, I maintain that the secular party on the school question is a strictly non-sectarian party, and not a sect at all, because it aims solely to settle this question on the basis of that equal justice, which is the common and supreme interest of all mankind."

This would be all exceedingly good, if it were true that the secular party "aims solely to settle the question on the basis of equal justice to all." If the lecturer had proved this proposition (which he has not attempted to do), his argument would be conclusive; for every one must admit the general principle that "if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party." But is it true that the secularists and the free religionists aim solely to settle the question on the basis of equal justice to all? Quite the reverse. The secularists aim at settling the question on the basis of *equal injustice* to all who have any Christian convictions, that is, to all who are not free-religionists like themselves. They aim at crushing the interests of all religious denominations in the matter of Christian education, and they aim to apply the money extorted from us to the moral ruin of our children and to the general propagation of paganism. This is what Mr. Abbot with truly Masonic cheek calls "equal justice to all."

We may ask him, would it be "equal justice to all," if the public schools were all to be placed under the exclusive control of the Roman Catholic Church? Would you think it just to have all the citizens taxed, that the boys and girls of opposite denominations may be educated by nuns, by Christian Brothers, by priests, and by Jesuits? We suppose that such a system of public schools would not please you. And yet it is quite certain, that nuns, Christian Brothers, priests, and Jesuits are the best instructors and educators in the country; and accordingly, you free religionists, who boast so much of your great love of the country, should have no objection against this kind of instruction. The pupils educated by us compare favorably with those of other institutions; they are, to say the least, as well instructed, while their moral faculties are much better trained, and their evil propensities more effectually checked and smothered by the help of Christian instruction, the example of their teachers, and the practice of religious duties. Why then, should you, Mr. Abbot, and your friends, object to such a good education being extended to all the children of the country? You would answer, that such an education, however good, is objectionable on the ground of the injustice done to the non-catholic families by applying the money exacted from them to the enforcement of a system through which their children cannot receive the education they desire. But we reply, that whether the education be exclusively Catholic, or whether it be exclusively godless, the injustice is as great, or rather it is much greater in the case of godless than of Catholic education. A moment's consideration suffices to see the truth of this remark. For Catholic

education, while forming better men, teaches much that is still admitted by most of the Christian sects, whereas godless education saps the foundation of public morality, and implicitly condemns the tenets of every Christian sect. From this it must be evident that if it would be unjust to put the public schools under the exclusive control of the Roman Catholics, it is even more unjust to put them under the exclusive control of the free religion party. Between the Roman Catholics and the rest of the country there is only partial dissent, whilst between the free religionists and the rest of the country there is total dissent and irreconcilable opposition. And thus it is plain that the secularistic or free religionist party, while cajoling the country with the big words of "common interests" and "equal justice to all," do really disregard all notion of justice, and aim at promoting their own sectarian interests alone.

We beg to remark here, that what Mr. Abbot falsely says concerning the secularistic view of the school question, can be said with perfect truth of the Roman Catholic view of the same question. We will use his own words: "*We maintain, contrary to the by no means plausible and still less ingenious misrepresentations hypocritically put forward by the secular party, that the Roman Catholics are not a 'sect,' and cannot be justly so considered from the mere fact of their not embracing the whole population. . . .* What really makes a party partisan or sectarian, is the selfish endeavor to sacrifice the interests of the whole people to their own interests as a mere part of the people; while if any party aims honestly at securing the interests of the whole people by rendering equal and exact justice to every individual, it is a strictly non-partisan and non-sectarian party. Hence the Catholic party, in the school question, is a strictly non-sectarian party, and not a sect at all, because it aims solely to settle the question on the basis of that equal justice, which is the common and supreme interest of all mankind."

To this reasoning Mr. Abbot cannot take exception. He cannot say that we aim at sacrificing the interests of the whole country to our own interests; for our solution of the public school question implies that every denomination shall enjoy equal freedom and equal facilities for the protection and advancement of its special interests. Nor can he say, that it is the interest of all mankind to be educated without religion; for religion is not only a duty of all mankind, but a necessity for all political and domestic society. We need religious education, were it only as a means for checking the growth of scoundrelism in the country, as experience shows that it cannot be checked by godless education. Nothing therefore remains but to conclude, that the interests of the people are much

better served by the adoption of the Catholic view, than they ever can be by that of the free religionist or infidel sect.

Whether the Republican party during the War of the Rebellion was or was not a "non-partisan party," there is no need of ascertaining. As to "the great body of honest men who are opposed to the army of corruptionists in politics," we willingly concede that, as a whole, they are not a partisan party, in so far at least as they aim at establishing politics "on the basis of common honesty." But Mr. Abbot, while mentioning the army of corruptionists *in politics*, should have remembered that there is also an army of corruptionists *in education*, and that the great body of honest men who are opposed to this latter, deserve the respect and the sympathy of all good citizens, and should never be called "sectarians," as he calls them; for it is manifest that they aim at establishing public education "on the basis of equal justice," which is really the equal interest of all mankind.

Mr. Abbot will doubtless deny that the free religionists we have just alluded to, strive to corrupt public education. He seems to think that the more completely religion is excluded from the public schools, the better and purer will the education be. Does he not even tell us very plainly, in the programme which we have given above, that Christianity is ignorance, superstition, bigotry, and sectarianism, and that unbelief is knowledge, truth, freedom, character, love, catholicism? It is on these extravagant notions that he bases his conclusion against religious education. But mankind does not listen to this new doctrine, though some fools admire it. All really honest men and all true statesmen condemn such a doctrine as tending to the utter destruction of civil society. "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity," says our often-quoted George Washington, "religion and morality are indisputable supports. In vain would that man claim the attribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. . . . Reason and experience forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." It is, therefore, a recognized truth, to which no one who consults the history of nations can demur, that the banishment of religion from the public schools is the bane of national education, and that the free religionist clique, in whose name Mr. Abbot speaks, constitutes an army of corruptionists in arrant conspiracy against the country.

It has been said, and we have heard it a hundred times from honest people, that the different and opposite religious doctrines which prevail in this country, necessarily require the public educa-

tion to be carried on independently of all religious views, that it may thereby suit the common needs of all without hurting any religious opinion. This view looks less radical than that of Mr. Abbot, as it does not pretend to be founded on *a priori* principles, but merely on grounds of practical necessity. Hence a great number of honest men, as we have just remarked, have been led to believe that such a view offered the only practical solution of the public school question. Unsuspicious people are easily deceived by cunning schemers; which sufficiently accounts for the silent acquiescence of good and religious men in the irreligious system. Yet it was not difficult to understand that the alleged necessity was only a cover to hide the iniquity of the scheme. Had the leaders of the infidel party manifested at once in its naked ugliness their plan of unchristianizing the country, they would have excited general horror, indignation, and execration. They therefore acted with caution; and they did what skilful generals do when they have to fight against superior numbers. They lay in ambush under the tree of liberty, and proclaimed, that respect for popular liberties would not permit either the children of the Jew to be brought up under Christian tuition, or the children belonging to any Christian denomination to be spoiled by the teachings of a different denomination. What then should be done? The plain conclusion, they argued, ought to be, that the public schools, which are destined to the instruction of all our children, cannot, consistently with the religious liberty of our citizens, adopt the religious doctrines of any denomination, but must remain altogether neutral with respect to them, and therefore must banish all religious practices, books, etc., and renounce all standards of religious belief. This is the silly argument by which the infidel party won to its cause a number of unreflecting men.

But the problem of public education admitted of two solutions at least, the one negative, the other positive, that is, the one aiming at *levelling down*, and the other at *levelling up*. The infidel party ignored this latter solution, which would have really met the wants of all denominations, and clung exclusively to the former one, on the plea that their negative system suited the common needs of the country without hurting any religious opinion. The truth is, however, that the godless schools *do not suit* the common needs of the country, and *hurt* more or less sensibly all religious persuasions. The country needs to have its children brought up in religious practices, with religious principles, amid religious examples, under the influence of religious motives, that they may imbibe a salutary respect for the Divine law, and a salutary fear of the Divine judgment, and that they may not hereafter be the shame of their families and the scourge of the country. It is useless to

reply that religious education can be secured by the Sunday-school and by domestic exertions. A sad experience has shown that the private efforts of good parents towards religious education are generally thwarted, warped, and nullified by the evil influence of the infidel schools. Let the public school system of the free religionists do its unwholesome work ten or twelve years longer, and we venture to predict that the United States of America will become a huge mass of corruption.

On the other hand, all religious persuasions have an undoubted right to complain, as they do, of the godlessness of the public school system. Whoever believes in God, in an immortal soul, in a future life, has a right to hate a system by which his children are virtually taught to disregard religion. This hatred is in the very nature of things. No one who believes, is willing to pay taxes for fostering unbelief. We admit that a number of Protestants, whose religious convictions are more or less indefinite, do not much feel (because they little apprehend) the evils of such a system; but these are not standard Protestants. Their clergy have often declared, either in educational conventions, or in public addresses, that they cannot be satisfied with the arrangements of the infidel schools. We know even of Protestants who send their children, both male and female, to the Catholic schools, rather than to allow them to imbibe the poisonous influences of the godless system.

Yet it is the Catholic families that feel the most bitterly the iniquity of the same system. The Catholic religion is not, like the Protestant, a mere opinion, or an indefinite persuasion based on private judgment and open to compromise; it is a firm faith in revealed truth, a faith as reasonable in its motives as it is certain in its object, a faith which is more precious to us than all the literary and scientific learning of the godless institutions, a faith which demands of the believer the practice of good works, the hatred of sin, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, and the constant use of those means which God has provided, through the Church, for the achievement of such a noble and difficult task. The good education of a Catholic boy requires, therefore, a care of which secularists have no idea; it requires the employment of means which the secularists have determined to proscribe. This Catholic education, besides the development of the mind, comprises the formation of the heart and the acquisition of virtuous habits, and this must be secured by the help of good examples, good companions, innocence of life, respect to religion, and encouragement to devotional practices. But it is as clear as noonday that a system which, like that of our public schools, excludes all religious ideas, can do nothing of the kind; it tends, on the contrary, to frustrate the efforts of Catholic parents in the work of education,

by giving to the children the practical example of religious indifference, which is sure to bear, sooner or later, its usual fruit of infidelity, knavery, and debauchery. This more than suffices to show that Mr. Abbot is not serious when he speaks of "equal justice to all" in the present system of public schools. Indeed, it must be evident to all, that a system which discards religion from education does not deal "equal justice" to those who cling to religion, and to those who have no religion at all.

But let us proceed. The lecturer adds:

"What I have to say on the school question, therefore, will be said in the interest of no part of the people, but of the whole people; for, unlike some others, I belong to no party or sect which has interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people."

We reply, it is not true that Mr. Abbot is going to speak "in the interest of the whole people," and it is not true that he "belongs to no party or sect which has interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people." Mr. Abbot is going to defend the godless system of public schools, how then can he honestly believe that he is going to speak in the interest of the whole people? Is he not aware, that all religious denominations are deeply interested in religious education, and that the whole country feels a pressing need of increased religious activity to protect herself against impending evils, by forming a generation of good and conscientious citizens?

Mr. Abbot seems to say that he belongs to no party or sect. This assertion coming, as it does, from a man who is so well known in Boston and elsewhere, is rather amusing; it certainly can deceive none but simpletons. For is not Mr. Abbot known as the editor of *The Index*, "a weekly paper devoted to free and rational religion," that is, to Freemasonry? How, then, can he say that he belongs to no party or sect, or that the sect to which he belongs has no interests separated from, or hostile to, the interests of the whole people? Orators are sometimes tempted to indulge in specious lies, but when lies are palpable it is silly to yield to the temptation. And now we have done with the exordium of Mr. Abbot's lecture. We might have left it out altogether, as it contains but empty words, but we thought that an analysis of it would help our readers in forming at once a pretty just idea of the general tone of the lecture which we have undertaken to refute.

THE CATHOLIC PROTEST.—After such an exordium, Mr. Abbot introduces his subject in the following words:

"But how comes there to be any school question at all? The public school system was established, and has been sustained, by the people itself, solely for the purpose of supplying a universal want, namely, the education of the people's children. Nothing

human is perfect, and the school system is not perfect; but it was honestly founded for the good of the whole people, not of a party or sect, and can be improved. Why is there to-day a 'school question' to be settled?"

We must remind Mr. Abbot (for he seems to have forgotten it) that the first public schools of our country were not free religionist but denominational. Religious instruction was common, and the Bible stood supreme. Up to the close of the first quarter of this century the clergy (Protestant) were almost invariably represented in the school boards. They examined the teachers, inspected the schools, prescribed the text-books, etc., and this they did in each town or school society of New England, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the other States settled by New England emigrants. Such schools were indeed "honestly founded" by those Protestant communities, "for the good" of their children as they understood it. But about that time the leaders of the infidel party stepped forward with a new plan of education. "In order to get their system of schools adopted," says Mr. O. A. Brownson, who was one of their agents, "they proposed to organize the whole Union secretly, very much on the plan of the Carbonari of Europe. The members of this secret society were to avail themselves of all the means in their power, each in his own locality, to form public opinion in favor of education by the State at the public expense, and to get such men elected to the Legislature as would be likely to favor their purposes. This secret organization commenced in the State of New York, and was to extend over the whole Union." The reader who wants more details regarding this secret plot, may read the very instructive book of Rev. Michael Müller on *Public School Education*, ch. iii. The members of this organization pretended that the system then existing did not work well enough, that the standard of education was lowering, and that the condition of the schools was not up to the demands of the time. The *American Encyclopædia* tells us that "the attention of philanthropic men (*Freemasons*) in all parts of the country was directed to the subject, and in 1817 (*which was the first centennial of Freemasonry*) commenced what has been not improperly termed a revival (*secularization*) of education, which is still exerting its influence for good (*and for evil too*) throughout the country." By the establishment of "public school societies" and of "*improved* school organizations," by the creation of educational journals destined to manipulate public opinion, and by other means, the secularists obtained partial successes, gave to their party a stronger organization, and extended their influence in many States, though not without occasional struggles with what they called the religious prejudices of the clergy and the superstition of the people. Thus gathering every year new strength and new importance, they resolved to conquer

the whole country by a combined effort, to supersede all "sectarian" systems of education, to ignore Christianity, to paganize the new generation, and thus to smother, so far as it lay in them, the last spark of religious fire still lingering in the popular institutions of the country. Thanks to the intrigues of unscrupulous men, the connivance of a rotten administration, the supineness or inattention of a distracted people, and the culpable imbecility of those whose duty it was to stand foremost *pro aris et focis* against the invading foe, the godless sect won an easy victory, and loudly proclaimed that henceforward the public schools, so far as it depended on them, would cease to have anything "sectarian" about them. This is how things have been brought down to their present condition, and this is what Mr. Abbot misrepresents as a system "established by the people." We wish he had informed his audience that Freemasons, in this country as well as in Europe, by the word "people" usually understand themselves and their adherents. But the wily orator could not, of course, make himself guilty of such an imprudent act of sincerity.

Thus it is not true that the godlessness of the public schools was established by the people. Is it true, at least, that it was "sustained by the people," as Mr. Abbot affirms? The people indeed, could not help to pay the taxes which were applied to the support of such a system; but this can hardly be interpreted as an approval of the system itself. Nor can the large number of children who frequent the godless schools be considered as a proof that the people are satisfied with them. Where no choice is left, parents must make the best of it, even against their will. Mr. Abbot might as well pretend that the American people was delighted to be plundered by the infamous clique which has ruled and ruined the country in these late years; for the people have submitted to it. The like has happened in regard to the infidel school system. Most of our people, that is, all good and Christian families, have tolerated this system with bitter resignation, just as they have tolerated all sorts of defalcations, embezzlements, and other scandalous practices, for which they had no remedy at hand. This is, we think, the only manner in which a very great number of American families "sustained" the secularistic system of public education.

To the interrogation "Why is there to-day a school question to be settled?" we answer very plainly: Because the public schools have been monopolized in the interest of a sect, to the injury of all religious denominations in the country. Mr. Abbot answers the same interrogation fairly enough in the following words:

"Since the year 1840, when the Roman Catholic Church, under the lead of Archbishop Hughes, began its attack on the public school system, there has been a persistent and determined protest against this system, on the ground that it is unjust and oppressive

to the Catholic conscience. Whatever the grounds of this complaint, its earnestness and sincerity are unquestionable, in view of the fact that the Catholics of the country have voluntarily taxed themselves sufficiently to establish and sustain a great system of Catholic parochial schools, for the education of their children under the sole control of the Catholic priesthood, and that now about four hundred thousand children are receiving instruction in them, to the total neglect and disuse of the public schools. A protest manifestly so sincere, urged in the sacred name of conscience, deserves to receive the most respectful and dispassionate consideration of the majority. If the protest is a reasonable one, and if the public school system really infringes the undeniable rights even of a single citizen, reform and redress are the only right course to be adopted; and if not, the fact of even an unreasonable protest on the part of so large and so rapidly increasing a portion of the people, is cause for grave disquietude in the minds of all intelligent patriots. The school question thus raised is complicated still further by the fact that the great body of non-Catholics who heartily support the public school system, are themselves divided as to the relation it ought to bear to religion, one part holding that the schools should have a distinctively Protestant Christian character, the other part holding that they should be wholly colorless or neutral with respect to religious beliefs. The former maintain an intermediate position between the positions of the Catholic and the secular or liberal parties, and are in fact attempting to reconcile irreconcilable principles. But their consistency or inconsistency does not affect the main question of the support or abolition of the State school system. Protestants and Liberals are nearly unanimous in supporting it, and differ only on the question whether the schools supported by the State shall be wholly or partially secular. But the protest of the Catholic Church strikes at the very foundation of the State schools; it denies the right of the State to educate at all, and claims the whole field of education as part of the domain of the Church itself. Let us then concentrate our attention for the present on the Catholic protest, and consider without passion and without prejudice, how far this protest is grounded in justice and in truth."

Thus the Catholics, who form "so large and so rapidly increasing a portion of the people," that is, twelve or thirteen millions of American citizens, earnestly and persistently protest against the public school system as now managed for the exclusive interest of unbelief. Another "great body," to wit, Protestants of all kinds, whose number may be safely assumed to reach at least twenty-five millions, hold that our public schools "ought to have a Christian character." These two great bodies evidently constitute the quasi-totality of our population. Therefore those who call themselves "liberals," "free religionists," "freethinkers," or "secularists," and who wish the public schools to be "neutral with respect to religious beliefs," are only a small minority, and though they have succeeded, by organized efforts, in imposing their godless system upon the people, they do not in fact represent the American thought of education. Had these free religionists respected the rights and the feelings of the Christian millions, as they were obliged, no school question would have arisen, except in so far as the bigotry of some Protestant declaimers might have resisted, and retarded for a time, the full admission of the Catholic claim. Whence it follows, that the present school question did not originate in the Catholic protest, but was pressed upon us by the infidel party, which turned to its exclusive interests an institution designed for the interests of the whole people.

That the Catholics have protested against the new system, is true of course ; but they were not the only ones that protested ; nor was their protest intended to shelter the rights of Catholicity alone, but those also of all other Christian families in the country. All denominations are interested in religious education, and all feel more or less keenly the injustice of the victory won by the unchristian party. That the Catholics should feel it more sensibly, and resent it more deeply than other denominations, is a great credit to them, and was to be expected, for reasons which we have already touched upon.

Mr. Abbot very wisely remarks that those Protestants who with respect to the school question, maintain an intermediate position between the positions of the Catholic and of the secular parties, "are in fact attempting to reconcile irreconcilable principles." This is a great truth. Do you hear it, you gentlemen of the Protestant Churches? It is not a Catholic that drives you out of the field of controversy in such an unceremonious manner ; it is Mr. Abbot himself ; it is one of those very infidels with whom you conspired against Catholic education. He declares to you, that the public schools shall not have that "distinctively Protestant Christian character," which your alliance with the unbelievers was intended to shelter. It was therefore a mistaken policy on your part to separate from the Catholic body in the great struggle for Christian education. Your claims are now ridiculed by your former allies, the liberals ; and you richly deserve it. Had you joined with us in the cause of equal justice to all Christian denominations, your claims would not now be disregarded, and the country, in all probability, would have been saved from the curse of godless schools.

The protest of the Catholic Church, adds Mr. Abbot, "strikes at the very foundation of State schools ; it denies the right of the State to educate at all, and claims the whole field of education as part of the domain of the Church itself." These words need explanation. That the Church alone has a right to teach revealed religion, we think, Mr. Abbot himself must readily admit. The State has certainly received no mission to teach religion ; it needs religion ; it must respect religion ; but it is not the depositary of God's revelation to man ; nor has it been intrusted with its interpretation. On the other hand, the State cannot prosper without justice, honesty, and morality, and therefore without encouraging the cultivation of religious principles and the exercise of religious duties. The State, therefore, is in continual need of the Church. This conclusion, though it may have little weight with Mr. Abbot and his supporters, is extremely weighty, as all historians, philosophers, and statesmen of all times and countries agree. And since it is in the

work of education that the seeds of public honesty and morality are to be sown, it is in this same work of education that the State is more especially bound to respect the rights, and second the efforts of the Church. We say "of the Church" in the singular, both because Mr. Abbot does so himself, and because we think that no man of sense will admit that there can be in the world more than *one* true Church of God.

Nevertheless, the Church does not claim "as part of her domain," the education of all the children of the country. She claims only the education of her own, and leaves to each different denomination the whole care of their religious interests. She respects the honest convictions of those who have been taught to differ from her doctrine; and, though she is certain of her divine truth (which is by no means the case with any other denomination), yet she does not claim, as our free religionists do, the right of depriving them of that manner of education which they conscientiously consider as good.

That the State "has no right to educate at all," is not a *special* doctrine of the Catholic Church. The State has the right, and the duty, to encourage good education; but its right to educate is but a Masonic invention; and were the State to make a law requiring all public schools to teach the Christian catechism, freethinkers would be the first to deny that the State, in this free country, has a right to do so. But we will argue in the following manner: Either the State is competent to educate, or it is not. If it is not competent, common sense compels us to deny that it has any right to educate at all. If it is competent, then, since good education cannot be divorced from religion, the State must teach religion. But this no American State can do, not only because no State has any right on religious matters, but also because the multiplicity of religious systems prevailing in the country makes it impossible to satisfy the claims of one system, without violating the equal rights of all the other systems. This impossibility of a uniform State system of education is so manifest, that it has been laid down as an incontrovertible principle by the advocates of godless schools.

The only manner of building up a good and efficient system of State education (if any such were possible), would be to support the educational rights of each denomination by a just apportionment of the public school fund among them all, in proportion to the number of pupils educated in each institution. Then would the State education be worthy of its name, inasmuch as the word "State" would no longer mean a score or two of domineering politicians, but the inhabitants themselves of the State, who alone, in a free republic, are entitled to call themselves properly "the State."

If Mr. Abbot takes the word "State" in this last sense, his remark about the Church "denying the right of State education" is

altogether preposterous ; for the Church has never denied the right of all citizens to educate their children according to the dictates of their conscience. But if he understands the word as meaning a small body of political men, who have succeeded in securing, by hook or by crook, a place in our assemblies, then not only the Catholic Church, but every one who has not lost all idea of human dignity, will most emphatically deny that such men have any right whatever to meddle with our liberties concerning education, or to decide for us which kind of education is the best. Much less are such men authorized to foster a general system of public schools that must ignore religion, and from which, as experience has already shown, the country can expect nothing but a generation of men without principles and without conscience. Still less have they the right to levy taxes on the citizens for the furtherance of a scheme which all honest and enlightened citizens dislike and condemn, as being radically at variance with the best interests of the country. Such taxes are not only unjust, they are supremely anti-political and anti-social. No true statesman would ever sanction them.

MINOR OBJECTIONS.—Our lecturer, after noticing the protest of the Catholic conscience against the present system of public schools, continues thus :

“On the minor objections urged by the Catholic Church against the public school system, I shall touch very lightly, reserving my chief attention for the one great and central principle of its protest. It is charged, for instance, that the public school system, as compared with the Catholic parochial school system, is unduly expensive, and the merit of superior economy is pleaded for the latter. This may be true to some extent, and is easily explained when the two kinds of education imparted are compared as to their intrinsic value.”

This is a simple evasion. For what is the intrinsic value of an education without religion ?

“Economy is not always secured by buying cheap articles ; and the cheapness of Catholic education is no argument in its favor, when its character is considered in the light of certain Catholic admissions which might easily be quoted.”

We do not know to what “Catholic admissions” the lecturer is here alluding. Catholics admit that, owing to the unfairness of the existing educational legislation, they labor under some disadvantages, that their means are still insufficient, and their efforts crowned with only partial success. But when did they admit that their standard of education is not immensely superior “in intrinsic value” to that of the godless schools ? We defy Mr. Abbot to quote any such “Catholic admissions.”

"But," he continues, "that the universal adoption of the voluntary denominational system, supplanting the public schools with church schools established by each sect in its own sectarian interest, could possibly reduce the total cost of education on the whole, is incredible. The cost of so many sets of schools would greatly exceed the cost of our present school system, if the same number of children should be educated with the same degree of thoroughness as now."

We think that Mr. Abbot's calculation must be wrong. It is a notorious fact, that State institutions are, as a general rule, more costly than private institutions of the same kind, standard, and efficiency. State money is held cheap, to say the least; harpies find a way to it, while an army of hungry leeches beset it, eagerly intent to feed on it to the best of their ability. The expenditure of the State schools is enormous, and it is not always fully warranted even when it is fully accounted for, which is not always the case. The Commissioner of Education in his report for the year 1872 complained that "few of the States and Territories can give a full and fair account" of their educational receipts and expenses. Nine out of them "cannot tell the amount derived from taxation for school purposes." Seven "can show no total income for school purposes from any source." And as regards expenditure, eleven States and Territories "cannot give any details," and twelve "cannot give the total amount expended." (Page xv.) This gives an idea of how State money can be, and is, handled in this country. The annual cost of our public schools is now *eighty millions of dollars* at least. How is this money spent? "For the management of the godless public schools," says Fr. Muller, "there is a costly array of 'commissioners,' and 'inspectors,' and 'trustees,' and 'superintendents,' and 'secretaries of boards,' and 'central officers,' all in league with 'contractors,' to make 'a good thing' so called, out of the plan. We now have contractors for buildings and repairs, contractors for furniture, contractors for books, contractors for furnaces, contractors for fuel, contractors even for pianos, and all making money out of it. The 'boards' that give the contracts do not make any money by way of commissions, do they? Ah! you know full well that hundreds of thousands of dollars are annually spent or squandered in running these public schools, and which are recommended in a particular manner for their *economy*!" (Pages 171, 172.) We maintain that, if justice were done to us, we Catholics, with the portion of the school fund to which we are entitled, would soon be able not only to educate all our children in the primary schools, but also to found a number of high literary institutions, and perhaps even a couple of magnificent universities. Our portion of the school fund would be about twenty millions of dollars, as we are about one-quarter of the whole population of the United States. If Mr. Abbot and his associates are willing to try us, let them come forward, and help us to obtain justice. It will

be for us, when we are on an equal footing with our adversaries, to show that our literary, scientific, and religious education has nothing to fear from a comparison with that of the godless system. We need not say more on this point, as we believe that this division of the school fund will never be consented to by the Liberals, whilst we ourselves hold that the public school question admits of a better and more radical solution.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"Again, the gradual expansion of the common school system by the establishment of State high schools, normal schools, and universities, is dwelt upon as a great evil, which will ultimately involve the destruction of denominational institutions of the corresponding grade. Perhaps no higher encomium in the eyes of every enlightened friend of education, who knows the worthlessness of most denominational colleges, could be passed upon our present system. Whoever is competent to compare Cornell University and Michigan University with sectarian colleges that could easily be named, will see that this objection is of the nature of a boomerang, and returns to damage the unskilful launcher of it. It would be foreign to my present subject to discuss the equity of sustaining high schools, normal schools, and universities, as State institutions, since we are now concerned only with the elementary public schools as such; but I would enter a general denial of the assumption that the lower grades of State schools are inequitable, because of the supposed inherent tendency of the system to expand into higher institutions of learning. Certainly a very strong argument can be made, on grounds of a thoroughly democratic character, in defence of that tendency, if it exists."

This answer does not meet the objection. We do not object to the gradual expansion of a lower into a higher education. We are not indifferent to the highest development of art, literature, and science, and we wish that America may soon emulate the old nations of Europe in all kinds of useful and ennobling studies. What we object to is the gradual expansion of infidelity, apostasy, paganism, and lawlessness, through the influence of hypocritical societies, which labor to cheat the American people, to pervert the American youth, and to corrupt the spirit of American institutions. It is all very well for Mr. Abbot to speak of high schools, normal schools, and universities as *State* institutions; but it is evident, that such institutions, if arising from the expansion of the present public school system, and animated by the same spirit, would not be *State* institutions, except in this sense, that the State, that is, *the citizens*, would *pay* for them, whilst *Freemasons* would *control* them for their own profit and for our ruin. This may seem good to Mr. Abbot, but the country has already suffered too much from these pretended "friends of education" not to desire to get rid of their influence; and thoughtful Americans are not at all anxious to see their pecuniary contributions applied to the further corruption of their children and to the further propagation of the Masonic fraternity.

These "enlightened friends of education" look upon the destruc-

tion of denominational institutions as a very desirable thing; that is, they would, if possible, deprive the American people of all religious education. To conceal the monstrosity of the attempt, they first allege the odious and baseless charge that what we do is "worthless;" then, to show this "worthlessness" of denominational education, they bring the ridiculous proof that our colleges cannot bear comparison with their universities. What! Is then all education worthless which is not a university education, or, must all colleges be universities? If so, then all the public schools which are not universities must be as worthless as our colleges. And yet the infidel party boasts of them. The truth is, that denominational colleges are not, and do not pretend to be, universities, though some of them give very thorough instruction in many useful branches of knowledge; and the only reason why Mr. Abbot casts discredit upon them, is their having a religious character calculated to retard the triumph of his sectarian friends. Let him therefore beware of his "boomerang" method of dealing with religious institutions, lest he may wound himself with his own weapon.

A third minor objection against the public school system is thus proposed and answered by our lecturer :

"Again, the argument that the secular education given in the common schools not only does not tend to diminish crime, as is claimed by their friends, but, on the contrary, does tend directly to foster immorality, both in teachers and pupils, was urged on this platform last Sunday by Bishop McQuaid. But statistics of unquestionable accuracy are against him on the former point, as any one may learn from the *Report of the Committee on Education of the New York City Council of Political Reform on Compulsory Education*, published in 1873; while, on the latter point, it is sufficient to say that moral abuses tend to creep into every great institution, and that infinitely worse stories are told, on authority at least as good, of the immorality practiced in Roman Catholic convents, nunneries, monasteries, and so forth, than have been told of American public schools. This is a very dangerous argument for Roman Catholics to use; it will hurt their own church a great deal more than it can possibly hurt the public school system; but it is one which I have little inclination to go into, and one which will certainly draw upon the Catholic Church a host of assailants, if the Church is incautious enough to give them an opportunity."

A host of assailants! We thank Mr. Abbot for the kind warning, though we think that we needed no warning at all, as the "host of assailants" has been at work all along these past years under our very eyes. But, when the Church will have been "incautious enough" to unmask her enemies, when their pompous self-glorification will be silenced by the forthcoming evidence of facts, when the mendacity of their stories, and of their statistics, too, come to be known throughout the country, then, of course, all the Liberals, who, in their affected liberality, are watching the opportunity of assailing the Church, will know that the opportunity has been offered at last, and "a host of assailants," greater and stronger than ever, will fall upon us. We may well be sure of this. But, after all, this foe is not very

formidable ; and we are ready to fight it. Know Nothings assailed us when we were fewer and weaker than we are now ; and although they resorted to such arms as our decent free religionists should and would be loath to handle, they were crushed by the American law and by the American people. What kind of weapons our new assailants will use against us we do not exactly know. Lies may be successful for a time ; but sooner or later truth triumphs, the liar smarts under the scourge of ignominy, and his reckless dishonesty becomes an object of universal disgust. Reason is not a weapon that Mr. Abbot's friends can wield against us ; for they have always been beaten by us in the field of argumentation. Declamation is apparently a better weapon in their hands, as they excel in its management ; but it is almost a worn-out article in this country. We are not ignorant that Mr. Abbot's men may have a hundred other means of annoying us ; for they, and their accomplices, are just now preponderant in our legislature, in the magistracy, and in the general and municipal administrations. But when they have done us all the harm they can, our right will still be as good as ever, and our position will even be relatively better. Legal persecution is a double-edged tool ; it disgraces the persecutors, while it purifies, strengthens, and ennobles the victims. Prince Bismarck, that model of liberalistic equity, exhausted all the resources of legal persecution against the German Catholics ; but found at last, to his great disappointment, that his infamous politics had only ruined his own reputation, and made his name execrable to all Europe no less than to the German population. He himself confesses, that no man in the world is so heartily and universally hated as he is. Mr. Abbot and his "host of assailants" are not likely to be permitted to do in a free country what Prince Bismarck has been able to do in the German States ; but were they allowed to do it, one thing is certain, the wrong done to any class of American citizens will ultimately recoil on the heads of the wrong-doers. The Church, therefore, will continue, notwithstanding Mr. Abbot's interested warnings, to tell the truth with regard to the immoral tendency of the godless system of education. "Cautiousness" she leaves to those who need it to conceal their snares. She has nothing to conceal.

We sincerely pity Mr. Abbot, who, while exhorting the Church to be cautious, reveals to us his own lack of cautiousness. In the first place, he considers the objection drawn from the immoral tendency of the public school system as one of the "minor" objections ; whereby he most imprudently betrays the fact, that morality with his party is only a thing of "minor" importance. This he will deny, for he will say that his reason for considering the objection a "minor" one is, that he cannot see the immoral tendency

of the system. But we shall soon show that this pretended blindness is a mere evasion. In the second place, to meet the same serious and undeniable charge, that the public school system, as it is now, is calculated to foster general depravity, he alleges a local statistic, which in the case has no value whatever, as it does not take into account those innumerable moral offences, which have not been brought before the local authorities, and it ignores, therefore, the awfully increasing corruption which desolates a thousand once happy homes. Cautiousness required a prudent silence rather than such a puny attempt at evading the point in question. In the third place, though it is true, that "moral abuses tend to creep into every great institution," yet no man who respects himself and desires to be respected would have uttered the stupid lie, that "infinitely worse stories are told, on authority at least as good, of the immorality practiced in Roman Catholic convents, nunneries, monasteries, and so forth, than have ever been told of American public schools." We need not utter a word in reply to this truly infamous slander. The holiness and purity of our religious communities are the admiration of the world, and one of the highest glories of the Church. Every one knows that convents, nunneries, and monasteries are responsible for their doings to such ecclesiastical superiors as would not for a moment tolerate even the seeds and the suspicion of immorality, and who would visit any scandalous member of a religious community with immediate expulsion. Every one knows also, how much a large portion of our daily press would be delighted, if it could gather a little dirt from our convents and throw it at us, even on the mere authority of an anonymous reporter, a Maria Monk, or an Edith O'Gorman. How does it happen that convent scandals do not enter into the daily statistics of crime, and are not seen reported in those very papers which usually teem with scandal and crime? It required the beastly courage and the stolid malignity of a free religionist lecturer to slabber with his foul drivell a whole class of deserving persons, whose life of innocence and of sacrifice defies the most searching criticism, and commands the respect of the whole country. Shame upon him! In the fourth place, to threaten the Roman Catholics with disclosures which "will be very dangerous to the Church," when such pretended disclosures have been forthcoming unceasingly from all Protestant and infidel books, lectures, papers, and magazines, without proving in the least dangerous to the Church, is to make a strange and preposterous menace. We have already said that the Church is not afraid of disclosures.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"The wholesale charges brought by Catholic writers against the public schools with respect to their so-called immoral tendencies will not always be suffered to go unchal-

lenged. Whatever truth there is in them should be made manifest ; whoever is guilty should be exposed and punished, but wholesale insinuations against the teachers and the pupils of the public schools will call out at last a species of reply not very agreeable to those who have indulged in this mode of warfare."

This menace we do not deserve. The Catholic writers do not make "wholesale insinuations against the teachers and the pupils of the public schools." We respect the persons; we condemn only the infidel system under which such persons are compelled to work. The teachers may be honorable, and the pupils well meaning; but men and women, boys and girls especially, have passions against which they cannot prevail without the help of religious principles and of religious aspirations. Hence the system which banishes religion from the public schools, is essentially an immoral system, and those are "guilty" and "should be exposed," who recommend it to the American people. Is it not so, Mr. Abbot?

He adds:

"No argument against the justice of taxing the whole community for the support of public schools can be drawn from any such local and incidental abuses as were referred to last Sunday. Whether actual or invented, they are neither part nor product of the public school system as such; and I pass them by, not simply because they are irrelevant, but also because if the debate is diverted to a discussion of the relative moral influence on society of the public school system, and of the Roman Catholic Church, the latter will have all it can do to defend its own principle of ecclesiastical celibacy, and the historical record of its effects on public morality."

On these words, which show the lecturer's embarrassment and his desire to evade the question, we make only two short remarks. First, the evils referred to by Bishop McQuaid (and not by him only, but also by a great number of Protestant gentlemen of the pulpit and of the press) are *actual*, not "invented." They are not "abuses" affecting a good system, but the *natural fruit* of a bad system; they are not "irrelevant," but pregnant with deplorable consequences; they are not merely "local" or "incidental," but *universal* and *inevitable*. This is a plain fact, nor can it be otherwise so long as the influence of religion is not brought to bear on education. Hence Mr. Abbot's tergiversation on this head is worse than useless.

Secondly, the Catholic Church has no need of defending her "principle of ecclesiastical celibacy," for this principle has been abundantly defended and triumphantly vindicated in past centuries against adversaries more formidable than Mr. Abbot. The celibacy in question may be incomprehensible to the carnal, the dissolute, and the free religionist; but it does not on that account cease to be excellent both in itself and in its effects with regard to public morality, as reason, experience, and "the historical record" uniformly show. Of course, Mr. Abbot, as a stranger to the duties

of ecclesiastical life, has no personal ground for shuddering at the thought of a hated celibacy; and, as a stranger to the Church, he has no business to attack what he does not understand, or to blame those who *freely* choose and cherish a manner of life so conformable to that of which our Saviour and his Apostles gave the salutary example. But to assume, as he does, that the Catholic Church would "have all it can do" to defend her principle, is to display a great ignorance of history; and to make the ecclesiastical celibacy a pretext for ignoring the need of religion in public education, is to confess one's impotence to meet the difficulties of a false position.

THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE.—After such a superficial and unsatisfactory treatment of "minor" objections, the lecturer proceeds as follows:

"It is not these minor and subsidiary objections to the system of State schools, their alleged expensiveness, their tendency to supplement themselves with public high schools and colleges, or the insinuation of their necessary immoral influence (which, if the insinuation could be sustained by proof, would be anything but a minor objection), that constitute the real strength of the Catholic protest against the public school system. Its strength lies in the claim that the *Catholic conscience* is violated and oppressed by this system. This is a claim which demands the most patient, serious, and candid attention of every just man. No matter whether the claim of an aggrieved conscience is made by a great party or by an obscure and unsupported individual, it is a claim which commands instant and reverential heed; and no institution can be solidly built or stable, which rests on disregard of one man's outraged conscience. Unless the foundations of the school system are laid on the rock of absolute equity and impartial justice, it is built upon the sand, and must fall; and the examination of the soundness of its foundations cannot be postponed, if only a solitary voice is raised in solemn protest against it."

How beautifully these words sound. It would seem as if Mr. Abbot were decidedly on our own side, so perfectly does he recognize and express the rational ground of our demands. He even tries to correct, in a parenthesis, the blunder committed a little before, where he had considered the immoral tendency of godless schools as a "minor" objection, and he confesses, that if we can make it good, the objection must be considered a very serious one. Unfortunately, this loud acknowledgment of a just principle is made to serve a mean purpose, for it is nothing more than a rhetorical precaution by which the lecturer strives to delude his audience into the belief that he is really anxious to have justice done to all, at the very moment he is going to attack justice with a plausible sophism. His pompous profession in favor of the rights of conscience is, like quack advertising, mainly intended to cover the worthlessness of the article offered to the public. How he will manage to draw a wrong consequence from so good a principle, we shall see presently. But we wish first to notice that the ground of the discussion is much wider than our lecturer makes it.

The Catholic conscience condemns, of course, the public school system as now enforced, but other denominations, too, have a conscience, and this conscience, also, should be taken into account. Why, then, is the discussion reduced by the lecturer to the objections of the *Catholic* conscience alone? Mr. Abbot, it is true, undertook only to answer the arguments of a Catholic bishop, but he might have taken notice that the Catholic bishop, though insisting mainly on the Catholic view, as was but natural, had also brought forward some very good Protestant authorities coinciding in the same view, and especially a protest of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in which it was said: "We do not hesitate to avow that we regard the education of the young as one of the leading functions of the Church, and one that she cannot abdicate in favor of the State without infidelity to her trust and irreparable damage to society." Should not the conscience of these Methodists, who are so numerous, be respected in this country as much as that of the Catholics? Moreover, it is not religious conscience alone, but also the great interests of our natural rights and common liberty that are concerned in the question of education. Hence not only the Catholics and other Christians, but even those whose conscience may be dead to all religious feelings, can reasonably object to the State school system as a usurpation of pre-existing individual rights and a confiscation of American liberty in educational matters. These incidental remarks might be further developed, but we must now see how our lecturer continues his argumentation.

After having laid down the principle that "the claims of an aggrieved conscience command instant and reverential heed," he, oddly enough, proceeds as follows:

"Nevertheless, it does not follow that every protest made in the name of conscience must be obeyed or yielded to, even if made in most absolute and unquestioned sincerity. Conscience itself is under law; it is bound to be reasonable. So far as the individual is concerned, his private conscience, whether in fact reasonable or not, must be obeyed, for it is to him the expression and measure of his moral reason, beyond which or above which he cannot go. But so far as his claims on other men are concerned, his individual conscience is not, and cannot be, the ultimate law of their conduct. They, too, have consciences as sacred to them as his to him, and the one common law of reason is binding on all alike. Hence the Catholic's claim of an injured and wronged conscience is not of itself a sufficient warrant for the immediate abandonment of the school system; he must first prove it to be a just and reasonable conscience. Uninstructed and perverted consciences are altogether too common in this world—foolish and wrong things are too often demanded or done in conscience's name—to make it either wise or right to give up a great public institution of proved beneficence, or to surrender the necessary conditions of its existence, the very first moment that it is challenged."

This is mere cavil and tergiversation. If our conscience is the rule of our actions, we are right in demanding what our conscience dictates to us to demand. That others, too, have their consciences,

as sacred to them as ours is to us, we certainly admit. But that there is a conflict between our conscience and the consciences of others with regard to our educational claims, as Mr. Abbot assumes, is false and absurd. We are Catholics and citizens: as Catholics, our conscience demands of us the education of *our own* children in the fear of the Lord: as citizens, our conscience requires us to defend the conscientious claims of our fellow-citizens concerning the religious education of *their own* children. Now, is there any conscience which demands that we shall not educate our children in our own religion, or a conscience which demands that money shall be extorted from us for an education which profits none but unbelievers? If such a conscience existed, would it not be proper, before obeying it, to wait till it first proves itself to be "a just and reasonable conscience?"

Again, when we conscientiously contend that each denomination in the country must be free to educate their own children according to their own conscience, and must not be robbed of their money for the triumph of a false education, which is fatal to the interests of all denominations alike, are we not in fact defending the consciences of all as much as our own? Where is, then, the conflict of the Catholic conscience with the consciences of others? How hollow is, therefore, Mr. Abbot's argument, and how absurd! No one can fail to see that our conscience and the consciences of all other denominations are the same. We all want religious instruction; we all feel that our cause is the cause of the people; and we all complain that we are swindled, under pretence of education, by men who are incompetent, and even unwilling, to give good education. Perhaps Mr. Abbot, who as a free religionist has peculiar notions of his own, imagines that swindlers may have a conscience which commands cheating and plundering. If this is his notion of "a just and reasonable conscience," we will concede that the conscience of his friends and associates may be in conflict with the Catholic conscience. But then, it would not be necessary for us "to prove that our conscience is just and reasonable;" it would be more proper to bring our despoilers before a police court, there to have their consciences fairly examined, and to receive the sentence they deserve.

Mr. Abbot, in the passage now under consideration, commits another blunder. He makes a transition from the Catholic individual conscience to the conscience of the Catholic community at large. An individual may be unreasonable, therefore he concludes the general conscience of the Catholic body may be unreasonable, and accordingly its reasonableness requires proof. The argument might easily be retorted, as every one sees, but we will simply remark that the transition from an individual to a community is

illogical. Bishop McQuaid did not urge an individual claim; he did not speak in the name of an individual, but in the name of millions of individuals, whose conscience, unlike that of their oppressors, can give a satisfactory account of itself, and has given it, whenever challenged, in this very land as well as in the rest of the world. To disregard this conscience because individuals are sometimes unreasonable, is the most shameful of fallacies.

The lecturer commits a third blunder when he pretends that we advance unreasonable claims on other men who have consciences as sacred as ours. It is on this assumption that he bases the distinction he makes between a conscience which must be obeyed and a conscience which may be disregarded. But what did and do we claim? Did we ever claim that Mr. Abbot or his friends must be compelled to pay taxes for the Catholic schools? Had we done so, we would have acted unreasonably, though we would only have acted as he and his friends act with respect to us. But we are not so mean; we have merely asked, and we still ask, not as a favor, but as a right, that since the public schools have been monopolized by freethinkers, freethinkers should support them entirely with their own moneys, and should cease from thrusting their grasping hands into our pockets. This we have a right to demand, and not we Catholics only; for the Episcopalians, the Presbyterians, and all other Christian organizations in the country are perfectly justified to advance a similar claim, it being evidently unjust that any denomination of believers should be compelled to pay the expenses of a partisan institution notoriously hostile to their beliefs.

Who is it, then, that advances unreasonable claims "on other men and on their sacred consciences" but Mr. Abbot and his secularists, who claim the right of taxing the whole Christian people for the furtherance of their antichristian schemes? And yet they pretend that, in claiming such a right, they obey "a just and reasonable conscience!" Why, men without religion can scarcely have a conscience which they feel bound to obey. Had they consciences, they would strike their breasts, and hide their faces for shame.

Mr. Abbot goes on in the following style:

"Despite his infallible standard of right and wrong, the Pope's *ex cathedra* deliverances, the Roman Catholic in this country must waive his divine authority of Pope and Church, and consent to plead his case before the bar of the universal reason of mankind. This Bishop McQuaid did last Sunday; from this platform he addressed his plea to the public intelligence of the country, just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican; and he never once quoted the authority of his infallible sovereign as a supreme confirmation of his own words. The Catholic Church itself, Pope and all, must do the same; it protests against the school system, and addresses the protest to the general intelligence of the country, and by the verdict of this intelligence the pro-

test must stand or fall. Therefore I say, that the Catholic claim of an outraged conscience, with the tacit but evidently implied sanction of Bishop McQuaid and every other Catholic who consents to reason his case before the public, must be judged by the laws of reason; and if it is adjudged to be unreasonable, such Catholics cannot without tergiversation repudiate the legitimacy of the verdict they have invoked and thereby sanctioned in advance."

We are of opinion that Bishop McQuaid addressed himself to those who needed to be enlightened, rather than to the "intelligence" of the country. In fact the intelligence of the country had no need of his lecture to be convinced of the reasonableness of the Catholic claim; that is a question already settled in our favor by the best statesmen of America since the time when equal rights were conceded to all denominations. Bishop McQuaid addressed himself to the prejudiced, the bigoted, and the misinformed; he addressed himself to that same class of citizens to which Mr. Abbot weekly addresses his *Index*; a paper whose aim is "to substitute knowledge for ignorance, right for wrong, truth for superstition, freedom for slavery, character for creed." Surely Mr. Abbot will not contend that such a class represents the "intelligence of the country."

Whether Mr. Abbot himself and his associates belong to the intelligence of the country, our readers will decide; to us it seems that they belong to another class. However, as there may be shrewdness without prudence, and talent without learning, so there may be intelligence without wisdom; and in this sense we are willing to admit that the infidel party can boast of some intelligent men. But intelligence without wisdom is a curse rather than a blessing; and America is already experiencing the baneful effects of the system which cultivates the former at the expense of the latter. Hence it is not to Mr. Abbot and his party that we look for a just decision of any important question. On the other hand, no new decision is needed concerning the question in which we are now engaged; for, as we have already stated, intelligent and wise American statesmen, not in the least biassed by "the Pope's *ex cathedra* deliverances," but acting "just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican," and consulting merely "the laws of reason," have long ago given their verdict against our present adversaries, and their verdict is this: *The Catholic conscience and the consciences of all other citizens have an equal natural and constitutional right not to be outraged. Therefore, a school system which is an outrage to millions of American consciences, is a violation of right, and a disgrace to the country.*

PANTHEISTIC THEORIES OF SOUL.

Ψυχὴ AND Πνεῦμα.

THE object of this brief essay is to offer a contribution to the history of early human thought on a subject most solemn, most interesting, and most mysterious,—the immortality of the soul. It is right to make a plain avowal at the outset, that nothing is further from the writer's wish or intention, than to impugn or to throw any indirect doubts on the truth of the theological dogma, which must be upheld by arguments of a wholly distinct nature.¹ In dealing with a doctrine which appears to have been held by all nations in all ages, we are entitled to take not the theological but the purely historical side; to contemplate it under an aspect quite different from that of divine authority, and to account, if we can, on independent grounds, for the acceptance of a belief so remote from, if not so contrary to, all human experiences.²

We therefore leave entirely out of the question, as not bearing on our argument, the inherent probability that a doctrine, which presents itself to us as the common inheritance of the whole human race, may be, though maintained by some on false and even grossly superstitious grounds, the corruption of a truth received from primal tradition, or implanted as an unerring instinct in our very nature. Like the existence of God, or of a moral sense of good and evil, which is seldom wholly extinct in the most degraded races, the conviction that the soul does not perish with the body *may* have less to do with processes of reasoning than with intuition. Nevertheless, it is obvious that we cannot altogether exclude reason when we attempt to investigate the conclusions of the great thinkers of antiquity. Nor must we be surprised to find that materialistic fancies had much to do with those convictions. It is precisely these which are the subject of our present inquiry. We are examining that general theory of soul which was arrived at by the Greeks and Romans especially, from whom so large a share has descended to us in all our habits of thought. Investigators of

¹ For instance, the justice of God, the law of retribution, of which we have so many and such clear analogies on earth, the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Divine government if no future state exists, the conscience of man and his innate sense of responsibility, etc.

² On a topic which may seem uninviting to some readers, it has been thought advisable to limit quotations from the ancient authors to the smallest number that appeared necessary for illustration. The whole subject has been contracted and epitomized from the vast mass of doctrine that has come down to us. But it is believed that all the principal doctrines respecting the soul, and the reasons for them, have been at least touched upon in the present paper.

truth will not fear to pursue it, under whatever aspect it may present itself to their view.

They believed then that life or soul—which two things, it will be seen, they either identified or confounded¹—survived the mortal body which it had inhabited and animated, and passed into other states or forms of existence. The links in the chain of reasoning, from the æsthetic conceptions of prehistoric man to the subtle refinements of Plato and Aristotle, are apparently complete. And we shall feel surprised, on examining them, to find how little they will stand the test, we will not say of common sense, but certainly of scientific inquiry. Commencing from notions which were physically false, they built up theories which fail to satisfy any one who brings to bear upon them the knowledge of modern times. The reader of Lucretius is often struck by the combined ingenuity of his reasoning and the unsoundness of his data.

There can be no doubt that, to the Greek mind, *ψυχή* conveyed the notion of the source and cause of all spontaneous motion in its most extended sense. The famous passage in the *Phædrus* of Plato,² defining it as ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, “the source of motion,” includes in the term *life*, volition, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the impulses of mind and passion, the growth of everything organic, as well as the intelligent faculty both in gods and men, and even in creatures. Their acceptance of the word *soul* was, therefore, very different from our conception of it.³ The vegetative life of a cabbage was, with Aristotle, not less *ψυχή* than the intelligent reasonings of his own mind.⁴ We cannot wonder that Aristotle nowhere entertains the idea of *responsibility* as affecting the destiny of the soul, or that the Greek language itself is singularly deficient in terms expressing the abstract notion of *sin*. Neither he nor Plato, much as they praise virtue and justice, and often as Plato speaks of the evil effects of misdeeds and injustice on the soul, ever approached to the doctrine that “the wages of sin is death,”⁵ or contemplated the *loss* of the soul in any other light than as the extinction of the faculty of intelligence, φρόνησις. Nevertheless, the doctrines of a judgment and of retribution (τίσις) in the other world

¹ See, for instance, Plato, *Phædo*, p. 105, D; Lucretius, iii., 396–407.

² P. 245, D; compare Aristot., *De Anima*, i., 2, init.

³ The etymology of *soul* is obscure. It has been traced to a Celtic divinity of light, called *Sul*, who is mentioned on several of the Roman inscriptions found at Bath (the *Aquæ Solis*, perhaps by a corruption, through assimilation, from *Aquæ Sulis*).

⁴ He makes τὸ φυτικόν a part of ψυχή in *Eth. Nic.*, i., ch. 13.

⁵ From the comparatively few and slight allusions to the immortality of the soul, and the after-state of existence in the Old Testament, it seems clear that the Jews were more immediately concerned with God's dealings with man in this life. With the doctrine of the Resurrection, and the reunion of soul and body, the preparation for the life hereafter, in other words, the care of the soul, became the primary object of the early Christians.

were early inculcated in the schools of Orpheus and Pythagoras, more than five centuries before the Christian era. But the thinkers of antiquity, who claimed no divine revelation on this subject,¹ spoke and taught about the soul, its essence and its destiny, with a freedom and a speculative interest far exceeding that of those who accept the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as a revealed truth. By religious men generally all investigations as to the nature and existence of the soul are rather shunned than encouraged, as tending to freethinking, and as implying latent doubts if a life hereafter is a reality. But to the ancient philosopher, unfettered by a creed, and under no sense of *obligation* to believe, speculations on the essence of the soul were a perfectly legitimate ground for him to occupy. Hence Plato and Aristotle, followed by Cicero in the *Tusculan Disputations*, the first as an idealist, the second as a physicist, and Democritus and Epicurus, followed by Lucretius, as materialists, took the keenest interest in theories respecting the nature of the soul; whether it was an emanation from the Divine Mind, or a *ἀρμονία*, i. e., a sympathetic and mutually supporting condition of mind and body, or an *ἐντελέχεια*, an acting and efficient principle residing within us;² or whether, like the Homeric *εἰδωλα*, shadowy and unsubstantial and scarcely animate forms, it pined for the bodily vigor and the sensuous enjoyments it had left,³ or more abstracted and idealized, enjoyed pure *φρόνησις*, or intellectuality only when liberated from them. Others, arguing from the supposed passage of the sun under the world, speculated on an Elysium below, or cool and verdant islands (the "Isles of the Blest") on the confines of the world in the far west, where the Sun-god seemed to descend and have closer converse with beings on earth.⁴ The havoc made by volcanic fires and their outbreak from the depths of the earth suggested the material hell of fire and torture on which Plato speculates on physical principles in the *Phædo*.⁵ Some

¹ That is, beyond a general and rather vague reverence for Orpheus and Musæus as *inspired* to be the interpreters between the gods and man.

² "Quædam continuata motio et perennis," Cic. Tusc., i., § 22.

³ On this view, which very widely prevailed in the early world, and still does prevail among lower races, we can readily explain the offerings (both sacrifices and costly possessions) made to the tombs of heroes and chieftains. To propitiate a spirit which was believed to be capable of harm to the living, many horrible rites (including the Indian suttees, which are of great antiquity), were performed. With good reason Lucretius exclaims (i., 101), "Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum."

⁴ Hom. Od., iv., 563. Virg. Æn., vi., 641, "solemque suum, sua sidera norunt."

⁵ P. 113, B. It is thus he explains the existence of the infernal river *Pyriphlegethon*. From the above doctrines two practices became familiar to the early Christians, viz., the prayer for *light* for departed souls, and the use of the term "Gates of Hell" (*Αἵτου πύλαι*, occurring in Homer and the Greek tragic writers as well as in the New Testament), to express a material prison from which there is no escape. It is very remarkable that the Greeks, in common, we believe, with the whole Aryan race, had no notion

again, more inclined to mystic views, inculcated not only a judgment and a penal state, but long periods of probation in a triple life,¹ after which the soul might return to its God, and be absorbed in a blissful contemplation of the beatific vision, τὸ θεῖον μονοειδές,² a doctrine approaching very closely to, if not actually identical with, Christian teaching. Another school indulged in speculations more akin to those of Anaxagoras and the Ionic philosophers, and debated whether the soul, after leaving the body, was dispersed in air, and so became extinct as a separate and individual essence, or merely returned in its animated state, to rejoin the divine all-pervading ether from which it had emanated. The upholders of *metempsychosis* (the transmigration of souls³) believed that the soul passed through long cycles of human and bestial existence before its final absorption into the divinity. All these were moot points with the schools of Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus. Materialism was the basis of them all, and the many opinions cited by Aristotle in the second chapter of his first book *De Anima* (where blood, air, fire, water—even the motes dancing in a sunbeam—all have their advocates as the ἀρχαὶ or component principles of ψυχή), only show how mere guesses on subjects beyond their ken amused and occupied the minds of philosophers.⁴

It must be confessed, in contrast with ancient times, that people now trouble themselves very little with speculations on the nature and essence of soul. To think about it at all is probably the care of the few. We occupy the position of believers (as we persuade ourselves) rather than inquirers; we are content with the assumed fact that the soul is imperishable, though how far even this is a rational belief or an innate conviction, and not a mere traditional sentiment or educational opinion, must be, to those who look impartially at the general action of mankind, in itself a subject of a rather anxious inquiry. Do men, living as they live, believe in a soul, or do they merely acquiesce in a dogma which they can neither prove nor disprove?

Nor does it occur to many perhaps to wonder, that however illogical and incoherent are the popularly conceived notions about

of a personal Devil as a power of Evil. The Theogony of Hesiod contains many remarkable traditions respecting the prison-house of the souls in the nether world. Milton's conceptions, in his *Paradise Lost*, are perfectly pagan.

¹ Pind. Ol., ii., 68; Plato, *Phædr.*, p. 249, A.

² Plat. *Symp.*, p. 211, E.

³ When once the soul was believed, as the etymology of ψυχή implied, to consist of air, the notion easily followed that any human being or animal might draw, with its first breath, the seeds, as it were, of an invisible soul dispersed in the atmosphere.

⁴ The student of this subject will do well to refer to Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i., §§ 19–20, and especially to the third book of Lucretius.

soul, ghosts, spirits, angels, and demons, nay, even about heaven¹ and hell, and however made up, as some of them unquestionably are, of mixed materialism and pantheism, they are so easily and so uninquiringly acquiesced in. The fact is, to speculate at all on what the soul is, as an essence, or its destiny and the place of its abode, is manifestly vain and useless. Science, it is plain, ignores it altogether. Not, indeed, that it presumes to deny the possibility of its existence; but simply that it takes no cognizance of it, as a subject lying beyond human ken, and because it has no data to found any reasoning upon. But modern science would not, like the early thinkers, identify vitality with soul, or confound the merely vegetative with the responsible, the reasoning, and the intelligent. They made no real distinction between the *ψυχή* of man and of animals, in respect of what we now understand by an immortal existence. The only difference was, that man had reason, *λόγος*, which however was but the guiding principle of impulse, *ἐπιθυμία*, and in no way constituted of itself a title to a life hereafter.² But they clearly distinguished *mind* from *soul*, *i. e.*, will and intelligence from vitality.³ Now, with respect to physical life, science at the present day hardly hesitates to pronounce, approximately at least, what vitality *is*, though it does not pretend to account for either its origin or its existence, and still more is it powerless to produce it. A condition of matter capable of forming and energizing vital cells, and endowed with, or possessing, the special function of preserving and perpetuating the particular organism, is evidently not *soul* in the metaphysical and theological sense. On this point modern thought and Greek thought seem widely to diverge. Whatever we may think about *life*, we must be content to admit that no,

¹ The idea of heaven as a residence of the blest in the bright sky, does not prominently appear in Greek thought, and the first definite speculation about it is that in Plato's *Phædo*, p. 109, seq. The very primitive ideas of a firmament, or solid floor (the *ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς* of Hesiod, *Theog.*, 128), as a vault of heaven, of the residence of the gods on a bright mountain called Olympus, and of mortals having been carried up to the sky to live with the gods, have but little in common with the Christian hope of happiness in some other world or sphere of existence.

² Cic., *Tusc. Disp.*, i., § 80, "In bestiis animi sunt rationis expertes." Animals therefore had *animus* but not *mens* or *ratio*.

³ With the Greeks *νοῦς*, with the Romans *animus* were the *mental*, while *ψυχή* and *anima* were the *vital* principle. Thus *νοῦς* and *animus* are included in *ψυχή* and *anima*, as parts or manifestations of it (Lucret., iii., 136, 167, etc.). The division of *ψυχή* into the *ἄλογον* and the *λόγον ἔχον*, and the subdivisions of each are well known to the readers of Aristotle's *Ethics* (i., 13). Plato's fondness for abstractions predisposed him to accept the congenial pantheistic doctrine, as taught by Anaxagoras, of *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* pervading and animating as a subtle principle (something like our magnetism or electricity), all created matter. In fact, the law of electricity, like the law of gravitation, was only just missed by the intelligent and acute Greek philosophers. They felt that *life* was a state or condition of matter; but their inquiries were chiefly directed to the cause and origin of *motion* (the various kinds of *κίνησις*).

living being has, or possibly can have, the slightest conception of what his *soul* really is; yet we all take for granted that such a principle resides in us; and we equally assume that it does not exist in animals. We conclude too, that if the soul has any separate existence, it must be immortal; for we do not speculate as Plato does in the *Phædo*, on the possible modes and causes of its destruction, much less on its outlasting a certain number of human lives, and then becoming worn out and perishing by a natural decay.

The ancient thinkers, accordingly as they inclined to the physical or the metaphysical conception, took very different ideas of the state of the soul in another existence. The former, and doubtless the earliest, was that which pervades the Homeric poems, and appears to be adopted even by Aristotle, as the more probable,¹ viz., the materialistic notion of *εἰδωλα καρόντων*, shades half body and half spirit, in a feeble state of semi-vitality, and semi-consciousness.² They were bloodless, and it was only by quaffing blood at the tombs which they still haunted on earth, that they regained for a time the powers of motion and speech.³ The general notion of these ghosts or spirits was, that though the solid body had been consumed on the funeral pyre, an unsubstantial and outline form of it remained as the habitation of the soul, but if any one attempted to grasp or embrace it, it had no more reality than a dream. The soul itself could not be consumed, and therefore it escaped from the fire and flitted away into space.⁴

The other, which we may call the Platonic conception of the soul, was entirely different. The *ψυχή* of Plato was an isolated and intensified intelligence, existing somewhere in space apart from the body. It was a principle in reasoning man which had to undergo a discipline on earth, a gradual process of assimilation to the Divine mind, *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*, a training to become just and holy,⁵ and the one grand object and aspiration of which was to leave this earth pure and undefiled, *καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*.⁶ It was to get rid of all purely phenomenal perceptions, and all mortal longings and propensities; it was to shun the life of mere enjoyment, to employ itself solely on abstract truth, and to prepare itself by the ascetic and contemplative life, the *βίως θεωρητικὴ*, for the state in store for it after this transient existence.

¹ Eth. Nic., i., ch. xi. See Cic. Tusc. Disp., i., § 37.

² Il. xxiii., 103.

Ω πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἔστί καὶ εἶν' Αἴδαο δόμοισιν
Ψυχὴ καὶ εἰδωλον, ἅταρ φέμεν οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν.

³ Thus the ghosts in *Od.*, xi., 147, 390, etc., cannot address Ulysses till they have drunk blood.

⁴ Propertius, iv., 7, 2, "Luridaque evictos effugit umbra rogos." *Hom. Od.*, xi., 222, *ψυχὴ δ' ἡν' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται*.

⁵ *Plat. Theæt.*, p. 176, B.

⁶ *Plat. Phæd.*, pp. 65-7.

It is evident, that this is the Christian idea of the soul's destiny. And it is a question of profound interest, to what extent such a view, magnificent and almost perfect as it seems to be, is really due to Platonism, and how far Plato (or Socrates) had been enlightened to feel and declare the truth. His arguments in the *Phædo* to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on logical principles, are admitted to be a failure. He endeavored to bring within the province of reason a subject which is confessedly beyond and above it. But there can be no question that the doctrines of the *Phædo*, though really unsound, exercised an enormous influence on all future ages. It is equally a mistake not to recognize this, and uncandid not to acknowledge it.

Aristotle's reasonings about the soul, on the other hand, are mainly physical. It is as the cause and mainspring of life and action, that he discusses it; not as having an immortal destiny, or as an ethereal emanation with which the gross human body was in constant antagonism. Indeed, the materialism of popular notions about the soul, even in these days of science and inquiry, is very remarkable, and tends to show that in matters in which tangible data are unattainable, man's belief is far more traditional than reasoning. For instance, the received stories about ghosts generally turn on the muscular, *i. e.*, the material, power of walking, talking, pointing, beckoning, or some purely bodily act. Yet a ghost is defined to be a spirit, or a disembodied soul, or some inexplicable "wraith" or "double" of that human frame, which we know to have been deprived of all motive power, and to lie mouldering in the grave. We are constantly told, too, in these days of "spiritual manifestations," that "spirits" perform acts which only material bodies can ordinarily do. And when these are called "manifestations of force," it is not explained how *mere* force (*e. g.*, magnetism or electricity), apart from mind and brain-power, can exercise volition. We often hear in sermons, and read in religious books, or see in pictures, the most horrible accounts of the tortures of the wicked in hell. Precisely the same ideas are current on this subject among ordinarily educated persons, as would be suggested by a shocking description of human beings having their material bodies consumed in some great fire. They are absolutely identical with the sufferings of the damned in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. Compare also Plato, *Gorg.*, p. 525, C. The truth is, reason is never applied to subjects supposed to lie beyond reason's province, and hence conclusions positively nonsensical and opposed to reason, are accepted by many, from a vague fear of questioning the details of a traditional belief, which perhaps has nothing to commend it beyond the fact that it has come down to us from very ancient faiths, finds some apparent recognition in the probably figurative

language of Scripture, and has a sort of sanction from the vague ideas about the soul and its immortality that prevail under some form or other among all nations. "We are carried away by idle stories," says Euripides,¹ "because we have no experience of another life, and because what there is in the world below has not been revealed to us."

It appears, however, to the writer to be the duty of all who love truth to show the baselessness of opinions which are at once derogatory to the goodness of a beneficent Creator, and a source of disquiet to those who entertain them.² As the lives of the lowest savages are often made miserable by a constant dread of sorcery, or evil eye, or some unseen malignant agency, which they try to avert by some silly or cruel expedient, so those higher minds which cannot contemplate a future without the aid and adjunct of the gross mortal body and its sensibilities, are not less the victims of a degrading superstition.

Of all the notions about the soul none are so directly materialistic as the representations common in paintings and sculptures of the Middle Ages, in which the soul is seen issuing in the form of a naked infant from the mouth of a dying person, or conveyed to heaven by angels, or tortured by demons in hell, or contended for by groups of good and bad spirits, or even being weighed in a scale.³ We may well wonder that such notions were so long and so widely accepted by devout and intelligent minds.

In truth, the ordinary and popular notions about the soul have no coherency, and rest upon no logical basis. They are framed to suit the natural emotions of fear and hope with regard to the unseen, but they are so framed that our entire conception is derived from the phenomena of human life. It is on this principle, and on no other, that heaven is supposed to be above and hell below the earth. The brightness of the one and the darkness of the other form the ground of a belief much older than Christianity, which, in some degree, seems to sanction it, but which, in fact, took up the prevailing opinions on these subjects and made no attempt to change them.

It has been said that the existence of the soul must be inferred from the plain impossibility of permanently working any system of

¹ Hippol., 197.

² We have heard sermons on purgatory which we listened to with sorrow, and we have known young minds very unfavorably affected by these spiritual terrors, which represent the Almighty as either powerless to prevent or willing to permit worse than pagan atrocities. (See further, editorial note, immediately preceding Book Notices.)

³ This is a very ancient and purely pagan idea. Æschylus wrote a tragedy called *Ψυχοστασία*, in which the souls of Achilles and Memnon were weighed against each other by Jupiter in a pair of scales. We read of the balancing of fates in Il., viii., 72, and xxii., 212.

ethics formed with exclusive reference to the present life; and if there is a soul at all, it must be immortal, for otherwise it would not, as by the very hypothesis it must, essentially differ from the nature of the body.¹ With regard to the first position, it may be replied, that the sole basis of Aristotle's moral teaching, which was good and virtuous in its way, was happiness on earth and not happiness hereafter. He had no clear view, and probably no faith, in our continued existence in another world. Moral responsibility, or obedience to a divine law, he ignores, except so far as it means compliance with natural religion for our own good; and with regard to the second position, the immortality of the soul, the early Greeks did not assert it except on the pantheistic grounds of the imperishableness of the animating principle, *ψυχή*, which, as we shall see, they identified with air. Hence, we can understand the surprise expressed by an auditor of Plato's, who had undertaken to demonstrate the doctrine dialectically.² One of the arguments, a subtle rather than a sound one, is given in the tenth book of the Republic.³ "Have you not learned," I asked, "that our soul is immortal and never dies?" He looked at me, and said in amazement, "*No, really, I have not; but can you maintain this proposition?*" "Yes, as I am an honest man," I replied; "and I think you could also; it is quite easy to do it." The argument, stated in a compendious form, is as follows:

"A thing is destroyed only by a peculiar malady of its own, as iron by rust, wood by dry-rot; but rust does not destroy wood, nor dry-rot iron. But, if a thing is liable to a peculiar disease, which can only injure, but not destroy it, then that thing is imperishable, since no other evil is likely to destroy it if this cannot. Now injustice and intemperance do injure the soul, but they do not destroy it as they can the body. A direct cause of destruction differs from a remote one, as bad food may destroy the body indirectly by inducing some fatal disease. But the soul itself cannot be destroyed by bodily ailments, such as fever, or by violence, unless they make the soul more unjust or unholy. Therefore, the soul is immortal."

This is merely a specimen of the Platonic reasoning. It is, of course, impossible in a brief space to discuss the series of arguments in the *Phædo*. They, in fact, prove nothing, and leave the question just where it was before, and where to mortal intelligence it must ever be. It appears to us that the doctrine of the soul's immortality was a natural and even necessary deduction from Pantheism. Of course, it does not follow (as we have already re-

¹ Lucretius regards the soul as made of atoms as well as the body, and thence argues that both alike are perishable, iii., 417, etc.

² Plato himself probably received the doctrine from the Hierophants, with whom he conversed during his stay in Egypt. Struck by its novelty, its plausibility, and its deeply important and long chain of consequences, he embraced it with the ardor of an enthusiast. But the *Phædo* is the only work of his in which the argument of immortality is fully developed.

³ Pp. 608-10.

marked), that because Pantheists held it, therefore it could not in itself be true. There is, as Plato teaches, an *ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀνευ λόγου*, a right and true view, even when one does not give the right account of his grounds for holding it.¹ But the very number and diversity of the arguments employed by Plato in proving the doctrine show that he did not regard Pantheistic opinions as the sole ground and basis of it.

In those primitive times, when ideas were derived mainly from sensuous perceptions, a notion prevailed that all things, living and dead, were composed of four *elements*, or simple principles, *στοιχεῖα*, viz., earth, air, fire, and water. These were matters of actual observation. In animals, for instance, the flesh mouldered to *earth*, the vital warmth represented *fire*, the blood and other fluids, *water*, the breath, *air*, or rather, air, warmth, and moisture in combination. To all the elements, *i. e.*, to matter, the Pantheists attributed Divinity. The pervading and regulating mind (the *Νοῦς* of Anaxagoras), was conceived as a subtle ether, or *soul*, permeating all matter and distinct from mere intelligence. Nevertheless it so far was endowed with volition, that streams flowed and winds blew, the fire warmed, the sun, stars, and planets moved, or seemed to move, from some inherent faculty rather than from motion imparted from without. Another interpretation of the observed facts was sought in the law of *ἀνάγκη*, necessity; these things moved because they must.² The coarser and heavier matters, earth and water, they regarded as a residue, the effect of subsidence;³ the lighter, air and fire, by their own buoyancy rising to the top, according to Ovid's well-known lines :⁴

"Flamma petit altum, propior locus æra cepit,
Sederunt medio terra fretumque solo."

The highest of all, the *αἰθέρ*, or luminous air, was regarded as a vast magazine of perpetual heat and light, the *food* of the sun and stars and waxing moon, the source of all lightning and falling stars, and the bright abode of the gods. Hence it was *δῖος αἰθέρ*, and distinguished from *αἴρ*, the denser mists of earth.⁵ From *αἰθέρ*, as all warmth, so all life, mind, and intelligence were thought to emanate. It was *σεμνότατος*, the most holy and worshipful of the

¹ Thætet, p. 202.

² Plato, Republic, x., p. 616, C. The doctrine was probably Pythagorean; we find it in Æschylus, Prom. Vinc., 523-6, who makes Zeus himself unable to resist fate and necessity.

³ ὑποστάθμην or ὑπόστασις.

⁴ Fast., i., 109.

⁵ Æsch., Prom., 88, Plat. Phædo, p. 110; Lucret., v., 498, "inde mare, inde ær, inde æther ignifer ipse." Anaximenes, in saying that God was air (Cic. de Nat. Deor., i., § 26), appears not to have distinguished *αἴρ* from *αἰθέρ*. Zeno and Cleanthes, the Stoics, said that God was ether, Ibid., §§ 36-7.

elements, and βίωθρέμμων πάντων, the supporter of life in all organic things.¹ Since from it every creature derived its life.

"Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas."²

In other words of the same poet,³

"Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo Seminibus."

Fire, therefore, required to be brought down in its simple and uncompounded state for man's use; and this is what Prometheus is fabled to have done⁴ against the will of the gods, who regarded it as their own special prerogative.

Now vitality in animals was manifested by warmth and breath, *i.e.*, fire and air. Both phenomena ceased with death; but the cessation of breath was a more sudden and more sensible cause or result of death than the departure of warmth. Therefore, life was rather air than fire. The last gasp, or sigh, was not unnaturally regarded as the actual departure from the body of its vivifying influence, the air.⁵ The death agony was interpreted as a forcible tearing away, a withdrawal or expulsion of the ψυχῇ, or *anima*, from every part of the mortal frame, even from the extremities of the limbs; for in proportion as the union was intimate, so the dissolution was violent.⁶ Hence Lucretius speculates on life being a concentrated molecular force, which at death makes its exit, more or less, completely from the body; sometimes leaving behind it little particles of vitality, which, in their turn, become the vitalizing principle of the worms and maggots which succeed as possessors of the carcass.⁷ When Virgil tells us the absurd story of the grubs of bees being created from the putrefying body of a heifer,⁸ he repeats this idea precisely. The grubs are produced, because particles of *anima*, that is, of vital air, are left in the body, the creature having been killed by blows,⁹ and its mouth and nostrils having been sewn up, so as to include the "breath of life." Not very different is the

¹ Aristoph., Nub. 570.

² Virg. Georg., iv., 224.

³ Æn., vi, 730. Cicero, De Nat. Deor., i., § 27: "Pythagoras censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commentem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur."

⁴ He was said to have brought it from heaven, concealed in the pith of a dry fennel-stalk (νάρθηξ), a story, derived from the producing of fire by the friction of a piece of hard, dry wood upon another. The legend is expanded by Plato (Philebus, p. 29, A), to account for νοῦς and reason in man, as an emanation from the same celestial source.

⁵ Lucretius, iii., 232:

"Tenuis enim quæquam moribundos deserit aura
Mista vapore; vapor porro trahit æra secum,
Nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et ær."

⁶ Lucretius, iii., 587 seq.

⁷ Ibid., iii., 720.

⁸ Georgic, iv., 300, seq.

⁹ *Plagis perempto*. This was done from the notion that life or soul would make its escape through a fierce wound. See Hom. Il., xiv., 518: ψυχὴ δὲ κατ' οὐραμένην ὡτειλὴν ἴσσυτ' ἰπειρομένη. The heifer's hide was to be left whole (*integra pellis*) for the same purpose, to keep in the life, which they fancied could be detached from the vital organs, so as to render the body helpless.

speculation of Plato, that the soul becomes so imbruted with the body that it departs with sufficient of the corporeal essence adhering to it, to become visible to the eye like smoke or dust; and that hence dim forms of the departed are seen hovering over tombs,¹ the ghosts of those who have not practiced in life a complete isolation of the mental from the bodily faculties and desires, but have devoted too much thought and care to the pleasures of the senses.

The inference from all the disquisitions and theories of the ancient philosophers on *soul*, *ψυχή*, as well as from the names for it, *animus* (*anima*), allied to *ἀνεμος*, *ψυχή* (from *ψύχειν*, "to cool by fanning"), *πνεῦμα*, *spiritus*, is this, that they regarded it as *air*. Now, on the Pantheistic view, not only was the air divine, but it was pervaded by the divine mind, emanations from which gave the reasoning and prescient faculty implanted in human and even in animal bodies. Thus Cicero says:² "*Divinatio naturalis referenda est ad naturam Deorum, a qua, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos et libatos habemus; quumque omnia completa et referta sint aeterno sensu et mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri.*" Thus Virgil says that some attributed to the intelligent rooks, the *corvi*, a kind of heavenly mind and foreknowledge, and also to bees.³ The fear expressed by Cebes in the *Phædo*,⁴ lest the soul on departing should be dispersed in space like smoke or a puff of wind, turns entirely on this idea of the nature of soul, which was evidently a very primitive one. The air pervaded space, and space was pervaded by the divine mind; but the soul was air, and therefore the soul was both divine and eternal.

Our familiar use of the word *expire*, to part with the last breath, shows how natural is the idea that life ceases only with the departure of that which has been its cause and support. To conceive the muscular action of the chest and lungs becoming enfeebled, and therefore to explain their inability to inhale and exhale by the failing action of the brain and heart, was too scientific for the primitive mind, which reasoned only from æsthetic effects.⁵ If the air that appeared to be parted with at the last gasp could have been *seen* to be annihilated, as fire is seen to be put out, or moisture to be dried up, it may be doubted if the immortality of *ψυχή* would have been inferred at all. But air departing to air, and mixing with it

¹ *Phædo*, p. 81, D.

² *De Div.*, i., § 110.

³ *Georgic.*, i., 416; iv., 220. "*Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis et haustus Ætherios dixere.*"

⁴ Page 70, A. Similarly Lucretius, iii., 505: "*Cur eadem*" (*i. e.*, mind and soul), "*credis sine corpore in aere aperto Cum validis ventis ætatem degere posse.*"

⁵ *Cic. Tusc. Disp.*, i., § 40: "*Quæ quum constant, perspicuum debet esse, animos, quum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint animales, id est, spirabiles, sive ignei, in sublime ferri.*"

again, could not be regarded as perishable. If there is any element that can be conceived to be eternal, it is the air.

The next step in this primitive reasoning was a not less easy and natural one. As a portion of animating air (life or soul) entered each body at birth, so it continued, even when separated, to be the particular life of the individual. Hence the immortality of the soul was extended to the mind and memory¹ of each person, as a part of his *ψυχή*. Mind was eternal; but *mens cujusque est quisque*, it is his *mind* that really makes the individual.

Other speculations followed in the same train of thought, some of which are of the highest interest. It was felt that the soul could not rejoin its pure kindred *ἀιθήρ* with the foulness of mortality yet adhering to it. It must be purified; and fire was regarded as the element whose special province it was to consume and destroy all stains; "*omnia purgat edax ignis*," as Ovid has it. In a celebrated passage Virgil² describes the processes by which the disembodied souls are purged from their mortal stains. Some of them are hung up to be aired, much as we should treat fouled clothes; others are washed in water; others are scorched in the fire. But the soul was the life, and life is sentient; it could not, therefore, pass through the fire, especially with any remnants of mortality cleaving to it, without a feeling of pain. Hence the process came to be regarded as *penal*, and as something to be suffered after death.³ Although such a view is wonderfully coincident with the Catholic doctrine of purgatory, it yet essentially differs in this, that the purgation was regarded as materialistic, and had no direct relation to retribution for sin. The notion of *satisfaction* does indeed appear in some of the details of the myths concerning a final judgment in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* of Plato;⁴ but it appears to have

¹ One of Plato's arguments for the soul's immortality is that all knowledge is a recollection or reminiscence of what the soul knew in a former state of existence.

² *Æn.*, vi., 724. Compare *Phædo*, p. 114.

³ *Æn.*, vi., 739:

"Ergo exercentur poenis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendant."

Æn., 743:

"Quisque suos patimur manes."

Compare the words of the ghost in Hamlet:

"I am thy father's spirit,
Doomed for a certain term to walk the night,
And for the day confined to fast in fires,
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
Are burnt and purged away."

Plato *Gorg.*, p. 525, C., διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντες τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, where the *eternity* of hell's torments is asserted.

⁴ *Pp.*, 525, A, and 615, B. From the Pythagorean law: "The Doer must suffer," ὁρᾶσαντι παθεῖν (which *Æschylus* calls "a very ancient saying," *τριγέρον μῦθος*, in *Chœph.*, 306), naturally followed a doctrine of *τίσις*, and the idea of a debt to be paid hereafter. See *Eurip. Helen.*, 1013-1016.

occupied a subordinate place in the theology of the Greeks. Their ideas rather dwelt on a judge and a sentence, than on any process of expiation and recovery.¹

That space itself, and the worlds that it contained, were pervaded by mind, was, as we have remarked, a general opinion. It is repeatedly asserted, even by the Roman poets :

“ Principio cœlum et terras camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.”²

And this all-pervading mind was believed to be the source of animal life and instinct on earth. So far, the early thinkers were rather pantheists than mere materialists ; they did not know enough about the *brain* in its healthy and morbid conditions to regard it the cause, or centre, or instrument of intelligence as well as of feeling. From universal mind came both the mind and the life of individuals :

“ Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus.”³

The air, in fact, literally swarmed with *minds*, which had animated mortal bodies in all past time, had been given back by them at their decease, and were ever ready to be taken up by and into newly created organisms. “ Plenus aër est immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis apparent,” says Cicero.⁴ A difficulty here presented itself to the early thinkers, which pervades especially the arguments in the *Phædo* of Plato, and was strongly, not to say very powerfully, urged by Epicurus, who may be called the *Hume* of antiquity. How could *mere* minds or spirits, apart from matter, retain their intelligence ? “ Aperta simplexque mens nulla re adjuncta qua sentire possit, fugere intelligentiæ nostræ vim et notionem videtur.”⁵ Still, when once these floating and

¹ Yet Plato says in the *Gorgias* (p. 525, B), that “ those who have committed curable (*i. e.*, venial) sins are *benefited* by pains and suffering, both in this world and in Hades.” See also *Phædo*, p. 113, D.

² *Æn.* vi., 724. So Cicero, *De Div.*, i., § 17 :

“ Principio ætherio flammatus Jupiter igni
Vertitur et totum collustrat lumine mundum,
Menteque divina cælum terrasque petissit,
Quæ penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat.
Ætheris æterni septa atque inclusa cavernis.”

³ *Æn.*, vi., 728.

⁴ *De Div.*, i., § 64. Plato even says (*Republ.*, p. 611, A), that the number of living souls must ever be the same; for, if they are immortal none can perish, and if they are multiplied, it must be from some mortal source; and in this latter case everything eventually would become immortal. Lucretius applies the same reasoning to prove that his *atoms* are imperishable, and can neither increase nor decrease in number.

⁵ *De Nat. Deor.*, i., § 27. So Lucretius, *iii.*, 800: “ Quippe etenim mortale æterno jungere, et una Consentire putare et fungi mutua posse, Desipere est.”

immaterial *animulæ* were again taken into a body, the mental faculty would be at all events renewed. On this supposition turns the whole doctrine of *metempsychosis*. The life taken in by an animal might previously have inhabited a human body, and conversely.

“Errat, et illinc

Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus
Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo.”¹

Of course, if breath was life, and air was divine, it followed *ipso facto* that the soul was immortal. Air existed always and everywhere, and immortality and divinity were correlative ideas.

Soul, however, *per se*, as an *οὐσία* or essence, ever was, as it still is, a problem of which no solution can be given. The following passage from Aristotle² illustrates the bewilderment to which thinkers were reduced:

“Some say the soul is mingled with the universe; whence, perhaps, Thales thought that everything was full of gods. This, however, involves some doubts. How is it that the soul by *residing* in the air or the fire does not constitute a living creature, but yet does so in bodies mixed up with other elements, and seems even to be improved when in them? Or again, one might fairly inquire *why* the soul that is in the air is better, as being more immortal, than that in living creatures? Both of these propositions involve a paradox, for to call fire or air a living animal seems somewhat unreasonable, and to say it is *not* animal, if it contains soul, is also strange.”

Such, then, is the history of a doctrine, as traced from the early reasoners, which is still fondly and sentimentally embraced by many, that the air teems with good and bad spirits, ever hovering round us, and even able, as the “Spiritualists” tell us, to perform acts when summoned to do so, and to communicate knowledge in some mysterious and supernatural way.³ It is at once the doctrine of guardian and ministering angels, which it is hard to distinguish from the *δαιμόνια* of Plato⁴ and the Hesiodic notion⁵ of disembodied beings, the observers and the guardians of man, walking unseen over the earth, *ἡέρα ἐσσάμενοι πάντῃ φοιτῶντες ἐπ’ αἶαν*.

Passing on rapidly from this necessarily very imperfect sketch, we arrive at a subject full of profound interest,—the doctrine of *παρθενογένεσις*, or birth without the male, by the mere influence of *πνεῦμα*, *ἐπίπνοια*, or spirit, in a word, of spontaneous generation through air.

This is intimately allied to the view already explained, that all life (*ψυχὴ*) was air; but that creatures could be impregnated or

¹ Ovid, *Met.*, xv., 165.

² *De Anima*, lib. i., ad fin.

³ Without giving any opinion for or against the truth of “spiritual manifestations,” we may just remark that both the belief and the practice of it are identical with the narrative in the Eleventh Book of Homer’s *Odyssey*.

⁴ *Sympos.*, p. 202, E, *πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξὺ Ἰστί θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ*, etc.

⁵ *Op. et. Di.* 238.

made to produce young by breathing certain vitalized air was evidently an advance upon it.

It was observed that a bird would produce an egg, though a barren one, without the male. It was called *ἀνεμιαῖον*, "born of wind."¹ Thus, in the *Birds* of Aristophanes,² generation or creation out of nothing is expressed by this figure:

*Ερέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις
τίχτει πρότιστον ὑπηνέμιον Νύξ ἡ μελανόπτερος ὤν.*

The first appearance of life, therefore, was attributed to the impregnating influence of air stirring in the dark regions of chaos. This is very like the language of Scripture, "And the Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters,"³ as if ocean life, undoubtedly the first that existed on this planet, had been first imparted in this way. Still more remarkable is the ancient Egyptian doctrine recorded by Æschylus,⁴ and which some will regard not so much as a coincidence as a forecasting of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The virgin Io is said to have become pregnant with Epaphus without contact with the male, but by the *ἐπιπνοία* or "over-breathing" of Zeus, and elsewhere⁵ by the mere magic touch of his hand. In the sixteenth book of the *Iliad*,⁶ the immortal steeds of Achilles are described as born to the mare Swiftfoot (*Ποδάργη*) by the west wind. This might be thought a mere allegory to describe the speed of the horses, but there can be no doubt that the ancients believed in a real conception from wind. Virgil repeats the idea of the *west* wind being specially prolific, and he describes the mares as standing with their heads in that direction and inhaling the mountain breeze:

"Ore omnes versæ in zephyrum stant rupibus altis,
Exceptantque leves auras, et sæpe sine ullis
Conjugiis *vento gravida*, mirabile dictu,
Saxa per et scopulos et depressas convalles
Diffugiunt, non Eure tuos neque solis ad ortus,
In Boream Caurumque."⁷

The poet takes the range of the winds from north to south *by the west*, but he specially exempts those on the east. The reason

¹ This, of course, is the origin of our familiar term, "a wind egg." 2 695.

² Gen. i. 2. Aristotle (*De Anima*, i., ch. v.) quotes a dictum of Orpheus, or the *Ὀρφικά* *ἐπη*, to the effect that life enters by respiration, *τὴν φύχην ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσεῖναι ἀναπνεύοντων φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων*. To which Aristotle objects, that this does not suit the case of non-breathing plants and animals. Here his science seems to have been somewhat at fault.

³ Suppl., 18.

⁴ Prom. Vinc., 849, *ἐπαφῶν ἀταρβεῖ χειρὶ καὶ θιγῶν μόνον*. Compare St. Luke, i. 35: *Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ, καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι*.

⁵ 149-151.

⁷ Georg., iii., 272.

is evident; the north was the cool and refreshing, the east and southeast were the parching and blighting winds; the west, the wind of Spring, when all nature seemed to revive under its influence. Hence, in a very poetical passage in Ovid,¹ the goddess Flora is said to have been carried off as his not unwilling bride by Zephyrus; and Orithyia was in the same way made the sport of the more boisterous Boreas.² The north wind was believed to have a beneficial effect on vegetation. "Those fruit trees which are not forward," says Aristophanes,³ "want rain, and the *north wind to blow on them*" (ἐπιπνεῦσαι αὐτοῖς). In the *Medea* of Euripides,⁴ the goddess Cypris (Venus) is said "to draw moisture from the fair-flowing Cephissus, and to breathe over the country gentle and fragrant airs." Here, too, we have the idea of life being imparted by wind. It is the goddess of love and of prolific union which breathes them, and spreads the misty vapors instinct with life over the land. In a remarkable passage of Theocritus⁵ directions are given that the lower part of the sheafs should be turned by the reapers to the north or the west wind; "for thus," he says, "the ear gains in bulk." Where it is to be observed that the very same winds are mentioned which Virgil names as possessing a fertilizing property. Even after the corn was cut, the ear was thought to be improved by these winds blowing through and along the stalks.

Another extraordinary notion connected with air was the possibility of a human form or *wraith* being made out of it, with all the appearances of a real person, while nevertheless that real person was elsewhere at the time.⁶ Thus, Apollo makes an airy form (ἑδωλον) to imitate Æneas, and for the Greeks and Trojans to contend about, while the real Æneas is in the Trojan citadel.⁷ Euripides has followed a story (said to have been invented by Stesichorus, who had been struck with blindness for disparaging the character of Helen), that it was not the real Helen who went to Troy with Paris, but her "double," a semblance of her, or "dummy," created by Hera out of air.⁸ Again, in Pindar we read that Ixion had for his bride, instead of the goddess Hera, to the possession of whose hand he had presumptuously aspired, a sham Hera made of the air.⁹ When the same goddess, Hera (herself a representa-

¹ Fast., v., 201.

² Propertius, iii., 26, 51. Plato, Phædr., p. 229, B.

³ Vesp., 265. Hence in Homer (Il., xi., 256) a strong lance is ἀνεμοτρεφής, "wind-nourished."

⁴ 835.

⁵ Id., x., 46.

⁶ Modern superstitions about a person's *double* and "second sight" are connected with this.

⁷ Il., v., 449.

⁸ Eur. Hel., 34.

⁹ Pyth., ii., 35, νεφέλα παρελέξατο, ψεύδος γλυκὺ μετέπων.

tive of the air, or sky, in mythology), is jealous of the birth of the infant Dionysus to her faithless spouse from Semele, he deceives her by a substitute made of air being placed in her hands as a hostage for his future fidelity, the real Dionysus being handed over to the nymphs to be educated.¹

These details may appear uninteresting, and the narrative of them somewhat pedantic, but they are important as showing how universal was the belief of the close connection between *air* and *vitality*.

Of course, the tenuity and dispersive property of air gave rise to many an anxious doubt whether, once dismissed from the body, the soul could continue to exist. The grosser materialists, like Lucretius, alleged this as a positive proof that it could not. The idealists, like Plato, with whom soul was in great measure an abstraction, saw in the air theory a proof, rather of the subtlety, purity, divinity, imperishable nature, of soul. We cannot deny to Lucretius the credit of being a very shrewd thinker, nor can we deny that the difficulty he raises as to when and how, whether at the moment of coming into the world, or with the first faint motion of the yet unborn embryo, the soul joins the body and insinuates itself into it from without, is a real and a grave difficulty.²

We have avoided, as we stated at the outset, the appearance of mixing up these pagan speculations about the soul with Christian doctrine. And yet it seems very pertinent to remark that the minds of the first Christians were perfectly prepared, from their familiarity with the above views, and from their belief of the capability of air to assume visible forms, to attribute to *πνεῦμα* a reality and a sacredness which mere science has no conception of. We read that when Jesus was coming out of the Jordan, baptized by St. John, he saw the Spirit descending upon Him like a dove.³ In the Acts, the descent of the Spirit upon the assembled Apostles is described as "a sound from heaven as of a violent current of wind."⁴ Again, Jesus *breathed*⁵ on the Disciples, saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit." The miraculous walking on the sea, and the apparition of Jesus, "when the doors were shut,"⁶ appear to have been explained and accepted as the properties of a spiritual rather than of a material body.

It may reasonably be maintained, that the *Phædo* of Plato, in-consequent as it is as an argument for the immortality of the soul,

¹ Eurip. Bacch., 292.

² Lucret., iii., 777.

³ St. Mark i. 10, εἶδε—πρὸ Πνεύμα ὡσεὶ περισσεύον καταβαῖνον ἐπ' αὐτόν.

⁴ Ch. ii., 2, ἤχος ὥσπερ φερομένης πνοῆς βιαίτης.

⁵ John xx. 22, καὶ πούτο εἰπόν ἐνεφύσησε, etc. In this sense the Romans used the phrase *afflari numine*, Æn., vi., 50.

⁶ John xx. 19.

exercised a perceptible influence on the early Christian mind. It is vain to deny that the current ideas about the soul, as indeed about heaven and hell, are essentially Platonic. Subjects, so far removed from human experience, naturally take the direction which tradition and the sanction of great names have given them. Independent thinkers, always rare, are few indeed on a topic so mysterious and yet so momentous.

To attribute to the soul, thus impalpable and immaterial, memory and self-consciousness, with all their moral consequences, was a great step in advance, though one not strictly logical. Hence arose the triple division of the reasoning part of man into Mind, Spirit, and Soul. The *νοῦς*, or intellect proper, the Latin *animus* and *mens*, must, like memory, be regarded as inseparable from nerve and brain, *i. e.*, from bodily organization. No one now doubts, for instance, that an idiot has an imperfectly organized brain, though we do not know *how* it is physically deficient, nor that a clever man differs from a stupid man in the superior development of the organ of thought. Dreams also are easily explained as the energies of a living brain, but whether it alone, or in combination with some other faculty, constitutes the will, and suggests and originates thoughts, ideas, and aspirations, is more than we can say. No argument for the existence of a soul, based on the phenomena of dreams, is of any real weight.

“To sleep, perchance to dream, aye, there’s the rub,
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must make us pause.”¹

The same must be said of memory, or the faculty of recalling former impressions. Plato vainly attempts to build a theory upon this, when he contends that the acquisition of knowledge is only a recalling (*ἀνάμνησις*) of the sensations and experiences in a former and perhaps higher state of existence.²

A considerable portion of Plato’s varied speculations on the nature of soul consists in the assertions of its infinite preciousness, and the danger of its deterioration by vices, especially by injustice. The explanation of this is not difficult. The one great end and use and function of *φύλη* in man, here and hereafter, was *φρόνησις*, the intellectual enjoyment of the faculty of pure thought, of which truth or its synonym, the Divine Nature, *τὸ θεῖον*, was the subject-matter.³ The indulgence of the bodily was the impairing of the

¹ Shakspeare, in Hamlet’s soliloquy.

² Phædo, pp. 73 B—E 76 C, Meno, p. 81 C, 86 A, where the immortality of the soul is inferred from its faculty of recalling a knowledge which lies, as it were, dormant within it.

³ Phædo, p. 68 A, 84 B, *τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένῃ*.

spiritual, which was obfuscated, defiled, incapacitated by sensuality and the continuous pursuit of pleasure. Therefore the soul that has been brutalized by gross vice will never attain to perfect intelligence, *τελεία φρόνησις*.

The instinctive dread of *nililism*, or in theological language, the fear of a man losing his own soul, was partly due to the risk of losing *φρόνησις*, partly to the innate love of existence in any form.¹ And yet the *dreariness* of an enfeebled existence in the other world, apart from any notions of a penal state, was regarded by the ante-Platonic thinkers at least, as a terrible contrast with the enjoyment of a vigorous life under the bright sun. "I would rather," says Ajax in the *Odyssey*,² "be a serf on a farm than a king of all the dead." The higher philosophy, however, as we have explained, took into account the mental far more than the bodily part of man in contemplating the conditions of the after-life.

These views of the ethereal nature of the soul and the gross earthly nature of the body and its pleasures, suggested the duty and necessity of asceticism as a process of detaching, by a voluntary mortification, the soul from its converse with the body. Observing the fact, that any excess in diet tends to confuse the thoughts and dim the brightness of the intellect, the followers of Pythagoras came to the conclusion—a very erroneous one, as modern science teaches—that the more the body was starved, punished, and denied its natural cravings, the more clear and keen would the intellect become.³ The ancients, in fact, knew very little about brain-power and the nervous system. They did not, therefore, understand that if the body becomes debilitated the mental faculties, or what they regarded as the soul, will suffer. Yet there were some who thought that the vital principle (*ψυχή*) resided in the brain, as others found it in the movement of the blood,⁴ which was also the Jewish theory of life.

As a fact, the punishing of the body to any excess with a view to improve and isolate the mind proves, by its effects, not that the mind is independent of the body, but the very contrary, the inseparable connection and dependence of the one upon the other.

According to the hopes and aspirations for a better, or the fears for a worse life in another state, men labored to show that the soul was immortal, or, with Epicurus and the atomists, that it perished

¹ Cicero discusses this point in *Tusc. Disp.*, i., §§ 12–14.

² xi., 489.

³ Aristophanes, *Nub.*, 103, and Theocritus, *Id.*, xiv., 5, ridicule the pale-faced ascetics, who were said *Πυθαγορίζειν* and *ἀθανατίζειν*, and went about barefooted, like monks of the more severe orders. Socrates himself, though he could enjoy a dinner and drink more than most (*Plat. Symp.*, p. 176 C, 223 C) often went without shoes, and made a parade of his abstinence and poverty.

⁴ *Phædo*, p. 96 B.

with the body. Lucretius, the exponent of the materialistic creed, exults in the thought that he has liberated mankind from the most degrading fears and superstitions, by demonstrating that the soul is composed only of more subtle atoms than the body.

He treats everywhere with ridicule the doctrine of a soul surviving the body, and continuing to exist in another state. He regards the accounts of tortures and sufferings to be undergone in Hades as mere fables.¹

Cerberus et Furiae jam vero et lucis egestas,
Tartarus horrificos eructans fancibus aestus,
Hi neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto.

Even if, he says, there is a resurrection of the body, the history of our former lives can in no way affect us, since there has been a break in the continuity of self, an interruption between the former man and the new existence.²

The great passage at the end of the tenth book of the *Republic*, as well as that in the *Gorgias*,³ of Plato, may be called a *locus classicus* for the Platonic doctrine of Soul, and of a future judgment and penal purgation. The former concludes⁴ with a brief but very interesting account of the plain of Lethe and the waters of the river *Ἀμνηστis* (Care-naught), of which all the souls that have passed out of a former state of existence are compelled to drink before entering on the new life. In this perhaps we may recognize the Indian and Buddhistic doctrine of annihilation,⁵ or a total insensibility and indifference to all external impressions. As they speak of different degrees of this state, and of "perfect Nirvāna," it seems obvious to compare it with the *Lethe* of the Greek mythology, from which the souls "*Securos latices et longa oblivia potant*."⁶

Buddha, like Epicurus, is said to have been an *ātheist*. Yet he was the founder of a religion, or rather of a religious philosophy, which at the present day numbers more followers than the religion of Christ. Plato was, if anything, a pantheist,⁷ and Aristotle seems to have been of no religion at all. The expediences of the present life were the only moral law he appears to recognize. Strange

¹ iii., 1011. Ibid., 830, "Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum. Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur."

² "Interrupta semel cum sit repententia nostri," iii., 851. See Virg. *Æn.*, vi., 720, "iterum ad tarda reverti corpora."

³ Chaps. 79-82.

⁴ P. 621.

⁵ In Prof. Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i., essay xi., there is an interesting account of the state which the Buddhists call "Nirvāna." He describes it as a state in which nothing but self, or perhaps self-consciousness, is attained.

⁶ *Æn.*, vi., 715.

⁷ His *θεός* and *τὸ θεῖον* do not prove him to have been a monotheist. With him they were rather abstractions, *i. e.*, he saw "godness" in the universe, rather than God.

that godless philosophers should have written so much and speculated so deeply on the nature and existence of Soul; and more strange still, that their speculations should have exercised such an extraordinary influence over human thought in every succeeding age!"

THE BISMARCK OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Polemique sur le Pape Clement XIV. Lettres au Père Augustin Theiner.
Liège, 1853.

Defense de Clement XIV. et Réponse à l'Abbé Gioberti. Par J. Cretineau Joly. Paris: Mellier Frères, Libraire Religieuse, 1847.

BRIGHTLY broke the morning of All Saints on the city of Lisbon in 1755. The Portuguese capital was enjoying a holiday, and Portuguese devotion had lighted a thousand candles on the high altar of St. Paul's patriarchal church, and before the shrine of the national patron, Santo Antonio. The churches were full of worshippers and mockers; the nobles of King Joseph's court were there, and vine-dressers from Estremadura and the agents of the English manufacturing companies, and swarthy creoles from Goa and the Malabar coast. The epistle of the feast had been sung by the Sub-Deacon of the Mass; the veil had been lifted by the hand of St. John from the Holy of Holies, and the twelve tribes of Israel with the mark of God on their foreheads stood revealed to the eye of faith. God had set His mark on Lisbon too, and thirty thousand souls were to stand before His judgment throne before the sun went down. The commemoration of All Souls was to be anticipated by a day. The earth yawned, and while the shriek, "misericordia meu Dios," went up to heaven, a hecatomb of victims sank into the jaws of the gaping abyss. The bed of the Tagus heaved and shook off the sleeping waters, and from the broken fountains of the deep a deluge poured over the city. The miracle of the prophet Eliseus was renewed, and the anchors of the ships in the harbor floated for a moment on the tossing waves. Lisbon was prostrate, and over the ruins a mighty conflagration, kindled by countless lights in the churches and by bands of escaped criminals, swept all night, like the flames of the last judgment over the ruined

¹ St. Augustine, the chief exponent of the doctrine of Purgatory, must have been well acquainted with the Platonic myths and allegories.

world. The disaster that opened the earth beneath the feet of the inhabitants of Lisbon opened the hand and heart of charity. Among the ruins of churches and convents were offered sacrifices of mercy far more acceptable to God than even the blood that streamed on the altars when the Temple stood erect in its pride of place. Human sympathy and divine love looked more human and more divine, when side by side they labored as gravediggers among the marble tombs, or bestowed their tribute of tears and treasure on the thousands that had been made widows, and orphans, and beggars, by the earthquake, the flood, and the fire.

There were two men conspicuous among these heroes of charity, two men whose feet never wearied in their daily journeys through the wreck of the city, whose ears and hands were open to every tale of misery and prayer for relief. One was a tall, athletic, handsome noble, a little past his prime, with bright piercing eyes and kingly brow; the other was an octogenarian priest, with silver hair, and a spiritual face wrinkled with age and toil, and tanned by the climate of Brazil. The noble was Don Sebastian Joseph Carvalho Melho, Count of Oeyras and Marquis of Pombal, the priest was Gabriel de Malagrida of the Society of Jesus; one was the minister of Joseph Emmanuel I., King of Portugal, the other of Christ, King of kings.

Pombal's energy and zeal in the disastrous days of November, 1755, equalled those of his Jesuit assistant and future victim, Malagrida. It may have been piety, or pity, or policy, or a combination of the three, that turned the minister of state into a minister of charity, but let us in truth and justice give him the glory of his good deeds and raise one untarnished monument, on the ruins of Lisbon, to the memory of the man, who descended to the grave with the curses of a nation whom he had oppressed and the prayers of the Church which he had persecuted. His own house bravely stood the shock of the earthquake, and the partiality of his sovereign and friends accepted the fact as a proof that Pombal was the favorite of heaven and his works the works of God. "Then deify prostitution, Sire," exclaimed the cynical Count of Obidos, "for all the dens of the *Rua Lujá* have been as fortunate as Pombal's house." Carvalho was born in 1699 at Louva, a little town near Coimbra. His ancestors were a fiery-tempered marauding clan, who harried the country and laughed at the law. There was no help in Portugal for their victims, so they carried their appeal to heaven. On every Sunday, the parish priest recited, after the High Mass, three *Paters* for the deliverance of the villagers of the Oeyras from the fury of the Carvalhos.

Sebastian Joseph inherited the recklessness of right and the poverty of his family. He shed more blood with the weapons of cal-

umny and statecraft than all his freebooting progenitors had done with pistol or stiletto. A student, and then a soldier, he got disgusted with both school and camp, and became a courtier. He had a commanding presence, great talents, greater daring, and no principle, and with these strands woven into one thread, he flattered himself he could traverse the labyrinth of diplomacy as profitably and as gloriously as any man in Europe. He aspired to be the Carolingian majordomo of the Portuguese Merovingians, to be to John V. and Emmanuel I. what Richelieu had been to Louis XIII. of France, and Calderon to Philip IV. of Spain. Nor was his ambition greater than his abilities or success. The grandees opposed his advancement and refused to recognize his claims to nobility, but he soon overtopped the proudest heads in Portugal, and necks that were too stiff to bow to him were given over to the cord and the axe. Yet he waited long before Fortune showered her favors on him. King John V. did not love him, and the minister, Peter de Molto, honored the yet obscure minister with his distrust and hatred.

Carvalho attached himself to the service of the Queen Consort, Mary Ann, of Austria, and she, through friendship for his wife, her countrywoman, the Countess of Daun of Vienna, became his patron. The king, however, would not listen to her suit in his favor, and the would-be premier must needs abide his time. It came at length; John V. died, and on the high tide of the new sovereign's favor, the bark of Carvalho's fortune floated out boldly and gallantly on the sea of politics. Joseph Emmanuel became, on the 31st of July, 1750, his Most Faithful Majesty of Portugal. The Queen Mother was all-powerful and made her client Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The weak, suspicious, and voluptuous Joseph was soon caught in the meshes of ministerial intrigue. The royal puppet acted, but Carvalho pulled the strings. The king had the name and the honors of royalty, the secretary its reality. The affection of Queen Mary for the Countess blinded her to the faults of that lady's husband. Carvalho had to keep himself on his good behavior during the life of the amiable, yet too-confiding princess, and wear a lamb's face over a fox's brain and a wolf's heart. Mary Ann died in 1754, and Carvalho buried his mask and sheep's clothing in her grave. For twenty-three years he ruled Portugal. He was made Count Oeyras and Marquis of Pombal, the constant recipient of royal smiles and royal ducats, and the possessor of absolute power. Let us take a rapid glance at the state of Portugal, when its evil fate consigned it to the keeping of the Marquis de Pombal.

At the close of the fifteenth century, the illegitimate Burgundian line occupied the throne of Portugal. She was then in the heyday of her glory. The Cape of Good Hope had been discovered by Diaz in 1482, and doubled sixteen years after by Vasco de Gama.

Spain had discovered a world in the West, Portugal was mistress of the East. Her great viceroys, Almeida and Albuquerque, had carried her flag over Southern Hindostan and Ceylon, and it waved in undisputed sovereignty on the Indian Ocean, from Babelmandel to the Straits of Malacca. The riches of the East were raining into her lap in showers of pearl and gold, long before an Indian fugitive had discovered the mines of Potosi, or Cortez had rifled the halls of the Montezumas. The power of Venice, Genoa, and the Hanse towns was gone; Lisbon was the commercial capital of Western Europe. There was a Portuguese colony on the coast of Guinea, and Portuguese greed and daring more effectually excluded the competition in the negro and ivory trade of powerful rivals than the poisonous fevers of that ill-omened shore. John II., Emmanuel the Great, John III., and Sebastian, were the heroes of the fiery Burgundian race, and their names are still fondly cherished as mementos of a nation's glory, short-lived in its day and now gone forever. The bloody battle of Alcassar, fought in 1578, against the Moors in Africa, deprived Portugal of her dominion and her king. Sebastian was never seen after that disastrous day. The story of his reign ends on that battle-field, but like the Cid and King Arthur, his life has been immortalized in song. The royal line became extinct; patriotism died in the hearts of the people. Coldblooded tyranny and bigotry, such as the world has rarely seen, were enthroned in the palace of the magnificent Burgundian kings. Philip II. of Spain became, by conquest, King of Portugal. From 1580 to 1640 poor Portugal was linked in chains of iron to the huge, overgrown, and already decaying monarchy of Spain—corpse was tied to corpse. The Dutch pounced upon the Portuguese possessions in the East and conquered half of Brazil. The trade of Lisbon was ruined, her markets deserted, her colonists driven from Guinea, the last life-drops were oozing from Portugal's heart, beneath the talons of the Black Eagle of the Spanish Hapsburgs. The outraged nobility made a despairing effort. The example of William of Orange and the Netherlands was before them, to prove that a total eclipse was not impossible in the monarchy that boasted that the sun never set within her borders. The nobles placed on the throne the Duke of Braganza, under the title of John IV., and proclaimed their country's independence on the 1st of December, 1640. A quarter of a century of desultory warfare succeeded. Portugal made good by her sword, and the friendship of the European powers, the just claims of natural right. In 1668 she again took her place in the family of nations, and the House of Braganza became as royal as that of the Bourbons or the Stuarts. But the hopes of the Portuguese patriots soon died. They had shaken off the military yoke of Spain to put on their necks

the commercial yoke of England. Under the first Braganza king, a treaty of commerce had been made with England, and in 1703, the two nations were brought into closer unity by the diplomacy of the English ambassador at Lisbon, Mr. Methuen. Great Britain was promised a share in the newly discovered gold mines of Brazil, and she was not slow in availing herself of the commercial advantages thus secured to obtain a strong political foothold in the Peninsula. His Most Faithful Majesty became a dependent on the Cabinet of St. James. English commerce was transforming the Tagus into another Thames, and English manners were the glass of fashion in the saloons of Lisbon. The effete monarchy had better have died at once. The Portuguese race had degenerated; it was cumbering the land, and the great people of destiny, the Anglo-Saxon race, threatened to sweep it into the ocean. The nobility was beneath the level of that of France in the latter days of the old *régime*; it was composed of little nobodies, with empty heads and licentious hearts. The kings of the Braganza line were pigmies in all regal qualities beside their Burgundian ancestors. In a word, Portugal was politically in as bad a state as Italy has ever been. When the luxurious æsthetic civilization of the Romanic races of Southern Europe decays, corruption, like that of a luscious fruit in tropical climes, is quick and loathsome. These nations lack the stamina, the nerve, the backbone of the Northman and the mountaineer. Children of the sun, they bask in light and song and knightly deeds, but shiver to death in storms of national disaster. Their fiery hearts make them the creatures of impulse; their warm, imaginative brain is impatient of the cool deliberations of reason, a stranger to the wise slowness in resolve which has made the Saxon and the Norman races the soldiers and the statesmen of the world.

Such was the political state of Portugal when Pombal began his administration. In religion the country was Catholic. The Patriarchate of Lisbon was the rival in wealth, in ecclesiastical and political power, of the Archbishopric of Toledo, in the palmy days of Spain. Its jurisdiction extended to the colonies; the Patriarch's word was law in Goa and in Lisbon; the patronage of the Indian benefices was in his hands; his power was equal to that of the Patriarch of Constantinople under the Byzantine Emperors. His influence declined with the monarchy, and in the seventeenth century, when the Congregation of the Propaganda was established by Pope Urban VIII., the management of the ecclesiastical affairs of Hindostan was transferred, in great part, from Lisbon to Rome. The Patriarchate soon became an honorary title, its holder only the first bishop of a third-rate kingdom.

Besides the traditionary faith of the people and their devotion to

the See of Peter, there was one great element of vitality in the Portuguese Church. John II. of the Burgundian House was the first sovereign who patronized the Society of Jesus. The Portuguese ambassador in Rome requested from St. Ignatius, the general, missionaries for the Indian possessions of his master. The world knows the result. King John has the glory of having introduced St. Francis Xavier to his splendid career. The Spanish Jesuit won more realms for the crown of Portugal than the discoveries of Da Gama and the victories of Albuquerque. He traversed Hindostan from the coast of Malabar to that of Coromandel, and over the three thousand isles of the Empire of Japan, fell the shadows of the cross and the Portuguese flag.

One of the companions who were to accompany him to India, Simon Rodriguez, was detained by royal command at the court of Lisbon. He became the favorite preacher and confessor of the nobility. He shunned the dangerous honors that wooed him; they pursued and overtook him. His commanding talents won respect; his priestly and religious virtues made him loved. The ermine and the purple sought the companionship of the black robe; plumed and jewelled hats were veiled to his birettum. Rodriguez became a general favorite. The pure austerity of his life and teaching was always admired, sometimes followed by the nobles of King John's court. Thus began the intercourse of the Jesuits with Portugal and their influence in the councils of its kings. The confessors of the royal family were chosen from the days of King John II. to those of Pombal, from amongst the children of St. Ignatius, and for two hundred years the Jesuits had control of the spiritual interests of the Portuguese colonies.

By what right, it may be asked, do religious bodies take part in politics? They belong to heaven, politics to earth; to serve an earthly king is to neglect Heaven's King. You cannot serve two masters, God and Mammon. How could Rodriguez, or any other Jesuit, be both at once the Minister of the King of Portugal and the King of Angels? To such questions we reply, that princes, like other men, have or ought to have consciences. A Catholic prince, if he wishes to practice his religion, must have a keeper of the royal conscience, as well as of the Great Seal. The law of confession applies to him as to the beggar at his palace gate. His political acts are moral acts, good or bad, before the tribunal of his conscience and of God. The royal confessor reads the secrets of state, because he reads his penitent's conscience. His duty as a father, a judge, a physician, a teacher, confers on him a jurisdiction over the political morals of his spiritual child, as well as over his social morals. The prince, if not an autocrat, is bound equally by the laws of his country and the positive laws of God. To levy

unconstitutional taxes, or an unjust war, is not only treason against his people, but treason against God. All acts without exception, political included, are amenable to the inspection and judgment of the priest, as confessor. The minister of penance must, at times, interfere in politics, or betray his sacred trust. Such interference on the part of a royal confessor is unavoidably frequent. The less, however, the priest has to do with politics, outside of the tribunal of conscience, the better for himself and the laity. The respect he owes to his sacred character should keep him aloof from active participation in the intrigues of courts and the cabals of party. He transcends the limits of priestly power and priestly decorum, when he attempts to invest his private opinions with the sacredness of sacramental decisions, and to prop the sophisms of a tottering party with ponderous folios of canon law.

The kings of Portugal went to confession, the Jesuits were their confessors ; the Jesuits, by a logical process clear to every Catholic mind, acquired political influence. They may have aimed at times, in some European courts, at becoming ministers of state, at ruling in the royal council, as well as in the sanctuary of the royal chapel. Such men knew not of what spirit they were ; St. Ignatius would never have acknowledged them as the legitimate offspring of his order.

The Jesuits could not have maintained their post for two hundred years in the Braganza court and escaped the assaults of envious, and in some cases, of patriotic tongues. Never has the pure lustre of the Society's fame as a body been tarnished, but it would have been a miracle, if for two hundred years, all the successors of Rodriguez at Lisbon had been as prudent as St. Ignatius, or as humble as St. Francis Borgia. It is no reproach to their memory to say that they were men. If Homer sometimes sleeps, the devoted priest, the unworldly religious may occasionally slip with the tongue. Zeal is a restive animal ; it needs the strong bit of prudence. Its overflow may stream through the grating of the confessional, and abandoning its natural channel in the sacrament, flood the council chamber. It is not impossible, nay, very probable, that some Portuguese Jesuits used their influence for political purposes. Those purposes were, without exception, honorable, but not always expedient, adapted to the needs of a theocratic state, but not of a Christian monarchy. When churchmen turn statesmen, a double danger arises to society ; either the state will be ruled as a theocracy, or the Church administered as a mere civil polity. Both alternatives are heresies in logic and theology. The State or the secular order is not theocratic since the abrogation of the Jewish law ; the Church is a divine as well as a human kingdom. It were desirable perhaps that all governments were theocratic, that the subordination of the civil to the

spiritual were universal and absolute. The case is not so. Secular society, since the Reformation, insists on its independence as secular. It is subordinate, because the sphere in which it moves is subordinate, but in that sphere it is self-dependent. The State insists in civil matters on its freedom from ecclesiastical control, from ecclesiastical interference. That interference may be suggested by the purest motives, but as a fact, the State resents it as an impudence. "You will not allow me into the sanctuary," says the State to the Church; "why then do you seek to usurp a place in my legislature or judiciary? In purely spiritual matters, I am your child and subject; in those that are mixed, in which the interests of both of us are concerned, we must take counsel together, the chair of honor and authority being reserved for you; but in interests purely civil, the only jurisdiction you can rightly exercise over me, is through my individual members in the sacrament of penance. But in the face of the world and of God, in my own domain, I stand on my own rights and will defend them to the death."

Public opinion from the middle of the eighteenth century, the period of which we write, set with a steady tide against the employment of churchmen in state affairs. The opinion we admit had its root in a pernicious error. The Reformation was working itself out to its logical conclusions. The naturalists of the last century, under the different names of encyclopedists, illuminés, philosophers, etc., asserted not only the distinction and separation between Church and State, but the absolute irresponsibility of the latter. In truth, it was only the civil element of society that they admitted. The spiritual, the sacerdotal, went by the board, because the teachers of the new doctrine were either Atheists or Deists. Here was the error. Starting from this false premise, they waged an indiscriminate war against the priesthood, and against the Jesuits, as the flower of the priesthood. We have all heard a hundred times the couplet of Diderot,—

"Et des boyaux du dernier prêtre
Serrez le cou du dernier roi."

It is an epitome of the revolutionary gospel done into verse. Not only was the priesthood excluded from politics, a measure which the honor and the interest of the Church called for, but from the sanctuary. The altar and the minister, the shrine and the worshipper, were alike doomed. Religion was a superstition of the past, a myth of mediæval darkness.

The Revolution, in its outstart, saw itself face to face with the Jesuits. A dark, black phalanx arose before it, mighty in number, firm as an ocean-imbedded rock. There were clear, swift-throbbing brains beneath the black caps, and fiery hearts beneath the black

habits of St. Ignatius. They could die; they could not be conquered. The world was their battle-field; the trophies of their victories over the world were in the Church of the Gesu at Rome. Paraguay and China, Canada and Japan, were red with their blood and wet with their tears. They were all-potent at Rome; they knew the cabinet secrets of Europe, and thousands hung upon their words in the halls of the universities. They were astronomers and poets, historians and musicians, chemists and theologians, preachers, professors, confessors, diplomatists, and, more powerful than all, men of God, ready to battle for God, and to die for God and His Church. They were in truth the right arm of the Church, the Janizaries and Zouaves of the Pope, attached to his See with enthusiastic devotion and romantic love. They were to the Pontiff, what the Scottish Archer Guard was to the French kings, from St. Louis to the Regent, Philip of Orleans. The papacy was the defensive, the divinely passive element of the Church; the Jesuits, the aggressive, the propagandist. "Down with the Society!" was of necessity one of the great shibboleths of the infidelity of the age. If individual members were guilty of indiscretions in commerce and politics, their faults were fathered on the Society; the Society must be destroyed. The throne and the altar could be overturned only on the ruins of the Society. From the days of Port Royal to the days of the National Convention, European history, the fate of Christian Europe, hung on the issue of the duel between the Jesuits and the Philosophers. The Society fell, fell with honor, with its face to the foe, its flag unsullied and bloody, clutched in the death-grip of the last of its Generals, Lorenzo de Ricci. The Revolution triumphed, and celebrated its triumph in an orgie of blood.

Carvalho, Marquis of Pombal, prime minister of Joseph Emmanuel of Portugal, was a representative man of his age. His creed consisted of one article, "I believe in England, political and ecclesiastical." He had studied the British constitution during an embassy to England under the preceding reign. He fell in love with it, as did Guizot, as did Montalembert. It is a masterpiece, and well would it have fared with England's fair fame, if her practice had always conformed to the theory of her matchless constitution. But in the enthusiasm of his admiration, Carvalho forgot that Portugal is not England. Greater statesmen than he have fallen into a like mistake. England, with her king, lords, and commons, that triple blending and counterpoise of all the elements of human government, was great and happy, because she was England. Her constitution had grown with her growth and strengthened with her strength. It suited the genius of the people, because they were Anglo-Saxons; and the Anglo-Saxons were from the time that the

light of history breaks upon them, in the gloom of the German forests, a liberty-loving and law-abiding people. The Southern or Romanic races have become hopelessly degenerate; they are the representatives of those tribes into whose veins a too large infusion of Roman blood was introduced. And that blood, at the time of the Barbarian conquests, was the green, poisonous blood of a putrescent corpse.

Carvalho wished to anglicize his country. The thought was that of a patriot, its execution betokened a fool or a despot. No man can blame his project, no lover of liberty, no respecter of rights, can approve his deeds. We defy an educated Portuguese, or Italian, to contemplate the state of his country a hundred years ago, to contemplate it now, and to repress the swellings of bitter sorrow and of burning anger. Voluptuous courts ruled by crowned fools and debauchees, a prime minister orientally despotic, a demoralized people, half conspirators, half slaves, the beauty of the Church, the Immaculate Spouse of God, hidden by the foul garment of political leprosy cast over her shackled limbs, as they were dragged along in lingering agony, chained to the wheels of the royal chariot. God knows that the Church was not responsible for this deep disgrace, this crushing misery. What could she do? Her spirit was free but her mouth was gagged, and manacles clanked in harsh, grinding dissonance upon her stately form. What wonder that when the crash came, she went down for awhile with the rotten thrones to which she was chained. The pure blood of her virgin breast flowed over the ruins of society, and, like the blood of Christ, it sanctified and saved, and from the crimson sea the spirit of Christian liberty emerged. For God's sake, let us be done with the suicidal folly of saddling the Church with the imbecility and tyranny of Hapsburgian or Bourbon, Braganzian or Stuart! Admit the fact; the damning evidence of which is written on every page of European history, that the Southern nations are politically demoralized. Italian lazzaroni and Portuguese and Spanish matadors can save their souls. We know it, we rejoice at it, for are they not our brethren in faith and charity? The Church is a soul-saving institution. Her kingdom is not of this earth. With politics, with progress in science and art, she has no concern, except as they help or impede the fulfilment of her mission. Her children may be clothed in rags; what matters it to her, if their souls are clothed with Christ. Her children may be ignorant of worldly lore, unskilled in worldly pursuits; what matters it to her, if they know their catechism, and are skilled in the exercises of a Christian life? Blame her for the backwardness of Romanic civilization, when you blame the American Constitution for not making all Congressmen observe the Decalogue.

Portugal was ruined; the fault was partly that of the government, partly that of the national character. The errors of the last of the Burgundian line, the tyranny of the Spanish rule, the inefficiency of the House of Braganza, would singly have ruined a greater state than Portugal. Combined they crushed the hapless Lusitanian peninsula to the dust. Then, as we have said, we must look at the character of the people. We are firm believers in the mission of races; deny it and you ignore history. The Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans, were the representative tribes of the ancient world; the Anglo-Saxon, or more properly the Saxon-Norman, the main branch of the great Teutonic family, is the representative of the new civilization. It was not in the Persian to do what the Greek did; the Gods had not given to Carthage the mission that they gave to Rome. When Greek civilization crossed the Hellespont with Alexander of Macedon, it was marching in splendid triumph to its funeral pyre. Asia was not Hellenized, but Greece was Mediized—Japhetic arms triumphed over Semitic voluptuousness, but Semitic voluptuousness triumphed over the intellect of the son of Japhet. The successors of Alexander became Persian satraps; the warrior was metamorphosed into the despot, the camp into the harem. So ended the mission of Greece. Her literature and her corruption were bequeathed to Rome, and the Romanic races have inherited both. The genius of empire went out of the family, as a legacy to the soldiers of Hermann, the Teuton.

The task that Carvalho undertook was hopeless. First let him blot out two hundred years of Portuguese history, then let him create a new heart and a new brain in his people. Till then, a Portuguese constitution on the English plan were a Utopian dream. Do we despair then, the reader may ask, of the regeneration of a fallen race? Is the resurrection of a nation in our own day a dream as fair and false as the resurrection of Portugal a century ago? Terrible are the throes of a new nation's birth, and hateful crimes of every form against God and man hover with foul wings over the cradle of infant liberty. What is it but another phase of the daily phenomenon of good and evil in deadly contest? Every wheat-field has it tares, every fisher's net its draught of useless spawn. Sin clings to the new-born nation, as to the new-born babe. Both come into the world children of wrath, with the brand of iniquity on their foreheads. Then comes the baptism of heaven, and the soul of the Christian child and the soul of the Christian state, are spotless and free, with the freedom wherewith Christ has made them free.

France is born again, and have not the odds against her restoration to the vacant throne in the hierarchy of nations been fully as great as those against the Portugal of 1754? There are sudden changes in the history of nations beyond the calculation of all

human forethought, and opposed to the evidence of all the precedents of the past. The dry bones of a dead race, mighty in its day, lie white and ghastly on the field before us. The spirit of God breathes, and the voice of God speaks, and the bones arise and join, and the flesh covers them, and the nation lives. These political resurrections occur at rare intervals in the chronicles of the world. They are miracles, and when we see them, we cry out, "The finger of God is here!" So might it have been with Portugal; so was it not. So may it be with Italy; let us hope that so will it be.

But reason and experience combine to teach us, that in the ordinary course of human events, no nation can be free until it has been educated for freedom. Loosen suddenly the bonds of despotism from a nation of slaves, and let liberty, in radiant youth and beauty, offer herself to their embraces; they turn on her and tear her, and before a horror-stricken world, the hideous farce is played of licentious anarchy, flaunting in the bloody robes of slaughtered freedom. The English colonies in America were taught, by their two centuries of battle with forest land and Indian, the stern lesson of self-reliance. Their antecedents in the mother country were republican. Deniers of the divine right of Tudor and Stuart to tyrannize; deniers of the divine right of a man-made Church to dictate to conscience, they came to the new world exiles of freedom, bearing with them all the elements of liberal government. Their severance from England was not a violent break with the past; no violent bending of national habit from the direction of its natural growth. The colonies fell from the parent state, as the luscious over-ripe fruit falls from the parent tree. Not so with Portugal. Nothing in Portuguese character or Portuguese habit warranted a statesman in attempting to transform the swarthy Lusitanian fig-consumer and wine-drinker, into the jolly red-faced English beef-eater and porter-drinker. It would require ages of schooling to Anglicize Portugal or any country of the Romanic race. Slow and unpromising at first would be the growth of the seed of English-sown institutions in its soil, and faint the hope of ever seeing it aught else than a puny, sickly tree. You must train the child for its future profession; you must educate the nation for liberty. And as on the tougher, slower-working brain of middle life or age it is harder to imprint the lessons of science or art than on the tender, pliant brain of youth, so for a nation grown gray in slavery or anarchy, with limbs either stiffened and corroded with chains, or unused through long and unbridled license to any yoke, it is hard, we may say impossible, to teach it to mark the vaguely defined boundary line between the domains of freedom and those of despotism or lawlessness. The past presents us with scarcely an instance in which the task has been accomplished.

Carvalho's faith, we have said, was, "I believe in England, in State and Church." He determined to nationalize the Church of Portugal, to make the Patriarch of Lisbon another Archbishop of Canterbury, and himself another Thomas Cromwell. He was to be the lay Vicar-General of the Portuguese Henry VIII. To break with Rome and destroy the Jesuits were the two cardinal points of his ecclesiastical policy. Let us see how he fared. To use and then destroy the Society was his plan. On the accession of Joseph to the throne in 1750, Carvalho won the confidence of Father Moreira, the royal confessor, and not only his, but that of all the Jesuits in Portugal. The executioner fawned upon his unsuspecting victims. He stood high in the esteem of the Society; he was its friend, its patron; one of his sons had been clothed with the habit of the Order; in protecting it, he protected the spiritual mother of his own child. Moreira's influence secured the aspiring courtier the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. He was on the highroad to power. He became Marquis de Pombal and Prime Minister of Portugal. He had reached his goal; he was on the top of the ladder; he kicked away the rounds by which he had mounted, and none more readily than the Jesuits.

Joseph I. was as suspicious as effete princes are wont to be. Pombal knew it, and played upon the monarch's fears. He hinted to him that his brother Don Pedro, was intriguing against the throne, and that the Jesuits were the soul of the intrigue. Did Don Joseph relax from the cares of state in the pleasures of literature, Don Sebastian Carvalho put in his way the thousand and one libels against the Society that were fluttering over Europe. The wily minister mysteriously enjoined an inviolate silence on the royal student. These books, he said, were the revelations of iniquities as great as those of the Templars; they contained the secrets of the Freemasons and Rosicrucians of the Church. Who knows but that the dagger or poison might be the reward of the master and pupil if discovered by the Jesuits in such occult studies! A Dominican's knife had once reached the heart of a French king. Might not some fanatical disciple of Loyola vie, in murderous skill, with the disciple of Dominic, as he had already tilted with him in many a fierce theological tournament? "Stolen waters are sweet." The king was pleased with his books; fear and hate of the Society succeeded in his heart to curiosity and suspicion. Lampoons in verse and prose, historic lies, romantic lies against the Jesuits were scattered broadcast over Portugal. The dragon's teeth were sown; Pombal waited to see the armed ministers of his vengeance spring from the ground. The mine was dug, the train laid, the slow match burning.

Ballister and Fonseca were the first fathers honored with exile.

The first was accused of attacking in the pulpit one of the pet schemes of Pombal; the second had in conversation censured, as ruinous to the country, one of the minister's financial projects. Then came the earthquake, and a splendid exhibition of the devotion of the Jesuits to the dead and the living. For awhile, they rode on the high tide of popular favor, and Pombal had to defer his vengeance. The two exiles were recalled, and one of the heroes of the calamity, Gabriel de Malagrida, was rewarded with the confidence of the monarch. Joseph was penitent for his suspicions of the Society, and betook himself, as Louis XI. of France was wont to do, to one of the refuges of a little mind and a cold heart, fantastic piety. The danger was over, and the royal heart ceased quaking at the end of the earthquake. Pombal resumed his ascendancy, and Malagrida was banished. The minister adhered to the line which he had from the beginning marked out for himself in regard to the Society. He believed in the adage, give a dog a bad name and then hang him. Calumny, he knew, was the shortest road to exile, the prison, and the scaffold. He determined to make himself master of the Jesuits' fame; he would soon become master of their property and persons. With the daring of the old Roman, he carried the war into Africa; he attacked the Society in its South American stronghold.

The Reductions of Paraguay were the glory of the Society and the wonder of the world. The Jesuit was all in all to the simple children of nature; they revered him as their priest, obeyed him as their ruler, loved him as their father. The golden age had returned; there was an Eden on the savannas around Cape Horn. A Portuguese serpent entered the garden and Paradise was lost.

Paraguay belonged, at this time, to Spain. The Portuguese governor of Rio Janeiro, Gomez D'Andrada, thought to make his fortune and fame by negotiating an exchange between the two crowns. The Portuguese colony of Del San Sacramento, on the Rio de la Plata, was fair and fertile; Spanish Uruguay and Paraguay were bleak and sterile, but rumor said that veins of gold throbbed beneath their barren breasts. And rumor said more, that the Jesuits were the genii of the mines, which they jealously guarded from mortal gaze. The transfer was effected; Spain got a rich district; Portugal a barren El Dorado. The mines were to be worked; the neophytes of the Jesuits were in the way; they might give trouble, if their golden domain were invaded; they were to be sent out of the country. The evictions of Donegal and the Scottish Highlands were anticipated. We have seen in our day whole clans swept from the soil to make way for sheep. British peers may claim the merit of effective execution; the originality of the design is not theirs; they must bow to the superior fertility of

Spanish and Portuguese genius. D'Andrada did not want sheep-walks but gold diggings; he decreed, with the consent of the Cabinet, that thirty thousand human beings, as so much rubbish, should be cleared from the surface of the gold-laden soil. The Reductions were to be broken up, the guileless neophytes sent adrift upon the world.

A shudder of fear, a hoarse murmur of indignation ran through the tribes. A nation was outraged. The Indians were Christians, but they were men, they were patriots; they could believe in no gospel that taught them it was a sin to love liberty more than life. They thought the heart's blood was not too dear a price for some thousand miles of barren land. That barren land was the Indian country. He had tilled it in the sweat of his brow; he was ready to till it with the sweat of a gashed bosom. There were rumors of resistance, and D'Andrada began to fear that he had disturbed a hornet's nest. All eyes were turned to the Jesuits; they were the only bridge that could span the yawning gulf between the natives and their conquerors. The Indians called on them for protection, for support. Scylla and Charybdis yawned on either side. The trembling hands of the miserable neophytes clung to the black robes of their fathers; the half sorrowful, half reproachful gaze of their dark eyes sank into those fathers' hearts. On the other hand appeared the frown and menace of Portuguese diplomacy and the destruction of the Society. The feelings of the fathers were of necessity with their children, their judgment precluded the hope of successful resistance. The Indians might struggle for awhile, but their struggle would end in extermination. To oppose the Crown would bring ruin on the Society, and it could not save the Reductions.

The path of duty was plain, though painful; to console the broken hearts they could not heal, to teach patience when they could not counsel resistance. Devoted to the last, the faithful neophyte bowed and said, "My father, I follow thee." The Jesuit took his hand and led him from his home, and mingled his tears with his. The work was done, and done in peace, by the Jesuits, loyal alike to their flock and their king. But they had compassionated the fate of the exiles; they had condemned in thought and feeling the policy and mildness of Portuguese legislation. They were disguised traitors, and merited the traitor's fate. Before being destroyed, they were to be deprived of the solace of their neophytes' affection. The agents of the government fomented the suspicions which some of the Indians began to entertain of the disinterestedness of their spiritual teachers. Calumny was found as potent in the forests of the New World as in the saloons of Europe. From suspicion to hatred, from hatred to war, the prog-

ress is rapid in the Indian heart. Some of the tribes refused to submit to the peaceful counsels of the Black Robes. They took up arms against the Portuguese gold-seekers. The Reductions were destroyed, the tribes scattered, the Jesuits expelled. The slow fever of corruption set in. The money, and liquor, and immorality of the taskmasters completed the demoralization of the slaves. If the Indians of South America were not swept into the ocean, as they have been on the northern part of the continent, their fate was perhaps more melancholy. The hidalgos and cavaliers of the Old World intermarried, in large numbers, with the natives, and their offspring have perpetuated the fused vices with scarcely a single virtue of the Indian and European. A deadly blight rests on lands fair as any the sun shines upon. Mexico and South America will remain hideous caricatures of government until a sceptre is stretched over them from across the ocean, or the "race of manifest destiny" pushes its conquests to the Horn.

The coast was now clear, and D'Andrada set to work. To his disappointment and disgust, he found that the bowels of the earth were as destitute of gold as its surface was of inhabitants. Science came to his aid, but its light, like the light of his dreams, expired in the dark caverns of a barren soil. He invoked the Jesuits, but, unfortunately for the adventurer, they had not the philosopher's stone; they could not change sand into gold dust, nor rocks into bullion. In the agony of his shame and sorrow, D'Andrada confessed to Pombal, the would-be Vicar-general of Portugal, the ruin of his schemes, the injury that he had unwittingly done to his country in trading away the land of San Sacramento for mines which existed only in his own brain.

Pombal was not done with Paraguay yet. His acts, like those of a celebrated personage of our own day, cast their shadows before, and the shadow was a pamphlet: *An Account of the Republic, which the Jesuits of the Provinces of Portugal have established in the Colonies, and of the War which they have there excited against the Armies of the Crowns of Spain and Portugal*. Such was the title of the interesting novel to which Pombal put his name—European fame for the patron, European infamy for the actors in the romance were the expected results of this literary enterprise. The Jesuits, the pamphlet stated, were the tyrants of the New World; they had attempted, not long before, to unite the colonies of South America into one sovereign empire, under the sceptre of a lay-brother, who was to be, by the grace of God and the favor of the Society of Jesus, Nicholas I. The Jesuits were ambitious; the Jesuits were covetous; the Jesuits violated the canons of the Church; the Jesuits were conspirators; the Jesuits were enemies to God and the king. These were the variations of the grand theme: "The Jesuits must be de-

stroyed." Pombal scattered his book over the Peninsula as lavishly as Mr. Borrow did his bibles a century later. It was read in Lisbon; it was burnt by the public executioner in Madrid.

Ferdinand VI. and Charles III. of Spain were informed by Don Levalos, governor of Paraguay, of glaring contradictions between the facts in America and the book in Portugal. The governor had gone out from Spain breathing vengeance against the Emperor Nicholas. He found that he had not begun his reign, and that there was little prospect of his doing so before the Greek kalends. He discovered no Jesuit empire, but a stupendous Portuguese lie. He found, in the words of a report of his proceedings, drawn up in 1815 by Francisco Gutierrez de la Huerta, a submissive people and loyal missionaries; he found conquests made for religion and the state by the mildness and charity and holy lives of the disciples of St. Ignatius. Levalos attempted, but in vain, to bring back the palmy days of Paraguay. Its golden age ceased with the gold digging of Gomez D'Andrada, never to return. The neophytes were not what they had been ten years before. Portuguese traders had robbed them of their country and innocence together, had driven them alike from their God and their home.

Pombal had expected war to the knife with the Society when he struck at the missions of South America. He was surprised and delighted to find the Jesuits the tractable ministers of his iniquitous policy. He attributed to cowardice a line of conduct which prudence and duty had prescribed. His hopes of success culminated; he wielded a weapon which his adversaries could not use, falsehood. His campaign in the New World had closed triumphantly, and he resolved to transfer the war to Europe.

Benedict XIV. was now Pope. As Cardinal Lambertini he had acquired a European name. He was a cosmopolite, for even when young in years, he was a venerable highpriest in the hierarchy of letters, and the domain of literature is the world. Never did a swifter or more brilliant career than his fall to the lot of a Monsignore of the Pontifical court. His native city, Bologna, sent him as the worthiest representative of her academic renown to the schools of Rome. He swept the lecture halls of all their prizes, and made himself the oracle of canon law in the home of ecclesiastical jurists. The sparkle of his wit, the gracefulness of his carriage, his constant good humor, the unaffected modesty with which he wore his blushing honors thick upon him, made him the idol of the saloons. Lambertini was small in stature, but great in mind. He became a Monsignore and a Cardinal, but he was little Lambertini still, with the thoughts of a sage and the playful heart of a child. When he became cardinal, he was sent as archbishop to his native town Bologna. He was at home by a double title, as a prel-

ate and a son. He ruled without effort, because he ruled by love. Society had claims on him, study had claims on him, the care of his diocese had claims on him, God had claims on him. He discharged them all. There was no more exemplary bishop in the Italian hierarchy than his Grace of Bologna, no gentleman more polished, no scholar more profound. He was a man who dared to think and speak his thoughts. Literature had broken down the artificial barrier with which superstition and prejudice sometimes fence off Catholic minds and hearts from the wild, yet beautiful spirit of the natural man throbbing in the world without the sanctuary. Lambertini was the friend and correspondent of all the scholars in Europe. Literature was a neutral field, a holy ground, where no rival pulpits stood, where no booming canons of the law echoed in the strife of decrees and councils.

Complaints had been made to Pope Clement XII. by interested parties against one of the vicars of Cardinal Lambertini. His Holiness listened to the accusers, and condemned the accused. The tale was plausible, but it was a fiction. Lambertini, who was on the spot, and knew his vicar and his enemies, read the charge as he read Æsop's fables. The Pope wrote to the Cardinal, and the Cardinal wrote to the Pope. The Pope requested the Cardinal to censure his vicar; his Eminence requested his Holiness to reconsider the case on the evidence that he, the ordinary of the diocese, would furnish. The proofs of the poor vicar's innocence were sent, and Lambertini concluded a respectful and affectionate letter by hoping that our Lord had as faithful a vicar in Rome as his Eminence had in Bologna. His Holiness, like a sensible man, took the lesson and laughed at the joke, and for the future always examined the affairs of Bologna through the eyes of Cardinal Lambertini.

Pope Clement XII. died in 1740. The Cardinal set out for the Conclave. It lasted six months of the Italian summer. There was much wire-pulling, and much sweating during those six months, and many a good Cardinal wished politics and statecraft were forever removed from this sublunary sphere by the honors of canonization. Lambertini's patience was evaporating under the burning roof of the Vatican, where the Conclave held its sessions; but the heat etherealized his playfulness. "My Venerable Colleagues," said he, at the end of the six months, "we have been here long enough. It is time for me to go home. Do you want a saint for Pope, choose Cardinal Gotti; do you want a politician, there's his Eminence Aldorrandi ready to serve; do you want a good fellow, then I am your man!" They took him at his word, and the *good fellow* became Pope under the title of Benedict XIV., on the 17th of August, 1740. "You see, my friends," he said, "I have not a papal face; I hope some charitable painter will give me one after my death."

Benedict XIV. was in favor of the largest liberty of thought, consistent with the authority of faith and the rule of morals. He reversed many of the decrees of the Congregation of the Index, and restored to theological science and general literature works, which an overhasty zeal had consigned to the list of prohibited books. In all political questions involving the rights of the Principality of the Church, he was ready to meet the sovereigns of Europe half way. He was no coercionist; he had more faith in kind words and kind acts than in hard blows or anathemas. In a word he knew how to temporize, to yield with grace what could not be retained with safety. No more conscientious Pope ever sat in the chair of Peter. When the path of duty was clear he boldly entered it; in doubtful cases he favored liberty in action and benignity in mode. He was what the world would call a model *Jesuit* Pope. Yet it was from him that Pombal hoped to wrest a decree for the suppression of the Jesuits. Benedict had always admired the Institute, and by his Bulls "*Devotam Gloriosæ Dominæ*" and "*Quantum recessu*," had officially expressed his admiration. On the vexed question of the Chinese ceremonies, his decision had been adverse to the practice of many of the Jesuit missionaries in the Celestial Empire. But the conscientious mistakes of individuals could not shake the confidence of the Holy See in the orthodoxy of a body of men, who were looked upon by the world as the most Catholic of Catholics, more Papal than the Pope himself. Benedict had a minister from whom Pombal had more to hope, Cardinal Dominic Passionei, a native of the Diocese of Urbino. His rise was rapid. At twenty-six he was performing in France and Holland the duties of a Nuncio, without having the title. Clement XI., Innocent XIII., and Clement XII., employed his diplomatic talents throughout Europe; and Benedict XIV. made him Librarian of the Vatican, a bosom friend and confidential adviser. No two characters could present a greater contrast than those of the Pope and the Cardinal. They were both learned. Lambertini's erudition was a defensive armor against the shafts of religious and political sophistry that were falling thick and fast in the Christian army. Passionei's erudition was a trenchant sword, which he flourished with keen delight, both in and out of the sanctuary. The Cardinal was pugnacious, always ready for a theological tilt, obstinate and overbearing, a hammerer of heretics, the hammerer of some of his best friends. During his nunciature in Switzerland he had converted several Protestants; now he was to share with Pombal in the dubious honor of destroying the Order, before whose onsets, for two hundred years, Protestantism had been routed, and had surrendered numerous and illustrious captives. Passionei believed only in one Order, that of St. Peter. He looked with suspicion on

religious communities, little states within states, which he was afraid might wax strong and overshadow the Hierarchy and the Papacy. To the Jesuits, least of all, was he friendly. He opposed the canonization of Cardinal Bellarmine and rejected from his library all works by Jesuit authors. He was a well-meaning man, but full of prejudices. His life was strictly ecclesiastical; it wanted but two ingredients to make it perfect, mildness and prudence. Benedict loved this prelate, so different from himself. He respected his talents and bore with his petulant humors. Ten years before Pombal began his intrigues, the Cardinal had occasion to show his ill will towards the Society. A Capuchin had published in Italy, under the name of Norbert, a book entitled, *Mémoires Historiques sur les Affaires des Jesuites*. He had travelled in India and America, and like many a tourist, returned with a bundle of lies. He hated the Jesuits. Afraid to attack them openly, he filled his book with the letters and sayings of other travellers and of the Governor of Pondicherry, accusing the Jesuits of engaging in commerce contrary to the prohibitions of the canons. The book was laid before the Holy Office; Passionei came forward in its defence. He sheltered the suspected volume and its author under the capacious folds of his scarlet cassock. "Norbert has not," he said, "incriminated the Jesuits, he only reports the accusations of others." Very true, your Eminence, but he reports them without answering them or without giving proofs of the truth of the charges. He adopted them as his own and then shifted the responsibility to the shoulders of others. "We would not," he says, after citing the testimony of Martin, Governor of Pondicherry, "have our readers accept the word of the Governor as gospel." The Fathers know that Popes and Councils forbid, under pain of excommunication, ecclesiastics to engage in commerce. They know it, Father Norbert, but you have written nothing to prove that you do not believe with his Excellency of Pondicherry that their practice varies from their theory. You would damn the Jesuits with faint praise. Like many a scandal-monger, you spread a false report and then would apply the salve to your wounded conscience by a hesitating "*I scarcely believe it.*" The *Mémoires Historiques* was an attack on the Society, and the world understood it as such. It was an insinuated lie. We prefer a robber to a thief; the open, public wickedness of the Middle Ages to the secret, polished villainy that corrodes the heart of modern society; we prefer a plump, dogmatic liar to a sneak. The Holy Office censured the book, and, in an appeal to the Pope, Passionei censured the censure. He expressed his own belief that the charge against the Society was not entirely groundless. It was his duty to investigate it before extending his patronage to a work which took it for granted. He did nothing of the

kind. He took refuge in a legal subterfuge. The Holy Office could not, he maintained, censure writings which related historically charges made by others. Norbert was the historian of the Jesuits' accusers; censure them, not him. The Cardinal's logic should have led him to conclude that he who spreads a false report, without contradicting it, shares in the guilt of the libellers and deserves their punishment. The question at issue was, "Have the Jesuits engaged in unlawful commerce?" That question *Pasionei* would not, perhaps could not, examine dispassionately. There are some men who, when they conceive a prejudice against individuals or institutions, become totally incapable of a sane judgment about them. On other points they may be logical and charitable; mount them on their hobby and they are off at a John Gilpin pace. No curb of reason, no rein of truth, or charity, can guide the wild, restive animal of prejudice.

The laws of the Church forbid clergymen to buy for the purpose of selling again; but there is no prohibition against selling the produce of their own fields, the fruits of their own industry. In Paraguay the Jesuits were all in all to the Indians; upon them rested the care of the temporal, as well as the spiritual interests of the neophytes. They were the procurators and treasurers and men of business of the South American Reductions. They were all these by the necessities of the case. There were Yankee traders in those days as well as now, and between them and the Christian Indians the Jesuits threw themselves, as the defenders of justice and commercial morality. No other method offered of protecting the guileless natives from being robbed of their property and of their innocence. The governments of Portugal and Spain knew, and officially approved, the conduct of the missionaries. The commerce which they carried on, in the name of the neophytes, was transacted in the face of day. It was not the proceeding of a dark-lantern party. Popes knew it, the kings knew it, the world knew it for a century and a half; and Popes and kings and the world approved. The Jesuits in Canada were accused of speculating in furs. In 1643 the directors of the Company of New France attested, on oath, the falseness of the charge. In China, it was said, they had turned brokers, by exchanging European for Chinese money. The Procurator-General of the Congregation of the Propaganda at Canton, and the officers of the Indian Commercial Company, vindicated them on every point. No doubt there were instances, both in Asia and in America, of individuals combining the apostolic powers of Judas with his avarice. The sanctuary has been cursed with such ministers; the Society of Jesus would have been more than human in its good fortune, had it been entirely exempt from the curse.

The intrigue against the Jesuits marched on to its goal with the resistless tramp of fate. Pombal demanded from the Pope a brief for the reformation of the Society in Portugal. He specified his charges and omitted his proofs. Cardinals Passionei and Archinto lent him the influence of their names and stations. Pope Benedict was dying and yielded to the wishes of his ministers. On the brink of the grave he was willing to give a proof of his readiness to oblige the prime minister of His Most Faithful Majesty. The innocent never fear investigation; the Society of Jesus could bear to be searched with lamps and the keen eyes of Pontifical visitors. So thought the Pope. The brief was signed on the 1st of April, 1758. The friends of the Society might have taken it as an April joke; Pombal determined to make the joke practical. The house he resolved should burn, were but one speck of dust found in it. Reformation meant, in his mind, destruction. The execution of the brief was committed to the Portuguese Cardinal, Saldanha, a partisan of Pombal. He notified his appointment to the Provincial of Portugal and began the work. The investigation extended, in regard to place, to the world, wherever Jesuits lived the lives of confessors and died the death of martyrs; in regard to time it embraced thirteen days. Pombal was accuser, witness, and crown-lawyer in the case, Saldanha the judge. The Jesuits were condemned, without a hearing, of engaging in unlawful commerce. The trial was over, the sentence passed; the execution followed quick on its heels. Joseph Emmanuel, Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon, interdicted the Jesuits throughout his diocese. With silent dignity the Society in Portugal met its fate, and lay bleeding and gasping at the feet of Pombal.

Benedict XIV. was succeeded in 1753 by Cardinal Rezzonico, under the title of Clement XIII. He was a man of sterner character than his predecessor, readier for a contest than a compromise. He came forward as the defender of the Society, and if need be, the avenger of its wrongs. Lorenzo Ricci, a Florentine, was its General; the meekest and most spiritual of rulers was called by the votes of his brethren to the chair of St. Ignatius, Laynez, and Acquaviva, when the occasion demanded the prudence of the first, the learning of the second, and the lofty Hildebrandic spirit of Claudius Acquaviva. Ricci could not save the Society. He presided at its funeral, and then died of a broken heart. On the festival of St. Ignatius, 1758, he offered a protest to the Pontiff against the late proceedings in Portugal. He protested in the name of his children, who had been accused and condemned in a breath. He protested against a trial, in which testimony had been admitted only on one side. He protested against the violation of the Constitution *Suprema* of Clement X., which forbids a bishop to deprive a religious com-

munity of jurisdiction in the Sacrament of Penance without first consulting the Holy See. The Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon had violated that Constitution; the Jesuits had been forbidden to preach or receive confessions in any place subject to his jurisdiction. He protested against the wholesale destruction that had overwhelmed the American and Asiatic missions. He protested against the justice of holding the Society responsible for the sins of its members, when it could be shown from the instructions, written and verbal, of the superiors, that a strict observance of the constitutions of St. Ignatius was enforced in Portugal as well as in Rome. When those constitutions are violated, when Jesuits, forgetting their vows, engage in worldly avocations, point out the offenders; but revile not, destroy not the Society, as if the ambition and avarice of these recreant children were the legitimate fruits of Jesuit training. He protested, in fine, against judges ignorant of the rules of the Order and bent on its ruin. He appealed from Pombal, from Passionei, from Saldanha to Clement XIII. Nor was the appeal in vain. The affair of the Jesuits was submitted to a Congregation, in which truth and justice triumphed. They were acquitted. Pombal's heart sank; he saw the airy fabric of his hopes crumble on the ruins of the falsehood which supported it. A fortunate accident put him on the old vantage-ground he had occupied before the accession of Clement XIII. From the fears or prejudices of the Pontiff he had nothing to expect, and he resolved boldly to rebel against the power over which he could not tyrannize. On the night of the 3d of September, 1758, as the king was crossing the Tagus in his barge from Tavora House to the palace, he was slightly wounded by a pistol-ball. The scandal-mongers of Lisbon said that the bullet was the messenger of vengeance for the Marquis of Tavora's disgrace and his wife's lost virtue. Be this as it may, that one bullet brought death to the Tavora family and to the Society of Jesus in Portugal. The incriminated house was one of the noblest in Portugal; it looked down contemptuously on the upstart Pombal. The Minister had solicited for his son the hand of a daughter of that house; the proposal was rejected. Pombal's hate was deep; he must have revenge. The opportunity was now offered; need it be said that he used it? He worked on the fears of the royal puppet. He kept him secluded from society. "Better, Sire," said the plotter, "the solitude of your own room, than the solitude of the grave." The royal suspicions were directed by him, who moved the springs of the royal mind, first to the Tavoras, and through them to the Jesuits. The noble house and the Society were prejudged and doomed; but the hour for striking the blow had not come. For three months Pombal feasted his heart on revenge, and his eyes on the calm unsuspecting faces of his victims. The Tavoras continued to come to court,

regardless of the gossip of the saloons and the calumnies of rival families. On the 12th of December, the Duke of Aveiro, the Marquis of Tavora, Donna Eleanor his mother, their relations and intimate friends were seized and imprisoned. The parvenu triumphed, his heel was on the noblest necks in Portugal. This was not enough; the blood of Tavora had refused to mingle in nuptials with the blood of Carvalho; it should, swore Pombal, in his heart of hearts, stain the axe of the executioner. An extraordinary tribunal, similar to the Blood Council of Alva in the Netherlands, was established for the trial of the accused. The Tavoras should have been judged by their peers; they were judged by a packed court, over which Pombal presided assisted by two of his creatures, Alcinha and Costa Real. The torture wrenched from the Duke of Aveiro an avowal of his guilt; that of his friends and the Jesuits. He was released from the rack senseless and mangled, and when restored to consciousness, declared that physical pain had caused him to belie his conscience. His judges turned a deaf ear to the retraction. Sentence of death was passed, and Pombal drew up the warrant with his own hand. The execution was fixed for the 12th of January, 1759, at the village of Belem, two miles from Lisbon. The axe, the rope, and the fire, formed a trinity of exquisite torture, in whose name, and by whose application, the victims were to receive the baptism of blood. Donna Eleanor, Marchioness of Tavora, headed the fatal procession, with the crucifix in her clasped hands, and the lofty spirit of Christian nobility in her heart. The doomsman advanced to bind her feet: "Unhand me, sir," she cried; "touch me not but to kill me." The man knelt before her and begged her pardon. She gave it, together with a ring from her finger. The neck was bowed, the axe flashed and fell, and the noble blood for which Carvalho thirsted streamed over the scaffold. The husband, the son, the son-in-law, and the servants of the illustrious lady were subjected singly to one or all of the modes of execution which the vengeance of the minister had collected on the scaffold. No charge was proved against these unfortunate nobles. Costa Freira, one of the first lawyers in Portugal, declared on legal grounds the innocence of the accused. The vindication of others brought an accusation of misprision of treason on himself. When, twenty years later, Pombal fell into disgrace, the records of his administration were searched, and on their evidence, the Portuguese council declared, that all persons, living or dead, who had suffered in consequence of the sentence in the Tavora case in 1759, were innocent of the crime with which they had been charged.

Pombal had swept the nobles from his path to absolutism; with bloody hands and feet he marched to the attack of the last citadel between him and his goal,—the Society of Jesus. On the eve of

the execution of the Tavoras, the Jesuits were accused in a body of aiding and abetting the attempted regicide. The Provincial of Portugal and the most illustrious of the Fathers were cast into prison. Calumnies and accusations beat with tempest fury against the doomed Society, and the rack began what the axe was to finish. The Jesuits bared their breasts to the storm, and met their fate with the silent resignation of insulted innocence. The Minister expected a deadly war, and had prepared himself for it, but he quailed before the serene glance of unresisting victims. He screened himself behind the throne and the altar. The crowned puppet of Portugal signed, at the bidding of his master, warrants innumerable of death and infamy. The Bishops were called on to denounce the Jesuits. Fear or policy induced some to comply with the iniquitous command. The King and the Minister, and a portion of the Episcopate combined in an unholy alliance against the work of God. The Pope and the Hierarchy of the Catholic world were indignant at the Portuguese government and the Judases of the Portuguese episcopacy. But remonstrances and threats were vain. Pombal had woven his web, his prey was trapped, and no power on earth could deprive him of it. Universal ruin hung over the Society in Portugal. Fifteen hundred Jesuits were in prison; the agents of their enemy swarmed over land and sea for new victims. Brazil and Paraguay were swept with the besom of destruction, and from their shores the Apostles of the new world were shipped to the doom that awaited them in Europe. The houses of the Society in the domains of His Most Faithful Majesty were seized and confiscated. Beggary, exile, the prison, death, were the punishments of the high treason of being a disciple of St. Ignatius; but then came the martyr's crown.

On the 20th of April, 1759, Pombal notified Clement XIII. of the intention of his majesty to expel the members of the Society from Portugal. A brief, forged by Pombal's ambassador in Rome, empowered the government to proceed in its work of iniquity. And it did proceed. In vain did Clement protest and pray. Pombal was defiant, and threatened schism. The Jesuits must leave Portugal, or the Society and the Papacy would be bound together and cast ignominiously from the country. The alternative was presented to the Pontiff of sacrificing the obnoxious Society or the exercise of his own rights. The Pope refused to share the guilt of robbery and murder, and threw the buckler of his protection over the victim that was bleeding to death at the feet of its destroyer. A murderous hand rudely thrust it aside, and hastened to complete the deed of blood. Malagrida and four companions were condemned to be executed, as accomplices of the Duke of Aveiro and the Tavoras, in the attempt on the king's life.

Gabriel Malagrida was nearly eighty years of age, and had toiled for his Lord in Brazil and Portugal with more than the devotion of a lover to his mistress. We have already seen him and Pombal digging side by side in the ruins of the earthquake of Lisbon for the mangled corpses of its victims. Both became popular idols. The image of the Minister soon fell from its shrine in the hearts of the people, while that of the Jesuit was honored with the votive offerings of a nation's love. Malagrida was a friend of the Tavoras; the marchioness had been his spiritual child. To have advanced the eternal interests of his enemies was, in the eyes of Pombal, an unpardonable offence. The father had been thrown into prison, as we have seen, with his unfortunate penitent; he had been condemned to death as a regicide, but by a cruel mercy Pombal spared him for three years, with the unrevoked sentence hanging like the sword of Damocles over his head. Those three years were passed in prison. At Pombal's voice, the grave of the dungeon gave up its living dead; Malagrida was handed over to the judgment of the Inquisition. Proof had been vainly sought of the old man's implication in the attempt on the king's life. Even the ingenuity of Pombal was baffled, and if the game was to be hunted to the death, it must be started in a new field. The political charge was dropped, and a spiritual one substituted. The saint of eighty was accused of sins which would have shamed a debauchee of twenty. He was called a seducer of the people, a hypocrite, a false prophet, a corrupter of morals. He was accused of writing two heretical pamphlets, *The Reign of Antichrist* and the *Life of the Glorious Saint Ann, dictated by Jesus and His Holy Mother*. The trial came on; the books were not produced, but Norbert the Capuchin, the protégé of Cardinal Passionei, who fluttered about scenes of Jesuit suffering and death like a bird of carrion over the panting remains of a noble quarry, drew up for the convenience of the Inquisitors a memoir which purported to contain choice selections from the missing writings. The Grand Inquisitor of Portugal was a brother of King Joseph. He heard the case and passed a Scotch sentence, not proven. Pombal resented the bold audacity of any man who had, and presumed to obey, a conscience. The royal Inquisitor was cashiered, and Paul Carvalho Mendoza, brother of the prime minister, succeeded to the vacant dignity. Blood is stronger than water, but hatred is stronger than blood. The ties of relationship which bound Pombal to Mendoza were weak in comparison with the tie of sympathetic hatred against the Jesuits. The Papal confirmation of the appointment was not awaited, the new Inquisitor took his seat, and Malagrida was at once condemned to death for the crimes of heresy, immorality, and blasphemy. The sentence was executed on the 21st of September, 1761.

Malagrida met his fate two years after the destruction of the Society in Portugal. Sentence of banishment had been passed against the Jesuits in 1759. One hundred and thirty exiles were embarked on a crazy boat, ill supplied with provisions, with its prow directed to the Mediterranean. They were the first waves of the reflux tide of religion that was soon to leave the Lusitanian coast a sandy desert, abandoned to the Arab depredations of French soldiers and English traders. The vessel was forced, by stress of weather, into one of the Spanish ports, where the fate of the Jesuits excited the pity, and their wants the munificent charity of Spanish hospitality. On the 24th of October they landed at Civita Vecchia. The Dominicans of the Papal port received them with open arms. Scholastic questions that had divided the disciples of St. Thomas and of Bellarmine and Suarez, the theological war of rival academies, and even the generous competition of missionary labor, were forgotten. The Dominicans saw, in the expatriated sufferers before them, their brethren in religion, and received them to their hearts and homes. A small slab in the Dominican Church at Civita Vecchia commemorates the landing of the Jesuits, and hands down to posterity, linked in a record of unmerited misfortune on one side and religious hospitality on the other, the names of the two most celebrated literary orders of the modern Church. To Rome, the refuge of the afflicted of all climes, the exiles went, and sought and found at the foot of the pontifical throne the protection and love which they had lost in Portugal. Pombal's hatred pursued them, and he determined to revenge himself on the Pope by flooding his dominions with the refugees. Colony after colony was shipped from the Tagus to the Tiber, but the pontifical heart of Clement XIII. was too large to be filled to repletion. It embraced the world; could it not embrace the whole Society of Jesus? His love for the sufferers was as tender as Pombal's vengeance was fierce. All were welcomed, all were received, as dear noble children who had ventured their lives and were ready to venture them again for Rome, the mother of the Christian world.

Cardinal Saldanha, the friend of Pombal and Patriarch of Lisbon, tried to seduce the young scholastics and novices who remained in Portugal. Dispensation from any vows they might have taken was offered, and a career of honorable ambition in Church and State was opened to them. The majority of the novices disdained the bribe, and preferred the glorious ignominy of martyrs to the ignominious glory of traitors. These young heroes were animated by the words and example of Father Joseph Carvalho, who vainly endeavored to redeem the infamy which his relation Pombal had attached to the family of Carvalho.

Two hundred and twenty-one Jesuits languished in chains for years; of this number, eighty-eight were released by death. They were not all Portuguese subjects; some natives of France or Austria were liberated by the intercession of their courts. The sufferings of these imprisoned confessors have been graphically described by one of their number, Father Lawrence Kauhen, in a letter to the Provincial of the Lower Rhine, written in the eighth year of his captivity, from the castle of San Julian. They were swept from the retreats of learning and piety by a whirlwind of cavalry, and pricked forward by the goading spears of the Portuguese soldiery into the gates of the dungeon. Dark, damp, narrow cells, the walls clammy and leprous with green decay, the floor overrun with rats, with straw for their couches, and a scarce allowance of mouldy bread for their repast, the Jesuits were set to learn the lesson of how evil and bitter a thing it was to have resisted Pombal. Their breviaries and articles of devotion were taken from them, the sacraments were given only to the dying, and certainly death had a rich harvest in those subterraneous fields of tyranny and patience. Yet the grim reaper did not ply his hook rapidly enough for the Portuguese minister's vengeance. The ragged garments of the prisoners rotted to pieces. "Everything rots in my dungeon," petulantly exclaimed the Governor of San Julian, "with the exception of the Jesuits." Our Lord was with them; members of His own Society, ministers of His altar, like the Apostles they counted it glory to suffer for the name of Jesus. Liberty was offered them on condition of abjuring the Institute. They spurned the offer, and so, one by one, the leaden years went on; one by one the prisoners died, or exchanged the dungeon for exile. The Society of Jesus had ceased to exist in Portugal. Pombal had triumphed over the king and the nobles; he had torn down the bulwarks of religion; a large party of the secular clergy and of the bishops applauded; the Pope had been insulted and defied; Portugal's iron age had begun. The miseries entailed on the country by Pombal's policy curse her yet. She is a cipher among nations, a scandal in the Church. Catholic faith and love still find a shelter in the hearts of the peasantry, but the government is demoralized, and, alas, the glory of the sanctuary is gone also.

Joseph I. died in 1777, and was succeeded by his daughter Maria I. The power of the minister expired with the sovereign whom he had cajoled. Pombal was brought to trial. Many of the decrees of his administration were reversed; the prisons were thrown open, and eight hundred captives returned to liberty and life. The fate that Pombal inflicted on others hung over himself. The charge of treason was brought and proved against him, and the executioner's axe flashed upon his startled gaze. His acts and his character were

condemned; his life was spared. He was forever banished from court; and all public and private claims against him, in person and property, were allowed a full hearing. In retirement, we may hope, he expiated in part the sins of his political life. Michael del l'Annunciata, Bishop of Coimbra, visited him once, and found him on his knees in prayer with his family, and gave to the fallen minister the episcopal benediction that he implored. Pombal died in 1782 in his eighty-fifth year.

Pombal was the type of a school of statesmen as numerous in the eighteenth century as in our own, and equally pernicious to religion and liberty. Machiavelli, the Florentine secretary, was the modern coryphæus of the school. Pombal, Choiseul, D'Aiguillon, Florida-Banca, Palmerston, Russell, Cavour, and Bismarck, have been its most distinguished disciples. Pombal destroyed the Jesuits and his country, and finally fell himself under the ruins he had caused. His example was imitated in France, Spain, and Naples. His success emboldened the Jansenists, and the philosophers, Diderot and Voltaire, hailed the fall of the Society as the dawn of the long-expected sun of liberty. The sun arose in a threatening sky, culminated in blood, and sank in the night of despotism.

Our subject was Pombal; we wished to record the history of a diplomatist, of a representative of a class, and from the latter half of the eighteenth century, to cast the horoscope of the corresponding period of our own. The fortunes of the Society of Jesus, after the triumph of Pombal, do not properly fall within the limits of the present article. They may, however, be briefly told.

In France the Jesuits had incurred the enmity of Madame de Pompadour, mistress of Louis XV. Her Jesuit confessors had refused her the sacraments. She promised to break off her scandalous connection with the king. For the future she would be no more to him than a friend, a sister, a counsellor. The spiritual interests of His Majesty, the interests of the country, her own honor, would compel her to remain at court. So she argued, but did not succeed in throwing dust into the eyes of her directors. She appealed to Rome; Rome referred her to her confessor. The favorite was furious; she swore the destruction of her spiritual guides, because they would not allow her to add sacrilege to adultery. Choiseul, the Prime Minister, desired, for reasons of state, the ruin which Pompadour sought from the private pique of a vindictive and licentious woman. Fortunately for the minister and the mistress, a scandal occurred just then in the Society, which enabled them, under the specious plea of the purity and fair fame of the Church, to urge on the king the banishment, and on the Pope the suppression of the obnoxious Order. Father Lavalette, a descendant of the defender of Malta, and superior of the Society in Martinique, had, in

contravention of the canon law and his own rules, engaged in very extensive speculations. Things went swimmingly with him for a time, until blinded by an overweening confidence in his own financial abilities and the splendid prospect of the magnificent prosperity of his mission, he rashly imitated the Scoto-French adventurer, Law. His bubble, if as gaudy and large as that of the Mississippi schemer, was equally empty. It burst and only after it had burst, were his superiors informed of the stupendous and far-extended schemes in which he had engaged. He was censured in the strongest terms, and expelled from the Society. His bankruptcy brought ruin on his French creditors. The case came before the courts and the parliaments, and the enemies of the Jesuits were not slow in availing themselves of the opportunity of charging the Society with the sin of one of its members. In vain did Lavellette write declaration upon declaration from London, whither he had gone after his exposure, acquitting his superiors of any knowledge of his schemes, of any complicity in his rashness. Logic and charity were disregarded. The storm raged with uncontrolled fury. Molehills were magnified into mountains; every charge, real or imaginary, ever brought against the Society, was raked from the ashes of the past, and had breathed into it a soul of courtier cupidity, Pompadourian revenge, and encyclopedist infidelity. The history of the intrigue against the Jesuits in France is long and sad. It ended on the 6th of August, 1762, in the publication of a decree, condemning the Order, and requiring an oath of abjuration from its members. Of four thousand Jesuits in France, five took the oath; three thousand nine hundred and ninety-five went into exile.

The Duke of Choiseul had united in 1761 the Bourbon courts in the famous family compact. France, Spain, and Naples brought to bear against the disciples of St. Ignatius the combined influence of diplomacy and violence. France, Spain, and Naples triumphed. The Jesuits, the grenadier guards of the Church, were proclaimed traitors to God and the king, and were driven in ignominy from the Bourbon states. But one link was wanting in the chain of iniquity, the extortion from the Pope of a decree of suppression. Just then Clement XIII., the steadfast friend and defender of the Society, died suddenly in December, 1768. Two parties battled in the three months' Conclave that succeeded his death. The black-robed Jesuit, with the banner of St. Ignatius, was the centre around which red hats and soutanes swayed to and fro on the eddying tide of the strife. The question at issue was one of expediency. Bourbonists and Jesuit cardinals rivalled one another in devotion to the Church, and acknowledging alike the past services of the illustrious Society, whose fate trembled in the balance, differed as to the necessity of the contemplated sacrifice. The bark of St. Peter was tossing in a

furious storm. Would the winds shift, and the waves be calmed, if the Society, like another Jonah, were cast into the deep? It is expedient that one man die for the people, said the Pontifical oracle of the Jews, in the time of our Lord. Could not a more illustrious Pontifical oracle decree to death the Society of Jesus, as a victim for the sins of the world, a victim noble and unspotted, a perfect holocaust for the afflicted Church? Are the European courts to be propitiated or defied? Are scandals to be avoided, and souls to be saved by concession or resistance? Are we to have a Bourbon Pope, or a Jesuit Pope? Two opposite policies lay open to election. There was one heart in the Conclave, but two minds. The goal aimed at was one, but it was sought by two different paths. Conclaves are subject to human passion, as parliaments or congresses, and Cardinals have affections and antipathies as strong as those of English Ministers and American Secretaries. The Church is the Incarnation continued. She is neither all divine, nor all human, but divine and human. Public events and private interests influence her human element, as they do all human institutions. Our Lord suffered and died in His manhood; the Church suffers and dies in the prejudices and passions of her human members. Yet our Lord was God even in His death; the Church is God's spouse, even in the tomb of her children's faith and love. Religion and politics, principle and passion, may struggle in the arena of a Conclave; Italian diplomacy and Austrian obstinacy and French intrigue may weave their webs around the Tiara and the Chair, and trimmers may call for compromise, when they should rather court martyrdom. Yet over the chaos of seething antagonistic elements, the Holy Spirit of peace and love broods as over the chaos of the primal world. Human motives are shaped by Providence to His own designs, and out of the storms of the Conclave, the Church's bark sails with a new pilot as stanch as when Peter took the helm.

John Vincent Anthony Ganganelli became Pope, under the title of Clement XIV., on the 19th of March, 1769. He was born in 1705, near Rimini, of a patrician house. The boy showed talent of a high order. He loved his books, and cared little for amusements or society; and the purity of his soul made him a fit flower for the garden of the cloister or the sanctuary. Ganganelli's inclinations pointed to the religious state. To embrace it, argued his friends, would be to cut himself off from the bright career which his birth and ability promised him in the Church. "Can I have better prospects," was Ganganelli's reply, "than in the Order which has produced Sixtus IV. and Sixtus V.?" So he went to the Franciscan novitiate at Urbino when he was eighteen years old. The Minorites are an active as well as a contemplative order, but

the future Pope took no part, for many years, in the public life of his religious family. He was a man of books, and, like all students, he loved retirement and the society of his own thoughts. Yet he was no misanthropist, and when duty sent him into the company of his brethren, he contributed his share to the simple, charming merriment which has its home in the hearts of pure children and the recreation-rooms of cloistered sanctity. Joy is a gift of the Holy Ghost to the unworldly. Ganganelli possessed it, for he was a true religious. He became a professor in the schools of his Order, and rose at once to academic eminence. It was found that he could rule as well as obey. Silence had not robbed his tongue of the gift of prudent speech in ecclesiastical and worldly matters; study had not destroyed a natural aptitude for business. He had studied his own heart, and therefore could fathom the hearts of others. We are inclined at times to draw too broad a line between man and man. Human nature is the same in the saint and the sinner, the prince and the peasant, the cloister and the court. Solitude is the vestibule to the temple of fame; the road through the desert often leads to the throne and the crown. The history of one soul is the epitome of the world's history; he who knows its winding may tread with secure step the mazy paths of diplomacy; he who can marshal his own great thoughts is a born sovereign. Here is a man, absolute ruler of himself, of large mind and large heart; cast him into the strife of the world, and he becomes lord of the ascendant. Ganganelli was not a great man, but he had talent, and his religious life made him its master. The Order of St. Francis prepared him for the world, the Franciscan cowl for the thorny tiara. There have been greater Popes than he. His lines were not cast in goodly places, yet he bore him bravely through the storm, and left a name untarnished by reproach. He may have prayed where he should have commanded, and destroyed where he should have saved. He was God's representative, but in deciding affairs which concerned only discipline, he had not God's omniscience nor infallibility. Admit that he erred, what then? Clement XIV. was still John Vincent Ganganelli, the Pope was still a man, and, apart from dogmatic and moral decisions, liable in all things to human infirmity. But we anticipate. Ganganelli, we have said, rose to consideration among his brethren. The shadow of the Generalship of the Order fell across the sunshine of his path. He was in an agony of fear. "If you love me," said he to his friends, "vote against me." "Non sitis pro me sed sitis mihi." The cloud passed, and he was again happy in his professorship at the convent of the Holy Apostles. He tried to cover his light with a bushel, but the good religious did not perceive that there were chinks in his bushel, and so the light flashed out.

He was a man of immense learning, and Pope Benedict had a special talent for discerning modest merit. Ganganelli was a student after the Pontiff's own heart. Their tastes were similar, and soon brought them together, and the humble Franciscan became Consultor of the Holy Office. "Take good care of this little brother of yours," said Benedict one day to the General of the Order, "he has my strong recommendation." Ganganelli, without knowing it, had entered upon the road to the sublimest dignity on earth. He became immersed in business. Questions from all the Congregations were submitted to his examination, and a pen or a book never left his hand. His patron died, but left in writing his very favorable opinion of the "little brother" of the convent of the Holy Apostles. One day Cardinal Rezzonico, nephew of the new Pope, Clement XIII., went to the cell of Ganganelli. "A great many reports about you, my friend," said his Eminence, "have been brought to the Holy Father. I am sorry to be the bearer of disagreeable news, but duty goes before friendship. You are irrevocably, beyond all hope of escape, Cardinal Ganganelli. The Pope foreseeing your refusal has commanded you, under pain of grievous sin, to accept the dignity." So the monk became a Prince of the Church, and from that moment popular opinion preconized him Pope. Nor was public opinion at fault; he became Pope on the 19th of May, 1769. He had scarcely started on his Pontifical career, when he was brought to bay by the bloodhounds that were on the track of the Jesuits. The Society might be banished by Pombal or Choiseul; it could be destroyed only by the power that created it. Its life or death hung on the word of the Pope. For four years Clement tried to elude the vehement importunities and threats of the French and Spanish ambassadors, until the question came to be narrowed to the alternative of the destruction of the Jesuits, or a European schism, perhaps as scandalous as that of Avignon. The Jesuits had fulfilled their mission; the Church required their sacrifice. The altar was built, and the victim consumed on the 21st of July, 1773. On that day, Pope Clement XIV. published his brief for the suppression of the Society of Jesus. The curtain fell, and the world thought that the brilliant drama of Jesuit history, that had been played before its wondering gaze for more than two centuries, had reached its final catastrophe in the tragedy of the suppression. The world was disappointed. The curtain rose again, forty years after, on lecture halls thronged with students listening to Jesuit professors, and penitents besieging the confessionals of Jesuit missionaries. The Jesuit was seen again in his old haunts, wherever there was a mind to be formed or a heart purified for heaven.

SYMBOLISM OF THE COSMOS.

1. *The Old Faith and the New.* By D. F. Strauss.
2. *First Principles.* By Herbert Spencer.
3. *S. Thomæ Aquinatis Summa Theologica.*

IN the candid title of the last work penned by Strauss a lesson is embodied. It is that man must have a religion; and if he overthrows one it is only to adopt another. After having rejected faith in revealed religion, he seeks the materials with which to build up a creed that will satisfy himself and the eager disciples who were dazzled by his sophistries. With that intent, in his old age, while the hand of death is upon him, he pens this profession of faith. The book is altogether unworthy of the man who at the age of twenty-seven wrote the *Leben Jesu*. It is a sad record of nearly forty years' thought. His disciples clamor for a religion and a doctrine; in return he gives them the dregs of thought that float on the surface of the fermenting intellect of Europe; he gives them the crude notions of science which he has been able to gather together from popular manuals on geology, anthropology, sociology, even phrenology; he gives them Kant's planetary dreams; he gives them Hegel's vague idealism; he gives them some commonplace criticism on Goethe and Mozart; and he leaves them as his final opinion, that life is nothing more than a dream of nothingness about something. But little consolation is to be found in this new faith. It is shadow taken for substance. It is an identifying of the symbol with the thing symbolized. This idea his Cosmic theory best illustrates. With him man is part and parcel of the material world, and nothing more. His life and being he has from the Cosmos, to which he returns after death, as does the dog or the tree. The soul is a metaphysical fiction. Matter is eternal. "If we contemplate the universe as a whole, there never has been a time when it did not exist, when there did not exist in it a distinction between the heavenly bodies, life and reason; for all this, if not as yet existing in one part of the Cosmos, already existed in another, while in a third it had already ceased to exist; here it was in the act of blooming, yonder in full flower, at a third place already in decline; but the Cosmos itself—the sum total of infinite worlds in all stages of growth and decay—abode eternally unchanged, in the constancy of its absolute energy, and in the everlasting revolution and mutation of things."¹ This is language worthy of a Lucretius or his master Epicurus. It is certainly a

¹ *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 173.

falling off from the young author, so intent upon drawing out the spiritual side of existence that he would reduce the well-authenticated facts of the New Testament to be simply mythical expressions of the deeper truths of thought and life. But Strauss goes further, and excludes God from his philosophy. "After the plurality of gods," he tells us, "in the various religions had resolved themselves into the one personal God, He in like manner resolved Himself into the impersonal but person-shaping All. This same idea forms likewise the ultimate point of departure—from whichever point of view one regards it—of our Cosmic conception."¹

Herbert Spencer has also a "Cosmic conception." In many points he agrees with Strauss. But he struggles hard against the logic of his position, which tends to drift him ultimately to the same conclusion at which Strauss got stranded. He acknowledges a power behind the Cosmos. "A power," he says, "of which the nature remains forever inconceivable, and to which no limits in time or space can be imagined, works in us certain effects."² But he makes that power impersonal, and by that one word destroys the whole force of his assertion. What is an impersonal power "that works in us certain effects?" We can understand how material force is impersonal; but an impersonal intelligent force is to our mind an absurdity. Herbert Spencer accuses Christian philosophers of attempting to measure the Divinity by their own finite notions. There are some who deserve the rebuke. But we would say to Mr. Spencer, *mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur*. He allows his imagination to impede his reasoning powers. He can conceive no personality that is not limited like his own. This shows that he has no proper conception of what personality is. The essential idea of personality is not one of limiting. It is the completion, not the limitation, of a rational nature. St. Thomas calls it that which is most perfect in all nature;³ and Boethius defines it as the individual substance of a rational nature.⁴ Therefore, an infinite personality is the completion of an infinite rational nature. Here is no contradiction; for assuredly the infinite is perfect. In the light of these principles an impersonal power is a meaningless term when applied to the Prime Mover and Ordainer of all things.

Again, Herbert Spencer makes a tottering move in the right direction when he tells us that "matter, motion, and force, are but symbols of the unknown reality." This is true, but he is not war-

¹ The Old Faith and the New, p. 169.

² First Principles, p. 557; London edition.

³ Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod perfectissimum est in tota natura; scilicet subsistens in rationali natura. Summa, I., 29, iii.

⁴ Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia; which definition St. Thomas adopts, *ibid.*, I., 29, i.

ranted in asserting it. If the reality is unknown, how knows he that it is symbolized in these things? In his philosophy there is no means of knowing; and his only logical conclusion is with Strauss to make the Cosmos the great All—"simultaneously both cause and effect, the outward and the inward together." These partial truths occurring in the pages of Spencer, or Strauss, or Comte—and they all have paid sometimes eloquent tributes to truth—belong not to their philosophy. They are reminiscences of the old systems they would overturn; and in this clashing between old and new, do they receive their death-blow. With "advance" on their banners, these systems are fast receding to inanition. They begin in mistiness, and end in a maze of contradiction. Their authors pride themselves upon their enlightened conception of the Cosmos. This is especially their conquest and their boast. With their patient research, their wide-searching views of nature, their thoughtful consideration of her laws, they might throw a flood of light upon her operations, and demonstrate the power and greatness and exquisite work of the Great Worker, who is great in the creation of an atom as in the making of a world, provided they based their knowledge on sound principles in the stead of the scientific guesswork, which now makes the foundation of their theories.

To understand the symbolism of the Cosmos we must go back to principles found in the nature of things. True philosophy deals with the actual. It cannot, therefore, devote itself exclusively to nature. There is also a world of grace: though distinct, the two are inseparable; grace presupposes nature. There is not a man born of woman who has not been the recipient of grace, actual or sanctifying. The philosophy that rejects the religious element, can explain neither man nor nature; for it takes the one for what he is not, and it ignores the Author of the other. Therefore, the writer lays down as the principle that embodies the real relation of things, natural and supernatural, this synthetic formula:

*God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word and completes its destiny in the Word.*¹

This principle is not given to man intuitively; otherwise, all would apprehend it in the light of simple reason. Nor is it the product of unaided reason; else why so many theories denying a first cause and a future destiny? Besides, the WORD by whom God spoke and created, by whom man was redeemed, and whose coming raised humanity in the scale of creation, it was a purely gratuitous condescension of God to externize in time, and in His eternal designs to decree that He become incarnate, and that He be made

¹ For a short analysis of this principle and for the grounds on which the writer rejects the Giobertian formula *Ens creat existentias*, see the *International Review* for March, April, 1876.

the means by which the destiny of the Cosmos was to be fulfilled.¹ That Divine Word is a revelation of God to man. But inasmuch as the synthetic principle embodies actuality, it is truth. It is based upon reason, and the tradition of a primitive revelation. It is the last word at which philosophy arrives; but in synthesis it may become the first from which it starts. It throws a flood of light upon things of heaven and earth. It contains the how and the why of the Divine decrees concerning the creation. It explains the existence of humanity, of science, of literature. It is the realization of this principle that God sought in the act of creating and in the higher act of becoming incarnate. Let us see what meaning the Cosmos has for us in the light of this principle.

I. The Word by which God created, and in which He completed the destiny of the Cosmos, all things reveal.² Only by reason thereof have they a meaning. They reveal the Word as an effect reveals its cause; for every effect in one manner or other reveals its cause;³ and when God acts, medium and end are one with the primal cause; for all three are His own divine essence. Behind the veil of the created, and distinct from it, is the Creator. Back of the sign and symbol lies the reality. Now, man's knowledge of the finite and the sensible is subject to the conditions of space and time. But space and time are no constituents of essences; they only express relations; they clothe things in the drapery of the passing, and render them symbolical of the greater reality. Everything in life and literature, in art and science, is significant of something beyond that revealed by the actual impression. He who rests content with the smoothness and finish of the marble statue, or with the mere sound of the musical chord, or with the brilliancy of the colors on the pictured canvas, and perceives nothing more than a form, a note, a ray of light, mistakes the source and aim of art. The same is true of him who would gauge the meaning of life by its material pursuits. There is evidently something beyond the immediate object of living. Appearance says not all. The phenomenon does not reveal the whole of the noumenon. It reveals only so much as is necessary to distinguish specific differences in objects.

Here lie a Scylla and a Charybdis of thought, clear of which all philosophers have not sailed. It is not true that we only perceive

¹ Creation not being necessary, it follows that the Incarnation is not necessary; but the creative act being accomplished, it were incomplete in the realization of its destiny without the Incarnate act. This proposition admits of rigid demonstration by the law of sufficient reason, or as it is sometimes called, "of minimum means." See Rosmini, *Teodicea*, lib. iii, cap. vii, n. 433; also *Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale*, vol. i, p. 41. The writer has learned that this work is from the pen of Padre Rossi.

² *Ex uno verbo omnia, et unum loquuntur omnia.* De Im. Christi, lib. i., cap. iii.

³ *Respondeo dicendum quod omnis effectus aliquo modo representat suam causam, sed diversimode.* S. Thomas, *Summa*, I., 45, vii.

the phenomenon, and that the noumenon is altogether beyond our knowing. We have a glimpse of the essences of things; were it otherwise we could not define them. Neither is it true that man knows the whole noumenon. That is known to God alone. There is philosophic truth in those lines of Tennyson:

“Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;—
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.”

The value of a thing is expressed in the aptness with which it fulfils its destiny. It has a meaning accordingly. But finite things, not being self-existent, have not in themselves the meaning of their existence. That is found in their essential prototypes in the Divine Mind. Nor can man, if he would understand the Cosmos, measure its actual ways and workings by their apparent results. Their full bearing is known to Him alone who gave them being and set them in motion. The unseen is more than the seen. The actual is the symbol of the ideal. Though distinct, one cannot be separated from the other. The actual has its life only in the ideal. It receives therefrom all its significancy. As in speech, the object named determines the meaning of the word used—and not the word the object—so it is the ideal that gives meaning and significance to the actual. The ideal, then, is the real; the actual is its symbol. It is a false system of philosophy that gives the ideal only a mental existence, and makes of it simply a thing of abstraction. It exists in the Divine Mind, and the Divine Mind does not acquire knowledge by the process of abstraction. Therein is it one with the essences of things. Were the ideal only subjective, the Cosmos, God, the Word, would all of them be illusions, man the dupe of his own shadowy fancies, life the dream of a shadow. But no, the ideal has an objective existence. All things assert it. Art, in its various embodiments, in marble, in harmony, on the canvas, in poetry, symbolizes the ideal that gives it meaning. Religion, in its ceremonies and sacraments, symbolizes the spiritual world, with which it is for man the golden ladder of communication. Science, in the enunciation of its laws, symbolizes the relations of cause and effect, and the conditions that underlie the harmonies of the Cosmos. The ideal formula which expresses the synthetic principle of philosophy, is a symbol that speaks of the relations existing between God and His creation.

Nor is active life less symbolical. In its individual growth and development, in its personal trials and triumphs, it is significant of something beyond; it is a preparation; it is the composing of a

harmonious masterpiece which is to resound through all eternity ; it is the carving of a grand statue with which to adorn the great Hereafter ; it is the writing of a thrilling epic in which the spiritual warfare and progress of a soul will figure with undying interest. In time, only the rough materials are visible to us ; we but witness the uncouth block, the blacked and scored music, the scribbled and fragmentary epic ; but when the angel of death comes, unless we have been too indolent at our work, and left too much undone, he will illuminate the scroll, recite the poem, intone the sweet chords of harmony we have spun together, finish the statue ; and then, when the veil shall have dropped from our eyes, we will behold the import of all the mysteries of life. In its organic forms of society and government, life is equally symbolical. Government seeks to establish harmony political and social. It speaks and acts by a delegated authority. The power that gives it sanction is only represented in the actual ruler. He symbolizes the higher authority. The people may say who shall wield that power, but in themselves they possess it not. The sanction must come from above. Thus is government also a symbol. So, too, with the simple social relations of man with man. They cannot be ignored. They have serious claims upon his attention. It is an old maxim, and a true one, that he who lives alone must be either an angel or a devil. The disintegration of the social order leads to barbarism. Therefore it must be kept up by agreeable intercourse. The social life banishes all exertion ; it leaves strain and labor at the door ; it is accompanied with ease, graceful motion, pleasant expression ; therein is strength reserved and effort put aside ; the hard and rude in man's nature are softened and smoothed ; his selfish barbarism is suppressed ; the corners of his behavior are rounded ; truth, courteousness, beneficence, geniality are developed ; man becomes refined ; gentleness of disposition is drawn out ; he literally becomes a gentleman ; he falls under the influence of civilization ; he seeks a standard and follows fashion ; for when properly understood, fashion is, according to Emerson, "an attempt to organize beauty of behavior."¹ Nor is all this for its own sake. It has a meaning. It is a partial reversion to that civilization from which man originally fell. It is symbolical, though rudely, often a parody, of the harmonious relations of man with man, of thought with thought, that belong to another order of things, when neither distrust, nor suspicion, nor the selfish motive, nor sin, nor passion, can intrude and mar the beauty of the social intercourse. Life in its spiritual aspect approaches nearer to the ideal ; but it also has meaning by reason of something beyond. Those who look to the

¹ *Essays, Second Series, p. 144.*

workings of their souls, and listen to the dictates of their conscience, seem to live in another and a far different world from that in which those live who ignore the spiritual side of their nature. With them, "every event," says John Henry Newman, "has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object, and an awful moral."¹ The belief in a spiritual world, the communion with God and His saints, the passing from festival to festival, the preparation to celebrate each worthily, the effort continuously made to suppress the disorderly emotions of human nature, to become more pure and spiritualized, and thus to advance in perfection, the belief in a spirit-world of evil as well as of good, the struggles with the angel of sin and darkness, the distinctness with which these things are visible to the eye of faith, each and all make of this life a living allegory, a *Pilgrim's Progress* in action. That which John Bunyan embodied in his prose poem, had been the uppermost thought of the Mediæval Christians during centuries. He wrote the history of each soul's spiritual life. The same history had in substance been frequently preached from the pulpit; and nigh two hundred years previously to Bunyan, did the monk, Guillaume de Guileville, in his *Pèlerinage de l'Homme*, embody the same idea in allegorical form. And if the tinker-dreamer is remembered, whilst the Cistercian monk is all but forgotten, it is because the former brought to his allegory a robust diction and a Protestant animus which the latter was incapable of, and to which responded the hearts of millions of English people. But life, spiritual and physical, is, like all God's designs, more than symbol. *Ernst ist das Leben*. It is serious, for the destiny of eternity depends upon the manner in which it is acted out.

To God, too, is the Cosmos a symbol; and to Him alone is the whole meaning of its destiny and the fearful reality underlying it, no mystery. To man, has it been given to think in sign and symbol. Therefore, in philosophy and literature, he attempts the explanations of the riddles he everywhere meets; in art, he undertakes to imitate the creative act and embody ideals which his genius learns from the nature of things; in life, he seeks to realize the meaning of his existence; in science he would rend the veil of creation's temple and read the deeper mysteries behind; in all cases, it is abyss leading to abyss, each deep calls upon a deeper depth; and the last discovery is a more abstruse enigma than the

¹ Idea of a University, p. 133.

first. One symbol becomes expressed in terms of another more inexplicable symbol. Only one Being has no symbolic significance for man, and that Being is God. He is in Himself *actus purissimus*—most pure actuality. He is not circumscribed by the condition of space and time. He is an eternal Presence. He alone can define Himself as the *I am who am*. He perceives essences. But though a living, infinite, omnipresent Monad, He also possesses in himself number, for He is Triune. Therefore He not only sees things generally. He has regard also to the specific, the single, the individual. His Omniscience, like all His other powers and attributes, is infinite in intensity. By the preservative act with which He keeps all things in existence, He is intimately present to them, still remaining distinct from them. A different aspect does the Cosmos present to Him, from what it presents to man, which were man able to express he would no longer be man, but God. A far different idea of the Cosmos might man have, were there to be lifted, only for a moment, the scales of space and time which now bedim and confine his vision. He would behold the laws of nature in harmonious working, with exception and rule and apparent contradiction, contrast and opposition all reconciled; matter in its nature and essence; the source and principle of life; the long chain of vegetable and animal life, in all their linked organic relations germinating, living, acting, developing, decaying, dying; over all and greatest of all, the flower of earthly existence, man. Still grander were the vision of man: Every individual distinct; each showing a predominant trait of character; in each a different guiding principle; one actuated by this or that passion, or by this or that virtue; the dispositions and motives of all laid open at once; all the notes of humanity assailing the ear at one and the same time, from the infant's wail at birth, through the varied sounds of joy and sorrow, of pleasure and pain, to the death-rattle; life in all its phases simultaneously passing before the eye; humanity a moving mass between an eternal past and an eternal future, which are both but an eternal present. All is a continual becoming. But this is on the surface. In time we see but change and motion; in eternity is there fixity. Beneath the passing lies the permanent. Becoming is meaningless without a permanent state beyond which there is no further change. But the thing becoming cannot determine that state; otherwise it would already have experience of it and would no longer need to become. The Cosmos, then, has not in itself the power of determining permanency. That lies with Him who has in Himself the meaning of its existence.

The Word, the Incarnate Word, is the clue to the symbolism of the Cosmos. It is in the nature of things that the inferior exist

for the superior, and subserve its purposes. Therefore, the natural exists for the supernatural, the Cosmos for the Word; and whatever meaning there is in creation is solved by the understanding of its relations with the Creator. Now, the actual has its whole meaning, its life and being, in the ideal; but the ideal in actuality is the created real, fashioned after the uncreated ideal in the Divine Mind;¹ therefore reality has all its meaning from the creating Power, which is the Word; and through all forms of life and existence runs the Divine note. All symbolize one act; all speak one word. That Word is no symbol, it is reality. It possesses the wisdom of the Divinity; it contains the reason of existences. In becoming incarnate, it bridged over the abyss between the infinite and the finite, and reconciled them. In man is the Cosmos epitomized. He is matter and spirit. In the Incarnate Word, the God-man, has the Cosmos found the inchoate fulfilment of its destiny. *God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word, and completes its destiny in the Word.*

II. On a misapprehension of the fact that God is pure reality, *actus purissimus*, in no sense a symbol, but the author of all symbolism, is based that erroneous conception that He is unknowable. Those who so conceive Him, confound knowing with imagining. They fancy that nothing can be understood which cannot first be represented to the mind's eye. They forget that while man cannot comprehend the infinite, he may still apprehend it. Now, the unanimous testimony of men in reference to a Supreme Being proves that man conceives such. The various attempts made to represent Him in wood, or stone, or descriptive language, prove that His great simplicity and His infinite perfections were not thoroughly comprehended by man. To make finite reason the measure of the infinite God is to reverse the order of things, and make reason the only God. This Comte did when he reduced Him to a metaphysical entity; this Herbert Spencer does in relegating Him to the unknowable; and prior to either Dupuis did the same, when he undertook to prove that the God of Christianity was as much a fiction of the brain as the deities on Olympus. "The gods," he says, "are, to my mind, children of men; and I think

¹ I distinguish between the *real* and the *actual*. The *actual* has meaning only by reason of the ideal which it expresses. It is the ideal that gives *reality* to the *actual*. Therefore the ideal is the *real*. The *actual* expresses a *perfect reality* in proportion as it approaches the ideal in the Divine Mind; which it does by the embodiment of a *created ideal*. It is that *created ideal* which is the standard of all excellence, and which the poet and the artist endeavor to express in words, on canvas, or in marble. The ideal they express or represent cannot be the *uncreated ideal*; for in that case *they would have* intuition direct and immediate from the Godhead,—which is not so, no matter how strongly affirmed by Gioberti and the Ontologists. In this sense, the *ideal* is the *created essence*; perhaps it is the noumenon of Kant, but which Kant misapprehended.

with Hesiod, that earth has produced heaven."¹ This were true enough were heaven to mean simply the Olympus from which Jupiter thundered; but when it includes the abode of the one, true, eternal Deity, we must totally dissent from it, and say rather that heaven produced earth, after which earth produced polytheism and fetichism, including the myth of M. Dupuis. To trace how this came to pass, is to account for the origin of mythology, a theme interesting as it is difficult. A few words on the subject may not be amiss.

The physical Cosmos may be viewed either scientifically or æsthetically. In one case, reason is the faculty most exercised; in the other, imagination predominates. Viewed in either way, the Cosmos is a grand symbol. Scientifically considered, nature is investigated, and her phenomena are referred to their causes. Reason is not satisfied with the outward appearance. It seeks to investigate essences; the primary truths, common to humanity and recognized by all as evident, it brings to bear upon the rest and motion, the action and reaction, the solid and liquid and gaseous states of bodies. It applies instruments to discover the secrets of Nature; it questions her by experiment; it resolves matter into simpler and more primary elements. Mathematics is the key with which to interpret the physical sciences. In its simple formulæ it embodies laws, in obedience to which star and planet and atom move; which regulate crystallic and magnetic action; which define gravitation force; which point out the comet's track, and compute the electric flash. In the present time, this view of nature has become almost the exclusive one. But the primitive peoples did not forget to make a scientific study of the laws of the Cosmos. Nature was for them, as well as for us, an inexhaustible book; and, if all were known, it might be proved that, where we know scarcely the alphabet of the physical sciences, they were deeply read. The Bible, in Genesis, in Job, in the Psalms, speaks of the great problems of creation, with what Humboldt calls "individualizing accuracy; and," he adds, "many questions are propounded which we, in the present state of our physical knowledge, may, indeed, be able to express under more scientific definitions, but scarcely to answer satisfactorily."² And to mention only one instance of the broad views of things taken in the Book of Job, we need but recur to the history of science, and notice the numerous conjectures formed of the earth, its shape and position in space, and then read the profound science contained in these words: "He stretcheth the north over the empty space, and hangeth the earth upon nothing."³ Going back still

¹ Les Dieux, chez moi, sont enfants des hommes; et je pense comme Hesiode, que la terre a produit le ciel.—*Sur les Origines de la Culte*, I, Int., p. xxii.

² Cosmos, vol. ii., p. 59, Amer. ed.

³ Job, chap. xxvi.

further in the history of nations, we find the Chaldeans at an early period treating questions of astronomy and chronology with a scientific accuracy, astonishing even at present, and laying the foundation of modern astronomical calculations—nay, more, constructing for us our divisions of time. They gave us the signs of the zodiac; they divided for us the ecliptic into 360 degrees, the degree into 60 minutes, the minute into 60 seconds, and the second into 60 tierces;¹ they brought numbers to a degree of perfection that cannot yet be excelled, though they computed on a much more complicated basis than the decimal system, namely, the system of sexagesimal fractions. “The people of Babylon,” says Lenormant, “and of Chaldæa, constantly put this system in practice in all orders of quantities and measurements.”² The tablet of Senkereh, in the British Museum, written in cuneiform inscription of a very ancient character, reveals numerical calculations which prove the science of numbers to have been thoroughly understood at least twenty centuries before our era. Lenormant, commenting upon it in a special monograph devoted to the purpose, calls it an “heirloom of that mysterious primitive civilization which preceded the Semites in Babylon, and from which these Semites gathered their system of cuneiform writing already formed.”³ Here is a strong light thrown upon early times. It reveals to us these primitive peoples not as living in inaction, or bewildered by the greatness of the material universe, or in awe of all things animate or inanimate, as some would picture them; but as solid thinkers, whose speculations have already reached a practical result, entering into business transactions and commercial relations, following industrial pursuits, and learned in the arts and sciences. “Never before the discovery of this monument,” says Lenormant, in wonder at the proficiency it reveals, “would we have dared to make so bold a conjecture as to suppose that at least twenty centuries before the Christian era, at the beginning of the first Semitic empire of Chaldæa, if not still earlier, the science of numbers had made such progress in this part of the ancient world, that at that time the people of Erech, of Our, of Larsam, of Babylon, moved with so great facility in the operations of calculations the most delicate and complicated, knew how to form the squares and cubes of numbers, as well as to extract their roots, were acquainted with the scale of the powers of numbers, and employed a mechanism of exponents exactly like that

¹ Mais les Chaldéens n'avaient pas inventé seulement la division de l'ecliptique en 360 degrés et 720 moria. Sextus Empiricus dit formellement qu'ils avaient divisé le degré en 60 minutes, et Géminius que de plus ils divisaient la minute en 60 secondes, et la seconde en 60 tierces.—Lenormant, *Essai sur un Document Mathématique Chaldéen*. Paris, 1868, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ *Essai sur un Document Mathématique Chaldéen*, p. 159.

which mathematicians of our own time make use of."¹ These rays of light, coming to us from the remote past, reveal a state of things modern philosophy has been disposed to discredit. What the Egyptian priest said to Solon, as reported by Plato,² seems equally applicable to more modern times: "You are youths in intelligence; for you hold no ancient opinions derived from remote tradition, nor any system of discipline that can boast of a hoary old age." Men of the present are inclined to consider themselves as the discoverers and authors of all scientific progress. They break loose from the traditions of the remote past. They ignore the fact that they were as helpless as Archimedes in his boast to move the world, if that past had not given them the foothold, and planted for them the fulcrum upon which they might effectively move the lever of their scientific attainments. They are prone to take their ignorance of the past as a criterion of the knowledge it possessed. But let them remember that not all which antiquity knew has been written; nor has all which it wrote been preserved. This important rule seems to have dropped out of Kreuzer's calculations when he deduced the following inferences: "A glance at the poetry and the religion of the diverse peoples is sufficient to convince one of an incontestable fact, namely, that all have shared this antique and universal belief that everything in nature is endowed with life and sentiment. There is no distinction of matter and spirit in the native thought of the first men; everything lives a common and uniform life."³ These peoples did distinguish between spirit and matter; but so evident was the distinction to them, so intimately present to them was belief in an immaterial order of things, that it never occurred to them to assert it formally. The spiritual world was to them as much, perhaps more, a reality than the material world. The human mind begins to make formal distinctions only when it fears a misunderstanding.

Æsthetically considered, the Cosmos appeals to man's sense of the beautiful and awakens the ideal in his mind. It mirrors forth the Divinity, His power and glory; and as such man regards it with reverence. As man is the Cosmos in miniature, combining as he does in a single personality both matter and spirit, there is be-

¹ Jamais avant la découverte de ce monument on n'eut osé pousser la hardiesse des conjectures jusqu'à supposer que vingt siècles au moins avant l'ère chrétienne, au début du premier empire Sémitique de Chaldée, sinon plus anciennement encore, la science des nombres avait fait de tels progrès dans cette partie du monde ancien; que des lors les gens d'Erech, d'Our, de Larsam, de Babylone, se mouvaient avec une aussi grande facilité dans les opérations de calcul les plus délicates et les plus compliquées, savaient former les carrés et les cubes des nombres et en extraire les racines, connaissaient l'échelle des puissances des nombres et employaient un mécanisme d'exposants exactement emblable à celui dont se servent les mathématiciens de nos jours.—Ibid., p. 158.

² Timæus.

³ Religions de l'Antiquité, tr. fr. Guigniaut, L. I., p. 19.

tween him and Nature a deep-laid link that binds him in relations of sympathy with it. When man fell, we are told that Nature, on his account, was cursed; the soil grew barren, and gave forth abundance only in return for the sweat he poured upon it; seeds of degeneracy took possession of the very plant and animal.¹ This hidden sympathy is in part the secret of man's attachment to his native land, to the place he has for years inhabited, to the scenery of hill and dale of which he grows fond. The æsthetic view of nature gives art and literature; the ratiocinative view gives science. They are both of them distinct, though each may occasionally intrude on the domain of the other; but once they went hand in hand; and were man still unfallen they would be found more intimately blended in the human mind. Prior to the fall, the symbolism of Nature was an unclouded mirror in which man read much of the meaning of earth and heaven. He clearly saw beneath the symbol the ideal which it symbolized. The harmony of spirit, sense, and soul within himself was reflected in the harmony of the universe. The true was not separated from the good, nor the good from the true, nor the beautiful from either, but all three were one.

But the fall broke the harmony that had previously existed in man's consciousness. By it he came under the control of his senses; he gravitated towards the material; disturbance in the moral order produced disturbance in the physical and intellectual orders; the serene light of reason became clouded by thick-coming fancies, and man in its stead began to follow the will-o'-the-wisps of conjecture and opinion. The symbolism of the Cosmos became obscured. But at the same time, God more clearly expressed to man the real relations of things and completed in substance the ideal formula of philosophical instruction which He had been imparting to him. For it was then He showed man that his destiny was to be completed in and by the Word, whom He announced to him as the Redeemer.² This truth was kept alive with prophetic clearness among the Jewish race down to the coming of the Divine Saviour; the sacred depository since then has been intrusted to the Church which it pleased the Word to make the visible medium of salvation. It was also preserved among the Gentile nations, though in an imperfect manner, and overlaid with fiction. But in spite of this luminous truth so emphatically laid down in the Divine revelation, the veil of corruption shut out its brilliant rays from man's intelligence, and nations sat in the shadow of darkness. Man fell more and more under the dominion of the senses; he lost sight of the ideal; he lost sight of the creative act;

¹ Genesis iii. 17-19.

² Genesis iii. 15.

he lost sight of the Creator Himself; and finally identifying the symbol with the thing symbolized, he became an idolater. The many attributes of the Divinity which were symbolized in the sun and the stars, in light and darkness, in the elements—the wind, the rain, and the ocean—became so many divinities; thus, we find the signs of the zodiac to be, not of scientific or agricultural, but of mythological origin. The ideal having become separated from the actual in man's conception of things, he looks not beneath their surface. "The personal idea of God," say Lenormant and Chevalier, "was by degrees confounded with the various manifestations of His power; His attributes and qualities were personified in a host of secondary agents, distributed in a regular hierarchy, in agreement with the general organization of the world and the preservation of its inhabitants. Thus originated that polytheism which in its varied and strange symbolism finally embraced the entire creation."¹ And thus is mythology primarily based upon Nature-worship. Men saw not the Energizer back of Nature's energies; these they worshipped; these they personified and represented in picture and statue. "That which the purified intelligence calls a force," says Kreuzer, "this primitive observation calls a person."² But it is erroneous to consider this the sole fountain-head of mythology. It were to leave unexplained many of the myths and legends of antiquity. Hero-worship was another source of polytheism. "Among the Greeks," says the last-named author, "men were raised to the rank of gods for their extraordinary qualities, their fine actions, and their services."³ He might have added other nations as well. With all men is it natural, in the course of time and after the human failings and imperfections are forgotten, to make a hero of the benefactor, and as the deeds are exaggerated in number and quality, to attribute to them a Divine origin. Thus it was that the hero who had benefited a people was remembered with gratitude; statues were erected to his memory; the feats he performed became the germs whence sprung many with no existence outside the fancy that nurtured them; they were no longer deeds within the power of man to compass; only a god could have achieved them; therefore, a god was their benefactor. But among the Greeks there are myths of a later origin which may be regarded as moral allegories, for instance, the ethical myth of Pallas Athenè.

III. The history of mythology, in its origin and early development, is explained by, while it is a confirmation of, the synthetic principle of philosophy: *God actualizes the Cosmos by the Word and completes its destiny in the Word.* Men did not begin by forgetting

¹ Ancient History of the East, vol. i., p. 318, Eng. tr.

² Religions de l'Antiquité, trad. par Guigniant, t. I., i., p. 121.

³ Ibid., t. III., iii., p. 854.

this principle, but by misapprehending it. Indeed, it is doubtful if a single term of it has ever dropped out of the teachings of human tradition. Where it is unexpressed, it is frequently implied, for it alone can give meaning to many of the forms and ceremonies of the religions of antiquity. The first term upon which men erred was the term *actualizes*. In speculating upon the manner in which God actualized the Cosmos they lost sight of the nothingness from which He drew it. The maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, true only when applied to secondary causes, practically became the measure of their conception of the Primary Cause. They could not grasp the idea of creation. They knew God to be a Monad, and they had to account for multiplicity. The idea which first and most naturally suggested itself was that of generation. Hence, they imagined the Primary Cause as an androgynous being, that is, one combining in himself both the male and female principle. All the older mythologies, such as the Egyptian and Assyro-Chaldæan, as well as the mysteries and ceremonies, abound in allusions to, and draw their meaning from, that idea. Mythology afterwards embodied the conception of two distinct beings, either eternally coexisting, as Ormuzd and Ahriman were conceived to be by the later Zoroastrians, though not by Zarathustra himself; or engendered from the First Principle as the Yn and Yang of the Chinese, or the humid and igneous elements of the Chaldæans.¹

But in the midst of these vagaries, those primitive peoples retained the consciousness of the term *God*. In recognizing more than one Divine Being, they were destroying the proper conception of the Divinity; but they were at the same time acknowledging the existence of Him they sought in His works. So evident was His existence to all, so easily might He be found by the earnest searcher, so intimately present was He to each individual, that St. Paul does not hold the pagan of his day excused for not having known Him. Nor was the term, *the Word*, altogether forgotten by men. Throughout the nations there hovered a dim idea, as of an almost forgotten tradition, that a Redeemer of men was to come among them. In India the idea took most definite shape. The Avatars of Hindu mythology foreshadow that central fact of all history, that clue to all philosophy, the Incarnation of the Word.² It might be proven that the primitive nations became

¹ Lenormant thus sums up his discussion of the legend of Semiramis. Fille d'un être ichthyomorphe, Dercéto, la déesse colombe, Semiramis, épouse un dieu-poisson, Ninus = *nunu*; sortie du principe humide, de l'abîme primordial la déesse ignée est fécondée par l'action de ce principe.—*La Légende de Semiramis*, Paris, 1872, p. 62. And still there are school histories which give the whole fable for fact. However, it is much more innocent than many another imposed upon man's credulity.

² F. Thébaud, in his late admirable work, has these suggestive words on the subject: "How did the idea originate among them, that some deity ought to take a human

more or less civilized in proportion as they more or less clearly realized in their actions and their literature the synthetic formula of philosophy, or in other words, their origin and destiny. A primitive revelation they all of them had. Tradition kept alive the substance of this revelation, and in so far as it was the actuating principle of their lives were they successful. If there were no God, it would be right and proper for man to consult self at all times, and under all circumstances to abide by its dictates. But since there is a God, man has Him to rely on and to make the motive of his deeds. Any turning away from Him is a degradation of the individual. Therefore, when man lost sight of God, he sunk down into himself, practically made self the principle of all things, and deified his passions, his appetites, his thoughts. Every stock and stone that he conceived possessed of Divine power he paid homage to, whether it was a tree, as the Vata of India;¹ a stone, as with the Dakotas of the West;² a dog, as with the Parsees; a bundle of rags or a tuft of straw; an old hat or a rusty nail, as with the negroes;³ there in a special manner was the Divinity conceived to be concentrated, and there was He worshipped. Such things were considered locations of the Divinity, because they were instruments of magic, by means of which supernatural results were supposed to be brought about. "When," says F. Schlegel, "we come to examine more closely the accounts of that Fetish-worship (so-called) which is most widely diffused through the interior of Africa, and prevails among some American tribes and nations of the northeast of Asia, it is easy to perceive that magical rites are connected with it, and that all these corporeal objects are but magical instruments and conductors of magical power, and that the religion of these nations, sunk undoubtedly to the lowest grade of idolatry, comprises nothing beyond the rude beginnings of a pagan magic, such as, in all probability, was practiced by the Cainites."⁴ Fetishism is also connected with the older forms of polytheism, when prior to the anthropomorphic image and the glowing myth of the Iliad or the Ramayana, the gods were symbolized in a stone or an uncouth block of wood.

And it would seem that the more profoundly symbolical a people was, the deeper was the degradation into which it became sunken. There is the Chaldæan of old. His founder, Nimrod, who is spoken of in Scripture as "a mighty hunter before the Lord," whom he remembered as a lion in the battle-field, an eagle in the chase, he

shape and 'dwell among us?' We cannot say. Perhaps it was derived from the primitive tradition about the one who was 'to crush the head of the serpent.'—*Gentilism*, p. 165.

¹ Hardwick.

² Schoolcraft.

³ S. B. Gould.

⁴ *Philosophy of History*, p. 199.

actually represented with the body of a lion and the wings of an eagle. In the formation of this species of symbolism the Chaldæan cosmogony had much to do. As that speaks of "bulls with human heads, dogs with four bodies and with fishes' tails, men and horses with dogs' heads, creatures with the heads and bodies of horses but with the tails of fish and other animals, mixing the forms of various beasts," all as existing prior to man, it was natural for the popular mind to couple the idea of their first founder with these monsters. But Chaldæa received its symbolism in a great measure from Egypt; for we are told that "Chur begat Nimrod;" and the latest researches of history prove the accuracy of the Scripture phrase.¹

"Symbolism," says Lenormant, "was the very essence of the genius of the Egyptian nation, and of their religion." Every relic of Egyptian civilization confirms the assertion, and points to her as pre-eminently the land of symbolism. The hieroglyph-covered monuments look down upon us with a look of deep significancy; the Sphinx tells of an insoluble riddle; the Pyramids have their meaning. The temples speak of mysteries symbolized. The deep scientific knowledge of the Egyptian priesthood gave them insight into the properties of plants and the predominant traits of animals; and accordingly both plant and animal were made symbolical of some attribute of the Divinity. The doctrine of emanation finally led them to conceive Him as embodied in these objects. With them, in all probability, began the custom of representing the gods with the heads of animals and the bodies of men. Herodotus was anxious to know why Jupiter was represented with the head of a ram, and was told that he so appeared to Hercules.² But primarily it symbolized "the great idea of a supreme and invisible God becoming perceptible to our sight by the creation of the universe, represented here by the sun entering the zodiacal sign of the ram."³ When the primitive idea became more corrupt, it symbolized the Divinity as existing alike in man and beast. The priests, in their religious processions, masked themselves in the head of some animal according to the god they were honoring. "The sun and planets," says Kreuzer, "have their abodes in heaven; these abodes are the signs of the zodiac, represented by animals; consequently the sun and the planets bear the figure of the sign in which they are found. And when the priests, in their processions and religious ceremonies, wished to represent the different stations and relations of these astronomical gods, they took themselves analogous masks."⁴ And still, with all its science, and all its symbolism, Egypt fell low in

¹ See Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i.

² *Gentilism*, p. 329.

³ Book II., chap. 42.

⁴ I., i., p. 505.

idolatry; perhaps no nation ever degraded itself in its mysteries and ceremonies of religion as did Egypt. It shows what a people can become when abandoned to itself and oblivious of God and His revelation.

But the age of myths is not passed. Man to-day, as formerly, uses sign and symbol in his thinking. A word gives sufficient material from which to spin a thread of fiction. The name of a person or place, a metaphor, a personification, is each the basis upon which many an aerial structure of mythology is raised. Man communicates ideas by means of sensible images. Abstractions he finds existing only in the concrete. The finite is the plane upon which his intelligence converges all things. It gives a miniature picture. Even the infinite, though ever making correct use of it, he knows how to express but in its relations with the finite: it is the not-finite. Men are still to be found who are content to rule their lives by fictions of the brain; that is, by myths. True, they have abandoned the sensuous and palpable form; but in its place they have substituted a scientific abstraction, a Cosmic theory without the author of the Cosmos. Now, he who reduces to a mathematical formula, as a mere natural force, the Being who created him; who finds in the universe no God but law; who considers nature self-sufficient, and self the sole standard of action, is a refined Fetish-worshipper. The meaning of the symbolism of the Cosmos has passed from him.

FASHIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN POETRY.

Deirdré. Boston: Roberts Brothers. No Name Series. 8vo., pp. 262. 1876.

Songs in the Night and other Poems. By the author of *Christian Schools and Scholars.* London: Burns & Oates. 8vo., pp. 211. 1876.

THE poetry of this generation is a revival of the artificial school which preceded Wordsworth, with, however, none of its verbal polish, and may be divided as follows: (1), the class of Motiveless Despair; (2), the Profoundly Unintelligible; (3), the Flesh class; (4), and the Croquet class, *vers de société*. The productions of these classes except the second (Browning being its chief), are generally of the newspaper grade of merit, and harmonize pleasingly with the amateurishness of "culture" peculiar to complaisant people in an immature stage of intellectual development; wanting standards and the educated faculty for their application, and pretentious and positive in proportion. The truest of American poets, Lowell, is not popularly appreciated to the full, because he does not belong to any of the classes specified; because, in other words, he is lucid, natural, correct, and true, and the beauties of his verse are too delicate for the hasty and unrefined. It is never necessary to resort to the symbols of algebra to ascertain what he means; he never despairs, and his lyrics are richly sensuous but never sensual—a significant distinction. He is a poet, moreover, of genuine sentiment, chaste and sweet in quality, and always perfectly in tune; yet one does not find his poems as frequently on American family tables as those of some of the journalistic verse-affectors "who string their losses on a rhyming thread," and who "chatter on molehills (far under the hill of the Muses)."¹

"Greekish girls, not Greeks, are ye!"²

Most of the poetry of this character is merely *réchauffé*; the inspiration comes from without to the writers, not from within; its production is owing to reading, not to overpowering poetic feeling, much less to the *mania* of Plato. It is merely the infection of the poetry of others imbibed by contact;—a disease is mistaken for afflatus, infection for inspiration, sympathy for a call to write, and a corner in a newspaper for immortality.

Shelley used to ponder over the mythological fiction that the Muses were daughters of Memory, not of Invention; and their dis-

¹ Chapman's Preface to the Iliad, 1598.

² Iliad., lib. ii.

ciples have been true to the family origin since Homer supplied material for an *Æneid*, and an *Æneid* furnished many a later and lesser Virgil, but the Nine must not be held responsible for every one who cries "Muse, Muse!"

"We call the muse. . . . 'O muse, benignant muse!'—
 As if we had seen her purple-braided head
 With the eyes in it, start between the boughs
 As often as a stag's. What make-believe
 With so much earnest! What effete results
 From virile efforts! What cold wire-drawn odes
 From such white heats!—bucolics where the cows
 Would scare the writer if they splashed the mud
 In lashing off the flies,—didactics driven
 Against the heels of what the master said;
 And counterfeiting epics, shrill with trumps
 A babe might blow between two straining cheeks
 Of bubbled rose, to make his mother laugh;
 And elegiac griefs, and songs of love,
 Like cast-off nosegays, picked up on the road,
 The worse for being warm!"

It is a manifest misfortune for art and imagination that so much verse is written; if there were less poetry, there would be greater poets. The multiplicity of books has so crowded the mind with the creatures of others' fancy, that no room remains for the results of spontaneous generation; one's own imagination is turned out of doors to make room for guests who, like a rural minister's donation party, bring baskets' full with them, but destroy the carpet, the furniture, and the dishes in exhibiting and enjoying their own generosity. To a poetic mind, capable of original self-sustaining operation, too many books are an injury; they are wary foes hidden in devices worthy of wily Ulysses, and reverentially drawn inside the gates to inflict a ruin which no Sinon is required to hasten, and no Laocoön can stay. The poets born may well protest to the poets made,

"I fear the Greeks
 Even when they bring us gifts."

Nor the poets only. Oratory has also suffered from over-production, and is in a decline by surfeit. Demosthenes transcribed Thucydides six times; had he enjoyed six authors instead of one, Greece would probably have had smaller defence against Philip, and the orator of whom Fénelon says, "he lightens, he thunders, he is a torrent which sweeps everything before it," would have afforded himself more enervating delight, and incurred less fatiguing labor, and would have dissipated in the frivolous pleasures of transient fancy what he has enlarged for posterity. The great orations, like the greatest poems, are those which are freest from

recondite erudition. The ultimate sources of both are the same, nature and simple imagination; and both have flourished most successfully under conditions at first the rule, now the exception,—conditions which exclude many books and are limited in largest part to extreme simplicity or intense passion. Simplicity is the mother of poetry; but oratory is born of turbulence. The muse of the one is sightless, as Homer was and Milton; but it is war which furnishes the orations in the *Iliad*, which, when not oratory, is poetry in its simple elements—nature—physical, mental, and emotional; and Milton would have been a truer poet had he been a poorer scholar; his God he quoted from Calvin's writings, his Lucifer is snatched from the wars of the Lord Protector, his armament is that of his own age, his language is of all ages, and the reader feels overpowered by incessant showers of lore selected from every country and every epoch, so heterogeneous as to bewilder, so brilliant as to dazzle. Thus *Lycidas*, his least, is more popular than *Paradise Lost*, his greatest; the heart is in the former, the latter is produced from the memory and the brain. It was the wars which brought forth the oratory of Greece, it was war which commissioned the orators of Rome, of France, of England, of Ireland and the United States, and war leaves books in the secret dust, and has no respect for any science but its own. If we

“To the famous orators repair,
Those ancient, whose resistless eloquence
Wielded at will the fierce democratic,
Shook the arsenal, and fulminated over Greece,
To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne,”

we find these men to have been ignorant of science, and so far as their orations show, ignorant also of what it is now fashionable to call “culture.” The fiercer and more frequent the conflicts, the more science dwindled; books were not in demand; poetry alone was active and in sympathy with its twin sister, oratory. “Even the most illogical of modern writers,” says Macaulay, “would stand perfectly aghast at the puerile fallacies which seem to have deluded some of the greatest men of antiquity. . . . But the very circumstances which retarded the growth of science were peculiarly favorable to the cultivation of eloquence.”

Simplicity is the essence of poetry, as passion is of oratory; and the epic, the highest form of poetry, is most urgent in its demand upon simplicity. It has not been disputed, and, in all probability it never will be, that the *Iliad* remains the model of epic verse. Yet what is the *Iliad*? A story of brutal love and more brutal war.

Agamemnon frankly exclaims, alluding to the quarrel which comprises the whole of the first book:

“Myself and Thetis’ son
Like girls, in words fought for a girl;”¹

and “the king himself thus prayed for all:”

“O Jove, most great, most glorious, that in the starry hall
Sitt’st drawing dark clouds up to air, let not the sun go down,
Darkness supplying it, till my hands the palace and the town
Of Priam overthrow and burn, the arms on Hector’s breast
Dividing, spoiling with my sword thousands, in interest
Of his bad quarrel, laid by him in dust and eating earth.”²

A savage prayer, but no more savage than the cowardly taunt of Agamemnon to the aged Chryses, offering ransom for his daughter. When the priest explained that Jove was wroth on that account,

“Heroic Agamemnon rose,”

—heroic in nothing except the brutal, and, wantonly insulting the seer as a “prophet of ill,” expresses a reluctant willingness to give up “fair Chryseis” for the weal of the army, provided proper recompense is made to him. Then “godlike” Achilles displays the mettle of his heroism by coarsely charging Agamemnon with being “in all ambition most covetous of all that breathe;” but he is willing to dicker with him for the loss of the stolen girl, and insists upon publicly declaring with contemptuous candor:

“O thou impudent! of no good but thine own
Ever respectful, but of that with all craft covetous,
With what heart can a man attempt a service dangerous,
Or at thy voice be spirited to fly upon a foe,
Thy mind thus wretched?”

He calls the king of men “thou dog’s eyes,” and the king of men retorts: “Strifes, battles, bloody things make thy blood-feasts still.” Whereupon Achilles could scarcely restrain his godlike sword from slaughtering his companion, and possibly he would have done so, had not Minerva “stooped down from heaven” and dissuaded him by a promise of future and sweeter revenge. He enjoyed, however, the temporary gratification of applying to the king such epithets as “ever steep’d in wine,” “dog’s face,” “with heart but of a hart,” “subject-eating king;” and the possible onset was again checked by “sweet-spoken Nestor,” who appealed to the gods to “repel these young men’s passions,” and they separated in wordy rage, Achilles to his tent and ships, Agamemnon to offer sacrifice to the gods. Compelled by superstition to give up the priest’s daughter, he orders Achilles to surrender to him Briseis, “whom

¹ *Iliad.*, lib. ii., Chapman’s versification is used throughout the article.

² *Il.*, ii., *ibid.*

all the Greeks to him (Achilles) gave," and godlike Achilles wails over it, and complains to Thetis of his loss, and prays her to kneel to Jove and persuade him to betray the Greeks, and to enable the Trojans "to beat them to fleet and sea," "embruung their retreat in slaughter." When the "rude fool" Thersites, dared allude to Agamemnon's injustice to Achilles, Ulysses, "the divine," poured upon that garrulous hunchback a sputtering of abuse and contumely; then whipped him, cripple as he was, until "bloody wales arose." Nor is the story of the *Æneid* less brutal, except that it is tempered more gently by Æneas's beauty and the recital of unhappy Dido's woes. Yet these are the great epics; the study of universal youth; the admiration and heritage of mankind; the most illustrious art of the brightest and serenest poetic genius. Their faults are protected with religious reverence, and they keep their position because in their essence is found the ultimate pure principle of poetry,—simplicity. They are offensive to Christian virtue, and outrage on almost every page the sensibilities of civilization; but they are nevertheless pre-eminent in the pure poetic element, and therefore retain their immortality in spite of their faults.

Lowell relates the anecdote of Wordsworth's striking his whip through the hooped petticoat of an old lady in a picture, as being happily typical, after the manner of mythological prefiguration, of his afterwards "striking his defiant lash through the hooped petticoat of the artificial style of poetry, and proudly unsubdued by the punishment of the reviewers."¹ We do not know whether any episode in the childhood of the author of *Deirdré* furnished fit augury of his desertion of the poetic school of his own time, in order to return to the distant fountain of epic verse there to drink his inspiration. Indeed, we cannot but wish that even the name of Dr. Robert Joyce were as unknown in this early and misty hour of his reputation, as the hidden freaks of his infancy—for the fact of his graduation by the University of Dublin only contributes prejudices to a discussion of his talent—and *Deirdré* does not acquire additional merit from the only other important fact mentioned in relation to its author, that he is an able and successful practitioner in Boston. It were better for the poet and the poem that his personality remained unknown and unsuspected until its proper place be judicially assigned beyond the chances of hypotheses; it is better, too, for the critics and the non-critical public that they should have an opportunity to read, discuss, comment upon, and judge literary and artistic productions independently of personal considerations, and unblinded by the predilections, for or against, which nationality, religion, social and professional distinction, or

¹ Among My Books, vol. ii.

unworthy friendship, or more unworthy enmity inspires. Predilections upon a personal basis are invariably misleading, though the friend study to be impartial and the enemy flatter himself that he is just, and criticism, even in its highest and most civil plane, is as thoroughly personal to-day, if it be granted the right to be so, as it was with Hazlitt. To be his contemporary was to be abused. The old Greek injunction, "Call no man happy till he be dead," read to Hazlitt, "Call no man clever whom I have met." Yet Hazlitt's criticism governed the reading public of England, perhaps unconsciously, more than that of calmer and fairer men; we smile at it now, but his victims had more to do with tears. The thing written was to him of less consequence than the person writing, and he delivered judgment upon the work *a priori*, in severe accordance with his verdict first upon the man, a verdict made up in violation of all rules of evidence, and deliberately defiant of justice, honor, and fair dealing. His praise was as exorbitant as his censure, his faculty of judgment was emotional, and rarely, except by chance, judicial; but his intuitions were often so superior to what he supposed to be his reason, that he was frequently correct in the sum of his opinion. Nor was he alone in this fault; the brilliant *coterie* who divided the humor and the rancor of *Noctes Ambrosianæ* might have bequeathed some judicious criticism to an admiring posterity had they been less ambitious to ridicule their and their friends' political and personal enemies. The speeches of Shiel are now read with astonishment and delight, and *Evadne* still charms the stage. The titanic labors of O'Connell are no less recognized by all mankind than his inflexible integrity. Yet, what epithet did the Shepherd spare in characterizing these two men, deriding the literary talents of the one and seeking to degrade the other into an apparent rôle of political trafficker! Personality in criticism is an immovable stumbling-block against candor. It is as great an obstacle to the friendly as to the wanton or the vicious. It has caused one class of writers to elevate *Deirdré* into the highest rank of poetic literature, and it has evoked from others expressions of stupid and wilful dispraise, suggestive chiefly of national prejudice and a failure to read the lines. *Deirdré* has been lauded as "one of the classics of the nineteenth century," and we are at a loss to know what the other classics of the century are. And a New England educational journal has so slight a conceit in regard to its merits, that its undeniable success is attributed solely to the publishers' pretty novelty, the "No Name Series," of which *Deirdré* is the second member. We say, therefore, that it is unfortunate for the poem, the critics, the public, and Dr. Robert Joyce, that the secret of the authorship has been prematurely violated. Time was when to touch the hem of the garment expressed the profoundest reverence. But to

handle a poet's "singing robes" now dissipates the glow of the glory which distance lends; enchantment crumbles between the fingers, when, on remote and inaccessible heights, it would appear seraphic.

We wish to thank Dr. Joyce, with the greatest frankness, for turning his back upon the prevailing fashions in poetry. In doing this, he exhibits not only high moral courage but true poetic instinct, and an exquisite sensibility as to harmony of subject and style. To write the story of this poem in other than heroic decasyllable would be to represent Samson in the shape and apparel of Sir Philip Sidney, or to paint Rachel in the glinting brocade, starched ruff, and powdered hair of Lady Jane. Anachronism is not limited to facts, it may be also a fault of style; and since the Gaelic story which Dr. Joyce selected is as purely epic, although in much less degree, as the abduction of Helen, the siege of Troy, and the wanderings of Ulysses and Æneas, it was imperative that it should be detailed in epic verse. Nor can we doubt that Dr. Joyce has devoted his leisure chiefly to the study of these universal models; the rich and masterly text is evidence enough, that in this respect, he was no less sagacious than Bossuet, who, before going into the pulpit, habitually read Homer. "I light my lamp at the sun," said he. Certain descriptions of scenery in *Deirdré* are modern, and, as we shall see, very pleasing and picturesque, without, however, adding strength to or confirming the unique individuality of the whole; they lend to the poem a kind of conventional grace. The conspicuous merit of *Deirdré* is in its sublimity—somewhat bald, we admit—of simple and strong delineation of two passions, love and hate. The accessories are not managed with equal or even striking skill, a fact which indicates that the author's genius is better than his talent; he conceives nobly, though he falls below his aim in execution. To sum it up in a word, *Deirdré* is an admirable and delightful attempt at a great poem, it is epic-ish, not quite epic, except in the narrow sense of being a legendary narrative in heroic verse.

The plot, if plot it may be called, which plot hath none distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, is, of course, brief and straightforward. *Deirdré* is the daughter of the court story-teller of King Connor of Ulster. Her birth is pronounced a fatal omen for the kingdom, and the nobles demand that the infant shall be slain, but the king calms the clamor by giving orders that *Deirdré* be shut up within a palace until she is old enough to become his wife. Naisi, one of the three sons of Usna, sees her beauty before she has reached womanhood; his affection is returned; and while the king is absent on the hunt, *Deirdré* escapes with Naisi and his brothers, who carry her to Alba, and there agree to render military

service to the Albanian monarch. He, however, falls in love with Deirdré, who again escapes, with her husband and his brothers, to an island in the sea, which, after a peaceful and happy period, they are persuaded by the King of Ulster to leave, in order that they may return to their home. The king breaks his oath, murders the three brothers and their kinsmen, and attempts to take Deirdré to wife. She is found dead upon the body of Naisi. This is not a "plot," neither is the taking of Troy. *Epos* in this connection means only a story or a song, and this story or song is only of nature, love, and war, the last being on a comparatively small scale, but savage, skilful, and terrific.

We will group together the metaphors and similes which are ideal only; then the descriptions of nature; and, lastly, the battles, in which the poet's power is most perfectly displayed; and this convenient classification will enable us more easily to reach a fair judgment of the qualities of the whole poem.

Lavarcam, Deirdré's nurse, is thus happily and aptly described. "Conversation Dame" has a subtle vein of humor in it which may be pardoned in a doctor:

"First of all there came
Old Lavarcam, the Conversation Dame
Of the great king, who told him all the sport
And loves and plots and scandals of the court.
A pace before them walked she mincingly,
And to each great lord bent the pliant knee;
Sharp eyes she had, each speck and fault that saw,
And face as yellow as an osprey's claw,
And wrinkled like tough vellum by the heat,
As moved she forward the monarch's golden seat,
Smirking and smiling on the baby bright
That in her arms lay clad in lily white,
With large blue eyes and downy yellow hair
And skin like pink leaves when the morns are fair."

After Caffa, the priest, has foretold Deirdré's beauty and the perils it would entail,

"Then rose an aged lord with haughty air,
And shaggy brows and grizzled beard and hair,
Whose fierce eye o'er the margin of his shield
Had gazed from war's first ridge on many a field
Unblinking at the foe that on him glared,"

and tells a northern legend.

"One young June day, when winter with shrill groans
Felt coming death through all his frozen bones,
And three long days had struggled in the North
In storm to march his drunken army forth
Of icebergs toppling o'er the ocean swell,"

a breaker dashed on the shore a young bear, which the fishermen

believed to be the progeny of a god. They built a temple, worshipped it year by year, and one day the mighty creature stole away.

“Beneath a hawthorn tree,
A little child sat weeping piteously,
With a great thorn in his white foot sunk deep
That made the red blood flow. Then 'gan to creep
The great bear round him snuffing till she came
And licked the blood;—then shot a dreadful flame
From the fierce depths of her red rolling eye,
And, like a fiend, she reared her head on high
O'er the fair child, and with fell face and grim
In hot blood wallowing tore him limb from limb;
Then turned she on the children all around,
And slew them, till the smooth green's grassy ground
Was all one mass of steaming flesh and gore,
And echoing to her loud remorseless roar!”

A literary authority,¹ accepted as one of the highest in the United States, speaks of this as “needlessly physical hideousness.” If this be a valid objection, what shall be done with hundreds of lines in the *Iliad* which are much more objectionable for the same reason? Does it not indicate rather what Horne finds in Chapman as a fit translation of Homer, “primitive power, and rough truthfulness of description?” What condemnation is adequate for Homer's recital in the third book, of the manner in which Menelaus sent his lance into the entrails of Paris? The objection to the passage quoted is surely finical.

Deirdré, however, is not slain as the old knight argued that she should be; but, a prisoner in the palace, grows in beauty and in curiosity.

“And ‘What am I?’
I asked the stream; and it was churlish too,
And would not speak, but from its weeds upthrew
A great brown frog, puffed up with too much pride,
And ‘Ugly! ugly! ugly!’ hoarse he cried.”

Lavarcam tells her she is to be a bride.

“A bride!—O Lavarcam, I know that too!
Oft have I seen the little wild-birds woo
Their winsome brides amid the branches green,
And call, and call, ‘My queen! my queen! my queen!’
'Twas only in the early yester morn
As I sat close beneath yon flowering thorn,
I saw a blue wood-pigeon and his bride
Adown the garden grass walk side by side,
Cooing in gladness as they went along.”

A squirrel invites her to climb his tree, and, swaying in its branches, she first sees Naisi with his brothers, and

¹ The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1876.

"The world's great shining plains spread out so far,—
Oh, farther than the slender glittering bar
Of cloud that oft *in windless nights of June*
Lies like a golden lance athwart the moon !"

Is not the vividness of the following picture a manifestation of pure genius ?

"They looked and saw
The eagle of the golden beak and claw,
And bronze bright feathers shadowy overhead,
And silent on the elastic ether spread
A space, or with alternate flutterings
Beating the light air with his winnowing wings ;
While, underneath, the quick hares 'gan to flee
Into the brake, save one that tremblingly
Crouched blind with fear. Then, as when 'cross the heaven
On a wild March day the dark smack is driven,
And a small cloud-rent sails athwart the sun,
Sudden a bright gleam smites the marshland wan,
Arrowy and swift, so like that flash of light
The mighty king-bird from the heavenly height
Shot down upon the shuddering prey below
With a great whirr that raised the powdery snow
In a pale cloud around, and from that cloud
His piercing mort-scream echoed shrill and loud
Upon the listeners' ears ; then with his prey
Up through the blue bright heaven he sailed away,
Leaving upon the snow a broad red streak
Of blood behind him."

In the eleventh book of the *Æneid* there is a picture of an eagle, and while the figure is less expanded and more quickly drawn, it is impossible to deny that it is a spark of the same genius which inspires both. We use Cranch's translation, being in the same metre.

"As when on high
A tawny eagle bears a serpent off,
And clings to it with griping claws, the snake,
Wounded and writhing, twists its sinuous rings,
And rears its bristling scales and hissing mouth ;
But none the less the bird with crooked beak
Strikes at the struggling reptile, and the air
Beats with her wings."

One of Naisi's brothers leads the march forward to the sea, a

"Ponderous sword hung low upon his thigh,
Whose huge hilt sparkled like a starlit sky
With many a gem ;"

And when Keth of Connaught seemed to threaten resistance to their march, Ardan

"Spoke to his followers their full files to close;
Then hoarse on either side, a tumult rose
Of hostile preparation like the war
Of winds in piny woods, or on the shore
The sound of waves remurmuring in the night."

In the tenth book of the *Aeneid*, Juno pleads with Jupiter in opposition to Venus. When she had concluded,

"The immortals all
Murmured their various sentences; as when
The rising breeze caught in the forest depths,
Muttering in smothered sighs and undertones,
Foretells to mariners the coming storm."

Some remarkable coincidences will be found in the fighting scenes in *Deirdré* and those of the *Aeneid*, which, however, do not cast any shadow of plagiarism upon the former; for the lion, the wolf, the bull, have been employed in the lore of every age to typify boldness, strength, courage, cruelty or ferocity; and no poet claims a copyright upon the winds, the waves, the mountains, or the sky.

We cannot extend these citations farther, except to quote a few additional lines.

"The moon lit up the open glades,
Gleaming in harness, shields and swords and blades
Of brazen javelins, *changing momentarily*
Like the pale starbeams on a troubled sea."

* * * *

"The low grumbling of the guttural horn."

* * * *

"From his vernal bed
The sun upraised his glorious gladsome head,
And looked with smiles benign o'er earth and sea."

* * * *

"The furious wave of Toth
Rose round the giant's pillars *white with froth,*
And shook its mane, loud bellowing!"

* * * *

The poem contains many superb pictures of nature, which, if isolated and offered to the public by themselves, would make a gallery, not so great in numbers, perhaps a dozen in all, but of surpassing merit in composition, and rare nicety in detail. We can make room for only one. It is late autumn:

"Upon the spreading thorn
The fieldfares bickered at the ruddy haw,
The last fruit of the year; the thievish daw
Fought on the palace gable with his wife;
And the fierce magpie, born to ceaseless strife,

Swung on the larch, and told his household woes,
 Or plumed his tail and threatened all his foes
 With vicious screams and angry rhapsodies ;
 And loud the finches chirruped in the trees.

* * * * *

Then from on high
 To earth slow spiralling adown the sky,
 The first great feathery snow-flakes made their way
 Till all the garden changed from black to gray,
 From gray to white."

And for this,

" A mighty herd of kine came driving in
 Filling the hollow. High the steam arose
 From their perspiring backs, like that which shows
 Its rolling mists at morn o'er Gada's mere
 Amid the young spring meadows, when the year
 Dyes its last hoar frost in the risen sun,
 And dim-seen cattle round the pasture run !"

Such spontaneous power as this is not mere poetic feeling ; it is genius ; and if *Deirdré* be not as free from minor faults, and occasional but not frequent lapses into mere functional verse, the reader is already in possession of sufficient testimony on which to base the highest hope of the poet's future.

Strangely enough, it is another Irish poet who, with Joyce, has contributed most conspicuously to the descriptive poetry of the time, John Boyle O'Reilly, also of Boston, and now editor of the *Pilot*. His volume entitled *Songs of the Southern Seas* contains Australian landscapes drawn with a dexterous hand, and finished with coloring of tropical gorgeousness. Strangely enough, too, considering their national ancestry, neither of these poets has shown a preference for sentimental rhapsody or that melodious lyrical jingle whose tintinnabulation suggests the clinking of wine-glasses and the smiles of Tom Moore. Irishmen both, they are pioneers in a healthier and more robust school of fancy, in which the permanent principle of the beautiful and the true is recognized above the quickly shifting moods, the exhilaration, and the languor of changing emotion, which produces a *Lalla Rookh* for the boudoir and couplets for a banqueting-room.

Yet we wish there was more of sentiment in *Deirdré*. It is singularly lacking in the domestic and the tender. To *Deirdré* herself we must make a specific objection ; she does not *materialize*. We know the poet is writing her praise ; we hear that she is beautiful ; we are assured that she is talking, and woful commonplace, too ; we read that she leaves Eman with Naisi and his brothers and the tribe ; we have learned the color of her eyes and hair ; but

nevertheless, we do not hear her or see her or touch her. She remains "hearsay" to us. Possibly, the fault is one of costume; she was carried into the feasting-hall, an infant, in white clothes, long and snowy, and appropriately broided; and the poet, so to speak, has forgotten to change her dress and introduce us to her in garments of womanhood, rustling so that our senses may know that it is indeed Deirdré. Nor do we think that, in heart and soul, she is in the slightest degree heroic, as a young Irish wife would have been, and ought to have been under circumstances so favoring to heroism. She is not even as heroic as Helen; for that lovely person, despicable in so many qualities, was brave enough to reproach Paris with his effeminacy after the fight with Menelaus, by whom he would undoubtedly have been slain had not Venus hurried him away through the unresisting ether. Creüsa is not a heroine in the true sense; yet she rises superior to Deirdré as a wife and a courageous woman. From the moment Deirdré elopes with Naisi until the end of the tragedy, she is only weak, frightened, whimpering, and stupid. She is fond of her child, but in that ordinary and inexpressive manner peculiar to a Saxon; but by no means peculiar to a young and ardent Gaelic mother, who would have made a palace hall or a tent ring hourly with her own joy and the crowings of the bairn as he found his voice. One cannot reasonably complain of the fatal absence of love scenes between husband, wife, and child, while the clan were on the march, or engaged in preparations for battle; the poet's opportunity, which he so unaccountably neglected, was lost during their peaceful life in the Hebrides, where they dwelt secure from intrusion and free from embarrassment. We cannot refrain from hoping that Dr. Joyce will repair what we conceive to be a radical and original fault in so extended a poem, by writing an additional canto, devoted to the detail of this portion of the narrative; exhibiting more clearly the character of Deirdré as it exists in his imagination, whence he has failed to transfer it to his readers; and describing such incidents and episodes of the pastoral life the clan then led, as will correct the erroneous notion of Irish barbarity and savageness, which so generally prevails regarding the early period of national history. We now see only the military ardor, the muscular strength, and the animal daring of the sons of Usna. He should make us see their gentler nature; their generosity, chivalry, patience, and kindness. Naisi we admire for manly attributes of the coarser kind; he is a Gaelic Samson; and the only weakness the poet accredits to him is one which not only is inartistic, but which casts a stain upon his conjugal honor, and fires the passive Deirdré with jealousy, which she has not the strength to suppress nor the tact to conceal.

“ In the green rose-garden beside the hall,
 I saw my husband meet beneath the bowers
 Dunthorne's young daughter, Enna of the Flowers,
 The fairest maid of all thy lovely land,
 And there he took and kissed her willing hand,
 And spoke words that I could not hear. Ah me !
 The soul-consuming fire of jealousy !
 The torments and the wrath ! Till Naisi swore
 In presence of his arms that evermore
 He loved me—me alone.”

We sympathize with Deirdré, and pity her ; but the poet should make us love his heroine, and we cannot love whom we do not know, even ideally. In a word, the artistic work upon Deirdré is not “ filled in.” She is given to our gaze only in sombre and indistinct outline ; she does not “ materialize.” A canto of the kind we venture to suggest would, we are confident, supply what most readers now feel to be a lack,—a full, warm, glowing, and tender picture of Naisi and Deirdré as husband and wife, such as Dr. Joyce can write with a dainty and exquisite pen.

Notwithstanding the felicity of the protracted similes, and the singular accuracy and beauty of the natural descriptions,—of which we have been able to give only a suggestion,—the battle-scenes are incomparably the finest. They are not indeed Homeric—they are fights instead of systematic or scientific warfare—but Virgilian rather, exhibiting individual prowess ; but the strain is not even so broad as that of the *Æneid*—there are fewer notes to the chord. The encounters selected for narration are commonly between the three brothers, singly or aiding each other, and the leaders of the opposing clan. These encounters are described with sudden and amazing directness. Episodes are related with a swiftness of brilliancy like that of a spear dashing through sunlight. We hear the rattle of the armor and the shouts of the excited participants, and blood flows in torrents on the breast of the streams and down the sides of the mountains. Naisi aims a blow at the heavy-barred Fomorian door :

“ Through boss and sea-worn plank, intent to slay,
 Crashing the cruel spear-head made its way,
 Far-piercing through a soldier's head and breast,
 Who stood behind, and bandied gibe and jest,
 Laughing with his compeers—ah, knowing not
 That Death oft seeketh man's securest spot
 To strike unseen ! Down drooped the soldier's head,
 And a grim pallor o'er his features spread,
 And fast his heart poured forth its crimson tide
 And hanging on the spear impaled he died.

* * * * *

As Naisi with a shout plucked back again
 His long spear, and the armed corse fell down
 Clattering upon the causeway.”

The naval battle is equal to anything in the *Æneid*—we say this deliberately. We cannot quote more than a brief portion :

“ Like the peal
Of the loud clarion ere the valiant cross
Their bickering swords with shields faced boss to boss
On the red field of war, from left to right
Of the long fleet rang Naisi's voice of might,
Ordering his battle. Loud the capstans groan
Shipping the anchors; strong the broad sails blown
Swelled their white bellies to the sunny ray;
Out flew the oars, to wreaths of hissing spray,
Churning the waters with well-measured sweep
And the fleet moved, first slowly, on the deep,
Till gathering strength at last along the main
It swept, far furrowing all the watery plain !

* * * * *

For a space

With many a sharpened hook in fell embrace
Each galley clasped the other; yard and shroud
And prow and poop shot forth its deadly cloud
Of darts and arrows; while in hands of might
Over the bulwarks crossed the sword-blades bright,
And the plume dropped from cloven helm and crest,
And the long spear in many a valiant breast
Buried its brazen head.

* * * * *

And now the king's great galley backward drew,
Swift swinging round with oars again outspread
To bring on th' Osprey's beam her armed head.
Swung round, she stops, and then returns once more
With speed redoubling 'neath the powerful oar,
Cleaving the water in her dreadful race
'Gainst th' Osprey, that, all-crowded, found no space
For turning from the shock that ne'er was given;
For, like the lightning bolt that shoots from heaven
And rends some lordly castle with its flame,
Round from the left the Hill Cat plunging came,
And struck the Alban galley where the side
Bends like a shoulder forward o'er the tide,
And reft her groaning ribs in thunder, then
Backed with wide-sweeping oars to plunge again !
Needless, for through the breach the waters poured,
And 'mid the galley's hollow entrails roared;
From side to side she rocked; with dreadful yell
Flat on the deck many a brave man fell,
Or at the bulwark clutched full desperately,
Or from the yards plunged headlong in the sea.”

Deceived by the promises of King Connor, the sons of Usna return to Eman. The story of their massacre is told with extraordinary vividness. They are beheaded by the monarch's orders. The pitying multitude burst into a shout of anguish rending the air :

"And with it rose the shrill voice of despair
From Deirdré, over all sounds rising high
And piercing, like a wounded sea-gull's cry
Heard 'mid the roar of storms,"

and the closing pages of the poem bring copious tears,—the deep, spontaneous tribute to the poet's power.

It is impossible to read the poem attentively without confessing that the inspiration is Pierian. It would be reasonable to suppose that the author had fed his imagination on two poems,—the *Iliad* and the *Æneid*, just as Greek mothers filled their chambers with copies of the Apollo and the Venus in order to cultivate beauty in their children. Here and there, one is startled by familiar personification, such as "Terror led their flight," "Mercy fled the field despairing; rage or coward dead possessed all hearts;" "Slaughter with crimson wings and raven beak flapped the black sky about exultingly." The treatment of the sea and sky, the earth and the atmosphere, is strongly flavored with odors from Parnassus; and it may be objected that, to garnish the robe of a Gaelic tale with flowers from Hellenic Olympus is incongruous; but, if this objection be allowable, what apology shall Milton find? We do not know how to defend clearly an allusion to the "trump of Doom" in *Deirdré*; but it certainly is as tolerable for Dr. Joyce to write in an Irish epic

"The young dawn arose in ruby flame,"

as for Milton to write in a Mosaic epic,

"Now morn, her rosy steps in the Eastern clime advancing;"

we cannot, however, so lightly pass "strong spear-bristling shield," nor "Moyle's hoarse-resounding, high wave-curling tide," merely because Chapman found it necessary, in translating Homer, to construct such English as "His golden-riband-bound maned horse," and "divine joy-in-the-heart-infusing wine." In the Greek, "a language blest of all others in the happy marriage of sweet words," one word expresses what in our harsh tongue "are mere printer's compound epithets;"¹ and as Dr. Joyce was writing English, and not translating Greek, he should have avoided an extravagance in hyphens. The frequent use of "full" as an adverb, and "fell" as an adjective adds no dignity to the lines; the revival of "unmeeting," "stowne," "dreed," etc., only detracts from a limpid simplicity of phrase and mars its graceful strength; and a singular fault of syntax appears in "I cannot love but one" and "None else, O king, but thou didst save me."

¹ Hooper's Introduction to the *Iliad* of Homer.

The rhyming is smooth, sweet, and unobtrusive; like rich quiet music in a cathedral, carrying its sweet strain along, filling the air with incense of harmony, lending beauty to devotion, and giving unction to prayer, but never attracting attention to itself. Taken all in all, *Deirdré* is a noble effort of rare poetic genius; its merits are many and magnificent, the faults few and trivial—falterings of inexperienced talent unequal to the desires of its commanding genius—as Mercury failed sometimes adequately to deliver the celestial messages of Jove. The author is young enough to make this superb production the beginning of a splendid hope. Wordsworth was forty-four when he wrote *The Excursion*, Dante must have been nearly forty when he began the *Divine Comedy*, and the first lines of *Paradise Lost* were traced after old age and sorrow had closed the sight of Milton. *Deirdré* is the poetry of nature and passion—the glorious oak on the mountain's brow, instead of the scarlet oak-leaf, pressed, dried, and pinned on the lace curtain of a drawing-room. The author of *Deirdré* is a poet in the high and true acceptance of that high title; and what Macaulay denied of another, we may affirm of him, "he has taken a seat upon the dais, unchallenged by a single seneschal."

Songs in the Night is a volume of religious lyrics. A religious lyric is commonly a rhymed expression of dull piety. Many persons address to man in prolix verse what should be addressed to God in plain prose. If the rhymes be intended directly for the Deity, the artistic effect is much the worse; for it seems to be an unformulated canon of painting, music, and poetry, that what men will not tolerate, God will gratefully accept. The pictures gravely hung in the churches, the windows illuminated with pretended prophets, evangelists, virgins, and martyrs, the statues caricaturing the sweetest and dearest associations of sanctity—would art cry out if a new iconoclast should go among them with an axe to shatter the plaster and the panes, and tear the base canvas into ribbons? In what art gallery or parlor would be preserved three-fourths of the daubs that desecrate consecrated walls? Is God less worthy of homage than man? When Handel was giving concerts in London, a young singer who had been the tenor of a suburban church, was introduced to him as worthy to take a leading part in oratorio. The candidate was accepted, a rôle assigned, and the performance began; but the ambitious aspirant proved to be an execrable vocalist, and the audience hissed so violently that the great *maestro* summoned the tenor off the stage. "Young man," said he, in his broken English, "go back to de country and lead de choir in de church; God Almighty will forgive you your bad singing, but dese people dey will not." So it is in all the arts; we expect God to pardon us for bad painting, bad music, and bad

poetry, just as He forgives falsehood and slander; with this essential difference, that, while sin in morals is odious to Him, we think He looks with pleased indulgence upon sins in art. Eastern nations drown their deformed children; we give ours, in art, to God. The great sculptors of antiquity destroyed, with a single blow of the hammer, the finished statue which did not electrically respond to the final invocation, "Now, speak!" We industriously gather the halt, the lame, the blind, the ugly, in the studios of all nations, and hurry them into the Christian sanctuaries. We group around the altar Thersites for Moses, Bacchus for the Beloved Disciple, Thor and Odin for St. Peter and St. Paul, Silenus for St. Anthony, druids for patriarchs, satyrs for saints, and dryads for guardian angels. We are equally ignoble and inconsistent in music. An Eastern Bishop and a Roman Pope arranged for the Church the first system of music; a monk of Arezzo discovered the principle of the modern scale; a papal choir-master first applied the rules of counterpoint, and a St. Philip Neri was the father of the oratorio. Now, plain chant is rarely sung except by rude voices which torture it; the harmony of Palestrina is heard only in Rome; the oratorio has been frittered away into Italian opera; the grand unison of the massive, stately, and gracious Gregorian has passed out of the Church to let in the frivolity and *floriture* of the concert-room; the chant is already a cavatina, and the *Gloria*, *Credo*, and *Agnus Dei* are syllabled to airs equally popular in the wine-garden and at the picnic.

As in art and music, so in poetry. Southwell, Heber, Keble, Faber, Adelaide Procter, and a few others, have laid at the foot of the altar the soul of their talents, baptized it at the holy fount, and preserved the white robe of its purity to the end. Yet ask the average reader of poetry what he knows of the verse of these, and he will recall perhaps a quatrain from "*The Christian Year*," or Heber's

"If thou wert by my side, my love,
How fast would evening fail
In green Bengala's palmy grove,
Listening the nightingale!"

but nothing of Faber or Southwell, and only a few lines of Adelaide Procter's gentle melancholy. The more recent religious poetry, which has received any notice whatever, is of the Motiveless Despair class, its most pleasing exponents being Christina Rossetti, with her spiritistic psychical introspection, and Jean Ingelow, whom everybody loves in spite of her exuberance of daffodils; but both are best known by poems not religious even in fantastic sombreness. In a word, so little reverence lingers in the skeptical and

gradually rationalizing Anglo-Saxon race, that one cannot wonder at the threatened disappearance of religion from poetry or of poetry from religion.

It is clear that no religious poetry can now find an audience unless it be characterized by a certain pure sensuousness and thoroughly good art. "Mysterious stirrings of the heart, and keen emotions, and strange yearnings after we know not what, and awful impressions from we know not whence" will not serve, notwithstanding that they may "have escaped from some higher sphere," and "are the outpourings of eternal harmony in the medium of created sound; echoes from our home; voices of angels, or the *Magnificat* of saints, or the living laws of Divine governance, or the Divine attributes." The condition of taste is such that religious poetry, to be generally read, must make its first appeal through the exquisiteness of its art; its religiousness will not be endured except as the inclosure by the art. The fastidious lover of our prevailing fashions in verse looks to the setting first; if the flagreee suit him, he may be persuaded to examine the gem! Even artifice may be found expedient where candid art would fail, or only moderately succeed. "It is quite an ordinary fact," says our best American critic, Lowell, "that a blaze may be made with a little saltpetre that would be stared at by thousands, who would have thought the sunrise tedious."

Songs in the Night come to us from the cloisters and walks of an English Benedictine nunnery. The author is Mother Raphael Draine, prioress of the convent at Stone, Staffordshire. A patient and accurate writer, we have known her heretofore as the historian of *Christian Schools and Scholars*, a work as valuable to the investigator of education as the grammars to a philologist; a work whose comprehensiveness and research must have consumed years of toil, demanded exact mental habits, and largely exhausted the intellectual energy. Two such elaborate volumes, covering twelve centuries of universal history, might well have been toil enough for one, and that one a woman, whose time cannot under the rules of her vocation be wholly given to literature; yet there are poems here which would justify the belief that the writer never wrote aught but poetry, and was in the very bloom of youth and ardor of imagination.

This is entitled "Forgotten 'mid the Lilies:"

* * * * *

"O darkness! thou hast beauties as the morn;
The quiet pensive stars are all for thee;
They veil their eyes what time the shadows flee,
And their bespangled mantle is withdrawn
Before the rosy brightness of the dawn.

* * * * *

" I wander on, scarce knowing how I dare
Thus brave the terrors of the lonely night.
Ah me! what stirs before my dazzled sight?
From yonder turret in the dark-blue air
I see a shadow as of waving hair!

" Art thou then near? Oh speak, and let me know!
I see thee, hear thee not; is this thy hand?
And dost thou by the waving cedars stand?
And does the night-breeze on thy forehead blow?
Wilt thou depart? Oh, answer ere I go!

" And did he answer? Ask me not to say;—
I only know he left me, and I lie
As one forgotten, yet who cannot die;
And here I found myself at break of day,
Forgotten 'mid the lilies by the way.

" It is a weary thing to be forgot—
A tearful, weary, melancholy thing
To lie here like a bird with wounded wing;
Yet there is something, though I know not what,
That makes me lie at rest, and love my lot.

* * * * *

" A sad sweet lot—I needs must call it sweet;
My cares, like withered buds, I cast aside,
And reck but little what may next betide;
The days and years fly past on pinions fleet,
Amid these lilies, crushed beneath his feet.

" Till then among the lilies let me lie;
See, I have cast my idle cares away,
Howe'er it be, I am content to stay
Until once more the Bridegroom passes by,
And hither turns his gracious, pitying eye.

" Know only this,—I suffer, yet I rest,
For all my cares and fears are cast away,
And more than this I know not how to say,
Forgotten though I be, I own it best,
And 'mid the lilies lie in perfect rest."

Most of the poems were suggested by passages, here and there, in the spiritual canticles of St. John of the Cross; a few are imitations of very old religious poetry, notably of Lydgate's *Court of Sapience*. Lydgate, we may add, was a poet of very high reputation in his day, not much below Chaucer. He was a monk of Bury Saint Edmund, and taught rhetoric there, and is the only poet of much distinction in the century between Chaucer and Spenser; yet only his name remains, and that flits like a phantom through manuals of English literature, to remind us of the brevity and hollowness of fame. A contemporary of Sir Thomas More, he was without a rival in poetic art and translation for nearly a hundred years, and

enjoyed the then enviable honor of composing at the royal request. Now, he is indebted to the learning and the fancy of another inmate of the cloister for a resuscitation of his memory!

Many of the poems in this volume are flawless; tenderness and grace of feeling are expressed in choice, chaste diction. They contain no striking novelties of metaphor, no metaphysical obscurities, or rhetorical tangles, as in Mrs. Browning, or artificial inventions and fantastic combinations, as in the verse of Jean Ingelow. Mother Raphael is a true poet in loving nature, and her fervor rises in the lines as sweetly as daisies in a meadow. We are not harassed by morbid grief, or set to sighing in sympathy with languid sentiment; she does not

"Dwell apart,
Tending some ideal smart
In a sick and coward heart."

The atmosphere of the book is young, vigorous, and healthy, full of salt-sea air as of chapel incense; and this, in religious poetry, is a merit which cannot be surpassed by any other quality. Its absence is the great fault of Adelaide Procter. Thus Mother Raphael writes of "disappointment:"

"He knew it must be so,
Some hearts for chorus tones are pitched too low;
The strings of his had borne too tight a strain,—
At the first chord he struck they snapped in twain.

"Dost thou despise him, friend?
Know that each soul is born for its own end;
*Nor is success the standard, for in heaven
A double bliss to broken hearts is given."*

This will answer for consolation, too, for we all cannot wait for heaven to console, if heaven shall; present burdens are so great sometimes, they fill the whole world we live in, and shut out heaven by the density and the darkness of their own sorrow. In such moments, a poet speaks dogmatic truth, for, though the world of each be very big with what presses close and thick upon us, and our atom swells into a universe,—how little each of us is in the world; specks, unseen of others, with eyes in the centre seeing only our own circumference and expanding that into the immense! And all the time, whether it be joy or woe with us, each speck is discharging its assigned function, with or without our will, and

"Life's pendulum swings on
As we with busy brain a texture weave,
And; hour by hour, infer, assent, believe.
The earnest eyes of angels by our side,
Behold the work, and all unseen, they guide
The shuttle's fall aright, till the fair web is done."

In nearly every musical composition we seem to hear strains which we think we heard before ; so, in new poems, we fancy there are welcome reminiscences of earlier pleasure. In *Songs in the Night* we hear Wordsworth, with musical recurrence ; and Christina Rossetti and dearly beloved Adelaide Procter. This makes the verse, if dear at all, so much the dearer ; and thus we commend *Songs in the Night* for that deliciousness of charm which gives us a new and lovely companion, in addition to others hitherto and forever dear, and all congenial.

CAN THE IMMATERIALITY, SPIRITUALITY, AND
IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
BE DEMONSTRATED?

Body and Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D., London. New York :
D. Appleton & Co.

Primeval Man. By the Duke of Argyll. New York : George Rout-
ledge & Sons. 1874.

THE proof that the human soul is immaterial, spiritual, and immortal, seemed, even to some Christian philosophers of preceding centuries, to be a difficult task. Duns Scotus held the opinion that neither the mortality nor the immortality of man's soul can be conclusively proved by unaided reason. Other Christian philosophers, with Jandunus, Peter Pomponatius, and Simon Portius, maintained that according to philosophy and natural reason, the human soul is mortal ; but according to faith it is immortal. Many understand Aristotle as wavering in his judgment of this matter ; while others, with the schoolmen, explain his words as unequivocally declaring for the spirituality and immortality of man's soul. There is a numerous class of physicists at the present day, who, with Tyndall, hold that "in matter we have the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," and, by consequence, matter is in itself capable of intellectual life. Locke maintained that it is not intrinsically impossible for matter to think ; on this account he denies that the immateriality of the soul can be demonstrated by natural reason, "for the state we are at present in, not

being that of vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the present question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty we need not think it strange. . . . It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge."¹ Herbert Spencer, Mill, and other English writers on science, with a numerous school of German philosophers, simply remit this question concerning the spiritual nature of the soul, to the category of the unknowable; a dark abyss into which every subject pertaining to spiritual and personal natures is sent by them, summarily and without the benefit of a fair hearing. Finally, there are they who look upon the question concerning the nature of the human soul as still unsettled, and they expect the physiologist and biologist to decide it; for they deem it an inquiry which it is for this class of physicists to answer. The Duke of Argyll denies that this dispute belongs to the sphere of physiology: "The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that physiology can ever be the basis of psychology; and this is an error and a confusion of thought which survives phrenology."²

No doubt the science of physiology and the philosophy of the human soul may mutually benefit each other, at least, indirectly; but the physiologist can never, purely by the principles of his own science, prove either that man's soul is spiritual, or that it is not

¹ Essay concerning Human Understanding; Book iv., ch. 3.

² Reign of Law, chapter vi. By the Duke of Argyll. George Routledge & Sons, New York, 1874. This work is, under several respects, worthy of high commendation; it is an able contribution to a kind of learning now much needed. In regard to Darwin's genesis of species, he maintains the following theses: "It cannot be too often repeated that Natural Selection can produce nothing whatever except the conservation or preservation of some variation *otherwise originated*. The true origin of species does not consist in the adjustments which help varieties to live and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which cause those varieties to be born at all." It is undeniable that all Darwin's multitude of facts really bear on the preservation or growth, not the first origin of species. Argyll's theory for explaining and defending the freedom of the human will is, perhaps, susceptible of being ultimately reduced to that of the "*præmotio physica*;" his reasoning would be more clear had he distinguished precisely between the will's necessitated action, the principle of which is intrinsic to the will, and its forced action, whose principle, if such action be possible, would be extrinsic to the will. Necessitated action of the will is voluntary, or, it is spontaneous though not free action; but forced action would not be the will's action; it would be passion, or action suffered by it. To say that the will is free when it is *determined* by the motive, is certainly a confusion of language. It is true that the will cannot choose without a motive as the object of its choice; but the choice itself, *qua* choice, must be the act of the will alone; otherwise such action is not different from that of the merely physical or natural agent, which is not free but necessary action, as *v. g.*, the fire's burning, the eye's seeing, etc. The motive is a prerequisite condition for choice, but it does not determine the choice that is free; it is the will that determines such choice.

spiritual, any more than could the soothsayer of old veritably read the future doom of a nation in the entrails of birds. Some physiologists, who see that their science gives no direct demonstrative proof for or against the existence of man's spiritual nature, classify the subject with metaphysical and fanciful matters that are unknowable, which is a false assumption, whether we consider their assertion as related to science or to the legitimate art of reasoning.

Among the scholastic philosophers it was generally held that the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, can be truly and validly demonstrated by natural reason; and they agreed among themselves as to the particular main arguments which conclusively prove these truths. Making abstraction of supernatural revelation then, what conclusive reason can be given in proof that man's rational soul is immaterial, and capable of existing disembodied, and, by consequence, that it is spiritual?

Before proposing an answer to this question, the precise meaning here given to the terms, "immaterial, spiritual," should be defined and explained. The term, "immaterial," is applied to two kinds of spiritual nature and substance, 1st, to that spiritual nature or being which, besides having no property possessed by matter, cannot naturally be united with matter, so as by that union to form with it one compound substance: of such a nature every pure spirit, as *v. g.*, the angel, is believed to be; 2d, the term, "immaterial," is also applied to that spiritual nature or substance which, although it continues to exist and act when its union with the body has ceased, yet, by its nature, it is both fitted and ordained to union in composition with the body; such is the human soul, as we shall see. A thing is not really "immaterial," then, according to the sense in which the term is here used, unless it can exist independently of matter, that is, when not actually in union with matter, whether as a substantial constituent or as an accident of body. Whatever can exist only as a property, quality, or accident of matter, and also, whatever can exist only as a constituent of material or corporeal substance, is itself something material; for, it pertains to material substance, and it naturally depends for its existence on that material substance. To this category we must refer all the qualities in matter which our senses can directly apprehend; all its properties that are chemical or dynamic. Ascending higher in the order of material action we find corporeal substance capable of life or vital operation; that it may possess vegetable and animal organism, with two very distinct grades of life along with their respective classes of action specifically different from each other. All the kinds of action here enumerated, including that of vegetable and animal life, are plainly seen to be the operation of corporeal substance. Even that school of physicists, who are so un-

philosophical as to reduce all action of every kind to that of one force, thus making too little advance on the generalizations reached by the simple mind that omits all consideration of second or intermediate causes, and refers every effect directly and proximately to God;¹ even the physicists referred to admit that the highest purely animal action does not transcend the order of material nature. Only that is immaterial, then, which has no common predicate with matter, or which has no real property that matter has, and which, by its own nature, can exist when totally separate from material or corporeal substance. Therefore, in order to prove the immateriality of the human soul, it is necessary to show that its properties, powers, and whole nature are of a totally distinct order of being from a thing that is material in its nature; and that though it informs matter, it can exist independently of matter. Observe, then, that "immaterial" does not here signify what is merely negative; it expresses something positive, and it denies that thing to be material. We concede to the materialist that what is styled the brute soul, *anima bruta*, having no action which transcends the power of corporeal substance, is itself of matter; for, it has none but sensible or organic action, and a sense or organ is material substance. The brute soul is styled material, also because, as will be made more manifest in another part of this article, it cannot exist except when united with matter, although it is, in itself, simple as a principle of life.

The word spirit, spiritual, is employed in several distinct senses, which need not be here enumerated and described, as breath or air, spirit of wine, animal spirit, etc.; but it must, in this place, be ascertained precisely what is meant by spirit, spiritual, when it is predicated of the human soul. *Spirit* may be sufficiently described for this purpose by affirming of it, 1st, it is a substance which is of a species that is totally different from that of matter, and it is superior to material substance; 2d, it is a substantial rational nature that can exist alone or separate from any other substance; it does not necessarily require another substantial principle to be united with it in order for it to be sustained in existence.

Some modern authors affirm that the spirituality of the human soul is proved by the simplicity of the soul: the soul is simple, therefore it is spiritual. This argument is, at the best, not satisfactory, is open to logical objection, and it was never employed by

¹ As the wise axiom expresses it, "bene docet, qui benè distinguit:" he alone teaches us well who distinguishes well. It may be good, and it is good, to show that the ten categories can be reduced to two, that of substance, and that of accident; but he alone philosophizes well for us who also distinguishes and explains the categories. So, it is of little profit to learn that all action may be reduced to that of force; the action and the kind of power in every nature beheld by us must have its distinctive operations defined and described.

the acute scholastic metaphysicians. Simplicity is opposed to composition,¹ as unity is opposed to multitude or many. The brute soul, considered in itself, is simple; the formal principle in the living vegetable is, in itself, simple; so every substantial formal principle is, in itself, simple, as is everything that has in itself unity, and is at the same time, not *per se* divisible. Hence, the simplicity of the soul does not prove the spirituality of the soul; man's soul is simple because it is a substantial formal principle; its spirituality arises, not from its simplicity, which is generic and is common to it and the brute soul, but from its being intelligent, immaterial as well as simple, and capable both of existing *per se* and acting *per se*. When the soul is shown to be a spiritual substance, then its simplicity as *forma hominis*, becomes proof of its natural immortality. To attribute to the word simplicity an interpreted and arbitrary meaning, according to which it is made to express the specific marks or notes only of complete spiritual substance, seems to be a forced use of the term, and the reasoning for the spirituality of the soul will then require, in order to escape fallacy, much artful trimming of words; which is wholly avoided in the direct and simple proofs given by the schoolmen. The brute soul is a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union with the brute body: the human soul is also a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union in composition with the human body. Let us now see whether there be really demonstrative proofs that the human soul is moreover a spiritual substance.

It would seem that no one clearly understanding the terms and scope of the principal argument for the immateriality of the soul, can fail to grant the conclusion as necessarily following. Anything whose action transcends the action of material or corporeal substance, is superior to corporeal substance or is immaterial; but there is in man something that has action which wholly transcends the action of any corporeal agent; by consequence there is in man something which is superior to material substance or is immaterial. If this argument be true, then there is in man a principle of action which is superior to any one of his corporeal principles of action, and it is on that account wholly or specifically different from all corporeal or material principle.

Though the rebuke given by the Duke of Argyll to those physiologists that assume the office of settling this question with the

¹ The following kinds of composition are usually named and described in works on general metaphysics. Composition 1st, of matter and form; 2d, of genus and difference; 3d, of integrant parts; 4th, essence and existence; 5th, nature and subsistence; 6th, subject and accidents; 7th, power and act. All components must ultimately be constituents that are in themselves simple; as to whether or not these ultimate elements can exist separate from the whole, depends, not on their simplicity or their being uncompounded, but on their having or not having the requisites of substantial nature.

forceps and microscope¹ be just, yet let us concede beforehand, to Maudsley, Huxley, Bain, etc., all the genuine conclusions which their inductive proofs have established; and that the phenomena of brain action, molecular nerve force, brain ideation, are facts faithfully described by them; all this, however, does not concern the present dispute, except in what is secondary and accidental; for, after all, the anatomy of the brain, with a minute and precise description of its organization, while of prime importance to physiology, is not essential to the present subject, unless in some secondary sense. All that the physiologist can discover and describe is a material organ, with its material parts or constituents; if he discovers more, it must be by the metaphysics, which, however, he forswears. The question here considered is, has man a something in his nature whose action transcends the action of any material organ, how perfect soever it may be? The answer is to be maintained, not against the mere physiologist, whose proper office is with organs and organic life; but rather against the physicist or the philosopher of physical nature, who affirms that it is physically possible for matter to think rationally.

A power which knows what is entirely abstract, *i. e.*, what is totally removed from matter, so as to have no real predicate in common with matter, cannot possibly be a power of material substance. A body can act only as body; its action is physical, material, and the object which such action reaches and really modifies is also a material object, for how can an agent go out of its entire sphere, and put action, the principle of which is not at all in its nature? Hence our Lord said, "Does any one gather grapes from thorns, figs from thistles?" It exceeds the natural power of thorns to produce grapes, and it is above the power of thistles to bear figs. To this it might be replied, "It transcends the natural power of thorns and thistles to remain within their species and to produce these fruits; but since the bearing of such fruit does not transcend the sphere of vegetable action, they could be made, by superadded virtue, miraculously to produce those fruits." This supposition appears to involve no contradiction or intrinsic impossibility. But for material substance or a body to know the purely abstract, the universal, the virtuous or morally good, would be for it to go entirely out of the whole order or species of material things to another order or species of things, having no one real note or

¹ Draper sees the truth enunciated by Argyll, but less clearly and precisely. "Though under the most enlarged acception, it would fall under the province of physiology to consider this immortal principle (the soul), and to consider its powers and responsibilities; these constitute a subject at once so boundless and so important, that the physiologist is constrained to surrender it to the psychologist and theologian." *Human Physiology*, Book i., ch. i. It is evident that he confounds the object of physiology with that of anthropology or the philosophy of man.

quality in common with it. It may be said that there are no two species of material substance in nature, which do not possess some or other common real qualities; but moral good, or the universal, has no real quality possessed by any material thing whatever. Matter must act materially; it cannot act immaterially, for this is a contradiction in terms. A body cannot remain a body, and understand the true; it may be informed with an intellectual spirit; it may be annihilated and replaced by an intelligent spirit; but it cannot as body be made capable of what is not done by a body, or what wholly transcends the species of bodily action, no more than a line on a spherical surface can at the same time be a line in a plane surface. It is in this meaning the well-known axiom of the schools is used: "*Modus agendi sequitur modum essendi*," the mode of acting follows the mode of being; or, the action is according to the nature or essence of the agent. A corporeal agent cannot act on what is wholly incorporeal, since that would be to have incorporeal action. It is not inconceivable that an agent whose perfection is superior in its species to that of matter should possess virtue or power great enough in its superior species to be capable of acting on matter; since the ability to do what is greater may include the ability to do what is less; but there is repugnance in supposing the action of any being wholly to exceed the limits of its species and power. The principal action of corporeal nature as known to us, is dynamic, chemical, vital, and animal; and the species which is highest of all is that of sensation, while the one which is lowest in species is the mechanical. It is not denied by the materialist that every sensible power is a material power, for every sense is an organ of the body, whether it be an external sense, or an internal sense seated in the brain; but what he does deny is the impossibility of matter's thinking intellectually, or he holds that it is possible for matter to think, and put all the acts of cognition which distinguish man from inert matter and the brute animal. We accept the concession, then, that all sensible cognition is the act of a material agent; for, in fact all sensible cognition has for its object, and its only object, sensible or material things apprehended in a material manner. Therefore, the sense which is a material organic power cannot apprehend or perceive what is wholly abstracted from matter and from every real quality of matter, as is the purely metaphysical, the universally true, the morally right, etc., for this order of being is totally separated from the material order, and a material agent acts materially or on material objects only.

Here a difficulty occurs which it is not easy to solve satisfactorily to all minds; but yet it does not impair the validity of the reasoning which we have advanced: if the material agent cannot transcend the entire material order of objects, in its action; and if the spiritual

intellect can come to know the material thing, but not without concurrent action of the material thing as object, then why say that the material agent cannot in its action go beyond the entire sphere of material objects, or that it cannot have an immaterial object of its action? The scholastic philosophers saw this difficulty, and they solved it by attributing to the spiritual intellect a supremacy of perfection, and a superiority of action by which it can descend to the internal sense, supplement its action, receive from it what the intellect can dematerialize, and thus elevate it to the intelligible order, or the intellectual order; they made this operation the office of the active intellect, or *intellectus agens*. It must be confessed that philosophers have never relieved this point of all its obscurity; but no one of them ever sought to relieve it of its difficulty by supposing that the intellectual idea was formed by the sense or organ. The difficult question is, how can the sensible image become an object of intellectual action, or be *objected* before the intellect in any manner? The question is not, how can a material organ form an intellectual idea, for that seems to assume what is absurd. Hence, since this difficulty regards only the manner in which a material thing can concur as an object in originating intellectual acts or ideas, it is beside the question discussed with materialists, can organized matter form for itself intellectual ideas, or can it think the purely abstract and metaphysical? Therefore, this difficulty concerning the origin in man's mind of ideas whose objects are material things apprehended by the sense, need not further impede the progress of our discussion; for no matter what theory be chosen among those proposed to explain this point, it still remains true that the sensible power or the organ does not form the intellectual idea; its office is to present the object.

Another objection will here naturally arise. Since all our knowledge takes its first origin from sensible things, and since it is conceded by all, that intellectual thought is not naturally possible to us without the fancy, which is admitted to be a merely organic or sensible power, not at all a purely spiritual power; hence the understanding, being something thus wholly dependent on the bodily senses, it cannot be anything really distinct from the powers of the body. In this objection the facts, it may be granted, are really as it states them; but the conclusion here drawn does not truly follow from these facts. The fancy or imagination is a sensible or organic faculty, which, perhaps without any doubt, is seated in the brain; it is also true that we cannot naturally think except dependently on that faculty for the objects of thought; and yet the intellect that does think, is not a sensible or bodily power, but it is, and it must be, a spiritual power, for the reasons already given, and for others still to be adduced. We may make a comparison which will serve

to illustrate by sensible things the manner in which the intellect is dependent on the fancy for its objects of thought, and thus help the mind clearly to conceive the nature of that dependence. For this purpose let us make the odd supposition that a man was so made as to be unable to see any visible object, unless as imaged in a mirror arranged before his eyes in such manner that from no point of the horizon, from no point above him, beside, or beneath his eyes, could any object be seen, except as imaged in that mirror; he can turn himself so that the mirror will reflect any object around him, but the object cannot transmit its light directly to his eye; in order to be seen by him, everything must be reflected to his eye by that mirror.

In this case the man could see no visible object at all, except dependently upon the mirror. In a similar manner is the human intellect completely dependent on the imagination or fancy for the presentation of all its objects of thought; if that mirror be veiled, as in deep sleep, the intellect sees nothing; if that mirror, or the fancy, which is an organic power in the brain, be diseased, its action is abnormal, and the mental operation is more or less insane, in proportion to the extent of the organic ailment. But yet the abstract idea which the intellect forms for itself, and by the medium of which it knows the object imaged in the fancy, is something wholly outside of the material order; it is the immaterial idea of a thing presented materially by the image in the fancy; it is immaterial, for, it is wholly abstract, and by consequence it has no real quality or real property of matter. Let us understand clearly what is meant by the proposition, "the idea in the intellect, *v. g.*, of a tree, is abstract, and it therefore has no real quality which the tree has." Examples will help to render this more easily intelligible: suppose the photograph likeness of a friend—this likeness has some resemblance to the person—but it excludes most of what is real in that person, retaining only a diminished outline figure filled up with some shading; yet this photograph has, as a material substance, many qualities common to it and the original, besides the figure. The image of the same photograph likeness formed on the retina of the eye is far more refined; and it excludes or omits much of what is gross matter in the photograph itself; still more refined and less grossly material is the image you will contemplate by closing the eyes, and beholding the same picture as reproduced and presented by the fancy. The photograph is, in a certain degree, abstract, as regards the original; the image on the retina of the eye is much more so; and still more abstract is the image in the fancy. Now, the idea as in the intellect, is wholly abstract, for it retains no real physical quality of the photograph, but is an image of a superior and totally distinct order, possessing even the capability of being applied

as a universal ; then how is it possible to conceive an abstract and universal idea that is produced by an agent which is purely material ?

It is manifest that the reasoning here advanced is *a posteriori*, or, it is argumentation from the effect or acts of the intellect to their cause. From the nature of the effects, we infer the nature of the cause ; and the more numerous and various the effects observed, the more fully is the character of their cause manifested to us. Having formed our idea of the cause, we describe it by both positive and negative predicates ; for example, we observe the different effects produced by oxygen and hydrogen. Inferring their nature from the effects witnessed by us, we affirm them to be gases ; that they combine in a uniform proportion, and constitute water ; that hydrogen will not support combustion ; that oxygen will not burn, but it will support combustion, etc. We here conclude to the nature or species of these objects from the effects produced by them : this is man's only method of learning truth empirically ; but proof by this method may be perfectly demonstrative, and therefore certain, as all logicians admit.

We have seen that the abstract and universal idea which is formed by the intellect, is an effect that exceeds all material effects, and that it must, therefore, be ascribed to the action of a cause which is of a specifically and totally different order of being. The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the will or rational appetite ; it can love and desire the morally good or virtuous ; it can love the absolutely true, as beautiful and good ; but this is action having no identity of property or quality with the action of any power in material substance ; therefore, the will is a faculty that belongs to an immaterial nature. Also, there is no assignable limit, whether of species or magnitude, to the objects towards which the intellect and will can tend, and which, in a certain proportion, even including God, they can attain or reach ; they attain or apprehend things specifically below themselves, in a manner superior to those things, for they attain to material things in an immaterial manner ; they reach even God, but in a manner proportioned to themselves and to their condition while the spirit is united with the body. We may say, then, that the object of their action is unbounded, is infinite. Now what power of material substance can be conceived, the object of whose action is thus unlimited, especially when we take into the account the undeniable principle that a material agent or nature cannot put immaterial action ?

We may validly conclude, therefore, that the human intellect and will are powers belonging to an immaterial nature, or that the subject of such powers cannot be corporeal substance. We know a being or agent only by its action, and the objects of its action ; how

else can we know anything of it? By the action of the agent or being we learn its powers, and from those powers we infer the nature or essence of that being; there is no other manner by which man can come to the knowledge of any real thing whatever.

It having been shown that the intellect and will in man cannot be powers of his body, because their action is immaterial, the proof that his soul is a spiritual substance may now be stated: the soul has action in the eliciting of which the body does not share; *i.e.*, the soul acts *per se*, or of itself; therefore it must be capable of existing *per se*, or substantially. The action of the intellect in knowing abstract truth or the universal, cannot be attributed to the body, or to any power of the body; it must therefore be the act of what is incorporeal, the act of another substance distinct from, superior to the body. In order to perceive the force of this reasoning, it is necessary to understand the precise meaning, and see the truth of the axiom, "what acts *per se*, or by its own virtue, also exists *per se*, or is a substance."¹ The intellect is, in itself, a power or faculty; as a faculty it must belong to some substance which is the subject in which it inheres. Now, since the intellect exists and acts dependently on the substance to which it belongs, we conclude that because its action is independent of the body, its subject must be in some manner independent of the body, and must be a substance. There is a something in man, then, which is intelligent and free, having action of its own in which the body does not share; then it has the essential properties of a substance, and can exist *per se*, or substantially. The human soul is therefore spiritual; for a spirit is an immaterial, intelligent substance; it is simple, because it is the formal principle in man, "*anima hominis est forma corporis*;" it is intrinsically active, because it is a living formal principle. If the foregoing doctrine be true, we may infer that the soul is not, so to say it, wholly immersed in the body, or its whole nature is not totally absorbed by the body; but some virtue of that nature is left apart from the corporeal substance, and therefore not constituting a something of the compound made by union of soul and body;² the intellect and will are not powers of the compound; they are powers of the soul alone. This seems reasonable and according to the very nature of things; for the soul is a substance which is greatly superior in its nature to material substance, and it is therefore not commensurate with matter; its perfection exceeds the whole capacity of matter to receive. Hence, some illustrate this union of soul and body, in which the entire entity of the soul does not go into that union, by the simple comparison of a man whose whole person ex-

¹ Quidquid per se operatur, et per se existit.

² St. Thomas, Summa, p. I, qu. 76, a. I, ad. I.

cept his head is immersed in water ; analogously, the intellect and will are not merged in the compound of soul and body ; they remain out of it or apart from it.

The dependence of the intellect on the fancy is, as already noticed, only for the presentation of objects ; hence, the fancy is necessary for intellectual action only by way of *conditio sine qua non*, as your eye depends for seeing an object reflected in the mirror, on having a mirror before it ; as the mirror is something extrinsic to the eye's power of vision, so in an analogous degree, the fancy is something extrinsic to the intellect. This reasoning suggests the objection : " Since the intellect thus necessarily depends on the fancy for the presentation of its objects, it follows that the soul cannot exist when separated from the body ; for, in that separated condition, the intellect could not act, for the want of an object, and by consequence, all the powers of the soul would be in a dormant state ; but as this manner of existing, in the very nature of things, is not to happen, we may infer that the soul has no existence except dependently on its union with body, and it is therefore not a spiritual substance." In answer to this statement we must reason *a priori* : as the soul of man when in union with the body must act in a manner proportioned to that condition ; so, when it is separated from the body, it must naturally have a mode of action, of understanding, which is proportioned to that manner of existing ; this cannot be doubted, for the natures of things are all perfect in their species. Hence, as in the one state the understanding acts dependently for its objects of thought on the bodily organs, so, in the other, it must act independently of this extrinsic and instrumental assistance.

We have no positive ground to doubt that the human soul is by its very nature ordained to union with the body. It is on this account that the soul as separated from the body is not styled a person ; for a person is defined in philosophy to be an intelligent substance, which is under every aspect complete ; and since the separate soul postulates that union with the body, it is not under all respects a complete substance. It is a legitimate corollary from this reasoning, that even natural reason furnishes some proof of the body's resurrection.¹

We may infer from the arguments thus far advanced that, aside from the proofs of the soul's immortality which remain to be given, man's soul, having action of its own, in eliciting which the body is

¹ St. Th., p. 1, 2, qu. 4, a. 6, ad. 1, 2, 3, and p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1, ad. 6, where he says, " Anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata habens aptitudinem, et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem ;" the human soul keeps its own existence when separated from the body, possessing an aptitude for, and a natural inclination to, union with the body.

not a principle, is an immaterial substance, and it is capable of existing as a substance when it is separated from the body. Now as to its immortality: there are many reasons which prove with more or less of logical force the immortality of the soul; when all are taken together, they constitute complete demonstration, as even pagan philosophers admitted and maintained. We may here legitimately assume that the soul is the living principle in man; it is the principle in him to which we have attributed his highest living acts, those of intellect and will, and from it comes all vital action in man. Then, if this living soul dies or ceases to exist when separated from the body, either it must die by a law of its own nature, or else God must himself directly annihilate it; but it cannot actually happen through either one of these causes, and therefore it cannot happen at all.

To say that God has not the power to annihilate what He created, would be nonsense; but there are sufficient reasons on account of which He will not annihilate all His creatures; and hence it is sometimes said in this moral sense, God cannot annihilate spiritual natures. We cannot assign any end which would justify to reason the creation and the subsequent annihilation of an intelligent being; indeed, what valid reasons can we state which prove even that this earth, the planets and stars, should be annihilated? God's manifestation of himself *ad extra*, is perfectly accomplished only by the creation of intelligent beings destined in His designs and fitted by their nature to endure with unending life. These statements indicate the arguments by which it is shown to be irrational to suppose that an intelligent being can be created for annihilation.

As was already affirmed, the soul's natural immortality is proved by its simplicity and substantiality, or by its being a simple and living substance that can exist independently of matter. Since death is the separation of the living soul from the body informed by it, just as corruption is the dissolution of a compound whole into its constituent parts; only that substance can die, which consists of a body animated with a living principle; but man's soul when separated from the body continues to exist a living substance, no longer compounded with matter; therefore it cannot die. The brute soul dies with its body, because, though simple in itself, it has no action distinct from its corporeal and organic action, and by consequence, it has no existence as a substance distinct from its body. When the vegetable dies, its living principle perishes; when the brute animal dies, its formal principle, or the principle of life in it perishes; for that which can have no action can have no existence; and the brute soul, if conceived to be separated from its body, could have no action; for, it has no intellect nor other power except what it has through the organs of its body when it is actu-

ally informing that body. But man's soul besides informing his body, has powers superior to all organic and corporeal powers; it can therefore exist when apart from the body, and, being an uncompounded substance, it cannot suffer dissolution or die.

Again, man's soul both knows of, and it naturally desires, unending bliss; then he is fitted and ordained by his nature for a state of perpetual beatitude; therefore, either man's soul is immortal, or else he is created without an appointed ultimate destiny which is proportioned to his nature; but God creates nothing in vain, therefore man's soul is created immortal. We cannot conceive that any created nature should ever totally fail to reach or at all to fulfil the end for which its very essence is shaped, and which is obviously the final cause of its existence, and hence the axiom, "*nunquam deficit natura in necessariis*;" nature never fails¹ or falls short of that for which it is necessarily ordained. Unless the capacity of man's intellect to know the good and true and beautiful, be in vain; unless the capacity of his will to desire longingly for perfect bliss be given to it in vain, then there is an object proportioned to those faculties of his nature, and that object necessarily supposes the immortality of his soul. We daily see the visible and passing things around us faithfully and exactly accomplishing the ends for which they are manifestly ordained by their nature, and by this we come to learn the most general and necessary law of everything's action.

Now there can, *a fortiori*, be no exception to this principle in natures of a superior order; therefore, since man's higher powers, his intellect and will, do not attain, in his mortal life on earth, an object proportioned to them, or commensurate with their capacity, his soul must be destined for a superior and immortal state.

That no object nor condition, attainable by man in this life, is adequate to the greatness of his powers and to the intrinsic dignity of his nature, is a truth that undeniable facts and principles render very evident. The most virtuous and meritorious life is passed, in numerous instances, either without any reward on earth, or, at least, without adequate or equitable reward; therefore the due reward of genuine virtue must pertain to a future state of existence. The quasi proverb, "virtue is its own reward," originated with the Stoic philosophers of old, and it is not really true in any but rare and exceptional cases; for, even when virtue brings to the good man some present recompense, it is never, at least in the case of difficult moral virtue, an adequate reward, as Lessius shows.¹ An action is not performed for its own sake, but on account of the end in respect to which that action is a means. The beauty and excellency of virtue cannot be duly appreciated by all, nor does its

¹ De Providentia Numinis et de Immortalitate Animæ, lib. ii., ratio 17a.

value proceed from these qualities principally or apart from all ulterior reason why virtue is good; but it is the end to which virtue is ordained from which it derives its chief importance, just as the seed is not sown merely for the sake of that action, but for the fruit that the seed is to produce in the future.

The prophet Jeremias asks, "Why doth the way of the wicked prosper?"¹ and Job, "Why do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches?"² It is perhaps certain that the reason or argument which principally founds this conviction in the minds of all mankind of every nation, tribe, and tongue, namely, man will have a state of life succeeding his present life; the principal reason which leads mankind to this conclusion is the fact that it is the obvious explanation, and it is at the same time the only consistent explanation of man's present condition in this world. Their idea of the future state is more or less perfect, more or less rude and obscure; but yet every race of mankind infers from man's nature and from the present order of things as understood by them, that man has another life beyond the grave. How can that conclusion be false, which all mankind agree in drawing from the same substantial facts? All feel the same strong desire, the same unsatisfied yearning for a future and better state of existence; how can this inclination of man's rational nature be thus universal to the families of the human race, and yet have no corresponding end or object intended to be attained by it? How can there be a nature that is brought into existence without a befitting end or aim, and thus prove an essential and manifest flaw in the very design of creation?

That the spirituality and immortality of the human soul are believed as a dogma of the Christian religion, need not be here proved, nor is it denied by the materialists, though they deny both the immateriality of the soul and the fact of revelation. There are other cogent arguments from reason in proof of the soul's spirituality and immortality, which, however, cannot be stated and developed within the limits to which this article must be confined. Let us now briefly consider the theory of the materialistic school, and examine some principal reasons which they allege in proof of their hypothesis.

There are, indeed, several classes of materialists, differing more or less widely among themselves, and not agreeing even in essential principles. First, there are they, who with Locke affirm that it is possible for matter to think, and they deny that there is any conclusive proof of the soul's spirituality. It is not easy to assign any arguments advanced by this class of authors amounting to

¹ Jeremias xiii. 1.

² Job xxi. 7.

more than vague generalities and unwarranted negatives; unless we accept as possessing some positive logical value Locke's theory of ideas and substance. He identifies the idea in the intellect with the impression on the sensible organ; that is, the image of the visible object formed on the retina of the eye, for example, is transposed to the intellect, where it has added to it the perfections that make of it the mental idea; but it is in other respects the same image that was projected on the retina of the eye. This might be passed by, if intended merely for a description of brute thought; but the arguments which are advanced above to prove the spirituality of the human soul, are a sufficient proof that this is no description of the idea in the human intellect. The image in the sensible organ always represents a singular or concrete object, or it is of this individual material thing; the idea in the intellect expresses the abstract, the universal, and therefore the supersensible; by consequence, the intellect must itself be above or superior to organic power. Locke also asserts that we know nothing of substance, we can know only its qualities and accidents; whence it follows that we are unable to know with certainty whether or not the substance can think. It is true that while we know the qualities and accidents of such substance immediately, we know the substance itself only by way of inference from them; but does it follow that we know nothing of a thing, even when we know it as the necessary conclusion from its evident premises? To admit such principle is to deny all scientific and demonstrative truth, and Mr. Locke's inept reasoning about substance must also be included in this destruction, along with all the most precious knowledge which can be acquired by reason. We know real beings only by means of their action; and that action as seen by us is, for our minds, the measure of their nature. We do not see those beings in their own intrinsic essence, but they manifest themselves to us by their action, their powers and qualities; and it is absurd to say that from no number of effects and signs can we conclude to the certain knowledge of their cause, for that is to deny the validity even of geometrical demonstration. Hence, while our minds do not immediately apprehend material substance, or any other substance, but know it only by way of a rational act, yet it is absurd to affirm that all the real qualities, effects, and signs, manifested by material substance, found in our minds no certain knowledge of its nature as substance.

There is another class of authors who seem to differ from Locke, rather in the manner of wording and presenting their theory, than in what is essential to the theory itself; they teach that all our certain knowledge of real things is limited to their phenomena, *i. e.*, to the direct sensible manifestation of their qualities and accidents;

substance, spirit, etc., are unknowable. Others explain all things by the correlation and conservation of forces, or, as Herbert Spencer enunciates it, everything knowable "may be expressed in terms of matter, motion, and force." It will not be out of place here to state the main principles of this theory by which everything that can be known is reduced to force, and the phenomena of force;¹ but they repudiate, however, "vague and barren disputations concerning materialism and spiritualism;" also they would fain, but they cannot, relieve all terms of the meanings given to them by "metaphysical psychology." Hence they confess their embarrassment at being unable to say just what they wish; or, as Maudsley, who speaks the language of the school, puts it, "he must use words which have already meanings of a metaphysical kind attached to them, and which, when used, are therefore for him more or less a misinterpretation."² But these authors do not draw the legitimate conclusion from this unwillingness of mankind or their inability, it may be, to change the established meaning of terms: mankind are right; it is the "scientists" that are wrong in their use of terms.

According to this hypothesis, then, all things in nature are mere force. But, in order to account for the differences among the objects observable by us, this force is distinguished by most of the school into six kinds: 1st, the force or momentum of moving bodies; 2d, heat, in molecules or atoms; 3d, light, consisting of molecules or atoms; 4th, chemical force; 5th, electricity; 6th, nerve force or vital force, allied to electricity; to this enumeration of forces Balfour Stewart adds, "energy of position," or, vantage-ground. Each one of these forces has its correlated or corresponding forces into which it may be transmuted by the agency of some other force; this connection or relation among forces by which one may be changed into another, is that which is meant by the "correlation of forces." Since matter is never increased or diminished by the various transmutations that take place in it, its quantity remaining constant under all possible changes of force into force; it follows that "the sum of all the forces in nature is a constant quantity," or, as Bain says, "It is an essential part of the doctrine that force is never absolutely created, and never absolutely destroyed, but merely transmuted in form or manifestation." By the "conservation" or "persistence of force," therefore, they seem to understand only the invariability of absolute quantity as to the

¹ Mill says that at the present time, "it is universally allowed that the existence of matter or spirit is, in its nature, unsusceptible of being proved."—*Logic, Introduction*, p. 5.

² *Body and Mind*, preface, by Maudsley. They wish to put all metaphysical truth, it would seem, within the category of the fanciful.

mass or total of matter. Of this point Spencer says,¹ "Persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible," *i. e.*, without a vicious circle. And again,² "By the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations do not persist, but that which does persist is the unknown cause of these manifestations."

It is evident, then, that the "scientists" do not agree in their opinions concerning the nature of this force whose "transmutations and manifestations" constitute the only objects which can be known by man. What is this force in itself? Is it something concrete and subsistent; is it something existent in itself, or is it something inherent in another thing as its subject? Is it the degree of power exerted, is it the agent itself, or is it both of them? In what does it differ from substance, nature, accident, and property, vulgarly so called among less "advanced thinkers?" What must be added to force in order to constitute with it "nerve force?" The answer is, "nerve;" but the question then is, what is "nerve?" The answer must be, "force." Spencer says truly, therefore, that the argument in proof of this one, constant or persistent force, is a vicious circle; but then, on the other hand, the thing is very obscure, and it is also doubtful as to what it is, and whether it is. What other reasons can be demanded in proof of falsity than that a statement is obscure and uncertain, and, at the same time, that its logical proof involves a vicious circle? Under this respect, then, the hypothesis which reduces all knowable things to one persistent, mere force, has less appearance of being a conclusion reached by reason than it has of being only a figment of the fancy. The advocates of the system seldom attempt giving strict definitions, and, indeed, definition is perilous for the mere theorist. Mill simply consigns questions regarding the nature of substance to the category of idle disputations about what is unknowable; Spencer, who, while he does not equal Mill in mere style of composition, seems much to surpass him in philosophical acumen, evades the plain fallacies by his equivocal assertion, that "only in a doctrine which recognizes the unknown cause as coextensive with all orders of phenomena can there be a consistent religion or a consistent science;"³ this proposition is equivocal, for it may be taken in a pantheistic sense or not, just as it best suits the exigencies of argument. But many of the authors belonging to this class, including Huxley, and most of the same school in the United States, should, perhaps, rather be styled idealists than materialists. They refuse to argue concerning the nature of the soul, about which they

¹ First Principles, p. 252.

² Ibid., p. 255.

³ Ibid., Part II., ch. v.

allege that nothing can be known, and, like pagans in the Areopagus, they pay offerings only to an unknown God. With men who make such a use of logic, plain facts, and the very testimony of all nature, there is no reasoning; and indeed there is no need of reasoning, since such notions can never be adopted by many minds; for, from the days of Pyrrho, the only answer given by the mass of sensible people to total skepticism and pure idealism was ridicule and laughter, and this is the only answer that seems justly due to either, as they are opposed to the evident first conclusions of good common sense.

The slurs on "metaphysical psychology," the refusal to argue "questions concerning materialism and spiritualism because vague and barren," can scarcely be considered either as loyal to truth or as ingenuous; such things are certainly unworthy either of philosophy or of philosophers. The denial of "the metaphysical," as well as their assertion that "the spiritual is not knowable," are vague negations, which they do not attempt to support by any demonstrative proof, nor do they attempt to refute the arguments usually advanced in proof of the soul's spirituality. As they do not give definitions, they are always at liberty to deny that their adversaries rightly apprehend their meaning. What do they mean by "metaphysical terms," "metaphysical reasoning?" Is not all absolute and necessary truth metaphysical? Is not even all abstract truth, in its way and degree, metaphysical? How can they form an argument that is conclusive, and that, at the same time, implies no metaphysical element? Do they not admit the principle of contradiction as explained in the logics? and yet this principle of contradiction is the ultimate metaphysical canon of all reasoning. It is self-contradiction for one to deny the metaphysical, who attempts to demonstrate a proposition by its reason.

If we assume, with Spencer, that the ideas in our minds, regarding the various manifestations of force, motion, and matter, are objectively real, or, in other words, that these three things are real objects existing concretely outside of the mind; then the arguments for the immateriality and spirituality of man's soul will apply to physical things thus conceived, with the same force that they have when applied to material things as they are understood by mankind in general, notwithstanding "the unknowable cause," which Spencer assigns for them: in any theory, his "force, motion, and matter," are, in themselves, merely sensible objects.

Apart from the question concerning the spirituality of the human soul, there are many serious objections to this theory which claims to explain all visible things by "the correlation and conservation of force;" first, it seems to be merely an arbitrary hypothesis which, without demonstrating any new thesis to explain the cre-

ated things around us, yet makes the extraordinary assertion that all man's previous ideas of real things, as classified under the "ten categories," are false. We are now to believe that such things as substance, quality, essence, property, accident, etc., are terms "of a metaphysical meaning," that express nothing but empty speculation founded on no reality. We must, henceforth, reduce all the species and families of things to unity, and their unit is force, but an undefined and undefinable force. Why not as well make that central unit to which all is reduced, "electricity," or "heat," or "motion?" For, it is sure that we can so strain our fancies of objects pictured before the mind, and so order our terms for things, as to reduce every phenomenon to some or other correlation of "electricity," or "motion," or "heat," just as, for example, we can when in total darkness, by dint of effort, compel the strained eye to see within itself every hue and figure of things possible and impossible. In fact, many a philosophical hypothesis has, in the end, proved to be a poorly devised figment of the fancy. Again, this hypothesis denies all the conclusions of general experience, concerning the qualities and properties of material things, as it also denies the previous teachings of physical science. Finally, as these authors propound the system, it pretends to explain philosophically the physical things of nature, as well as the facts and principles of mental operations, and yet it repudiates the essential basis of all philosophical reasoning, *i. e.*, it absurdly rejects absolute and necessary truth, stigmatizing it as "metaphysics," by which its votaries appear to mean, frivolous speculation, having no more value than day-dreaming.

It is but just, before concluding these remarks, to consider, at least briefly, the often-repeated complaint made by these physicists, that the "metaphysical psychologists" very absurdly ignore the conclusions of physiology, as well as the discoveries of other natural sciences, "without even having been at the pains of making themselves acquainted with what these conclusions and discoveries are."¹ Perhaps a like complaint may be made with equal justice against the "scientists" for repudiating "metaphysics," or absolute truths, and the conclusions from them.²

It cannot be doubted that the combined study of physiology and sound philosophy, gives mutual aid to these branches of knowledge, as already observed. But, in this matter, let us not

¹ *Body and Mind*, by Maudsley.

² Argyll, *Primeval Man*, Part I., rebukes, in pertinent terms, this conduct of "positivists" in ostracizing the philosophical investigation of their doctrines, and he cites for censure Mr. Lewes's words, interdicting all study of the "unknowable:" "Whatever is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted to research." Among these questions forbidden by Mr. Lewes, we must reckon those concerning spiritual natures and the existence of a personal God.

affirm either more or less than the truth: the only knowledge of sensible things required for the perfect validity of the argument demonstrating the immateriality of the human soul, is that which regards the well-known and invariable properties of material substance, which determine its specific nature as matter, in other words, such qualities of all matter as are known to the mass of mankind. The particular qualities of matter in this or that species do not concern the argument. Just as the mathematician need not know the best kind of timber or the right temper of steel for bridge-building, in order to know demonstratively that, out of these materials, a triangular brace cannot be made, one of whose sides is longer than the sum of the two others, so, by a like proportion, in order to know demonstratively that intellectual action specifically exceeds the power of matter, it is not at all necessary to know all the ganglia or nerve-cellules in the labyrinth of the brain. What else can be discovered, inspected, and analyzed in the brain, than organs, shapes, adaptations, and constituents of organs, as related to organic action? As mechanics and engineering must take their absolute principles from mathematics, which, under this respect, has supremacy over those branches; so, the physiologist that will reason about spirit, or spiritual nature, is dependent, for the principles that must direct him, on another science, physiology aiding the argument only in an indirect manner, or inasmuch as organ or matter is *not* spirit. It is manifest that some knowledge of man's sensible organs, or of his external and internal senses, is strictly necessary for comprehending the intellect's action as dependent for its objects on the ministry of these organs. But yet, it still remains true that learning in the theories of physiology is not necessary for demonstrating the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, for, since physiological science is concerned only about particular forms of matter, as this organ of vital action, this tissue, these cells, etc., and not about the necessary and universal predicates of all matter, its own special conclusions do not really and directly pertain to the argument at all.

A PARTISAN ASSAULT UPON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

Vaticanism in Germany and in the United States (Circulated by the
"UNION REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE").
Washington, D.C.¹

IT seems as though Washington, "the Father of our Country," had more than human prescience when, in his "Farewell Address," he warned the people of the United States against the pernicious effects of party spirit. Several times since the publication of that memorable address, the integrity and continuance of our present civil institutions have been imperilled by the violence of partisan passions. And never in our country's history has there existed a deeper necessity to lay Washington's warning seriously to heart than in the present critical juncture of affairs.

The year which has just closed was ushered in with signs of universal gladness. The hour of its commencement was hailed with the shouts of exulting multitudes, with joyous peals of bells and salutes of artillery. The light of innumerable bonfires and illuminations seemed but the reflection of the light of the joyous hope that warmed the hearts and brightened the faces of American citizens, under the belief that our Centennial anniversary was but the first of an endless series of similar anniversaries, and that, in the course of ages yet to come, their descendants in countless generations would celebrate as a united people, knowing no North, no South, no East nor West, but only one common country, the one thousandth, and, if the world should so long endure, the ten thousandth anniversary of the independence of a land blessed, beyond all other lands on the face of the earth, with advantages of soil and clime, and blessed, too, with civil institutions securing freedom to all—institutions which would know no change except that which would grow out of a clearer and fuller apprehension in idea and application in practice of the principles of true freedom, and be but the ripened fruit of a richer and more perfect civilization.

But it so happened that the times of our Presidential canvass and of our Centennial anniversary came together, and partly through the agitations incident legitimately to that canvass, but still more through the bitterness and rancor of partisan dissensions, and the

¹ A note at the end of this pamphlet states that "Committees and individuals, in ordering POLITICAL PAMPHLETS (the capitalizing is that of the note), will please address 'UNION REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,' Washington, D. C."

lust for place and power and official emoluments of partisan demagogues, the year which at its commencement was bright with hope, at its close was darkened with a gloomy presage of danger to our civil institutions, and fear lest as a people we might be torn by intestine strife and plunged into the abyss of political anarchy.

If these perils shall happily be averted, it will not be through the moderation of partisan leaders or their reverence for the principles of justice, but through the good sense and calm judgment of the American people rising above mere questions of party, and triumphing over the passions which demagogues have persistently endeavored to excite.

At the outset of the recent Presidential canvass it was feared by the more unprincipled officeholders and strategists of the party in power that, under a calm consideration of the only questions which were legitimately involved in the contest between them and their political opponents, the American people would not divide themselves broadly into two parties; that perhaps, indeed, the old party lines would be obliterated, or if not, that at all events, the adherents of the Republican party would not rally to the support of their leaders with the unanimity and enthusiasm which passion superadded to political ideas would induce. Hence it was announced that "an emotional issue" must be made. The easiest way to make such an issue, and one which would create the greatest excitement, seemed to be by a revival of the old Know-Nothing movement, and the making of a religio-political attack upon Catholicity. But it was quickly discovered that an openly organized movement of this kind would not do, and the movement in the form in which it was first conceived and planned was not made.

A number of reasons may be assigned for this. The primary cause doubtless was, that He who "turneth the thoughts of men" as He does "the waters of the seas," did not will that the Catholics of the United States should at that time be exposed to the fires of open persecution. Many considerations had weight in the minds of demagogues sufficient to restrain them. It became evident from the manner in which General Grant's Des Moines speech was received, and subsequently Mr. Blaine's proposed alteration of the Federal Constitution, that an open assault upon Catholics would not be approved by the better portion of our non-Catholic population. The comments of the secular press of the country upon General Grant's and Mr. Blaine's demonstrations, showed clearly that the people of the United States were not prepared to combine in a gratuitous assault upon the liberties of a large number of citizens, whose fidelity to our Constitution and laws have been attested and confirmed by their uniform loyalty ever since the first settlement of our country, and who, in every crisis and struggle

through which, as a people, we have had to pass, have proved uniformly faithful, and borne in every emergency their full share of burdens and sacrifices. It was found, too, that it would be impossible to make a party issue on the basis of anti-Catholicity that would present even a show of plausibility, much less of fairness and justice. As regards the proposed establishment of a universal system of forced ("compulsory") "unsectarian" education by an alteration of the National Constitution, taking from the people of the several States of the Union the control they now exercise over the education of their children, and concentrating it in a bureau of the General Government at Washington, it became evident that the more thoughtful portion of the American people were already regarding with well-founded alarm, the centralizing tendency which of late years has been going forward as regards our civil institutions with constantly increasing power, and is absorbing into the control of the Federal Government affairs that heretofore have been left to the free action of the States severally and of municipalities; and that unnecessarily to further centralize political power by giving the Federal Government control over the subject of education, and increasing the official patronage at the disposal of the Executive Department at Washington, already enormous, and not unfrequently employed as a means of political corruption, would be a most perilous procedure.¹ On the other hand, it was found that the mere politicians of the Senate and House of Representatives, who are ever ready to support any measure which they suppose will be popular for the time being, would not divide upon party lines as regards the proposed alteration of the Constitution, and, consequently, that nothing would be gained to or taken away from either party by "rushing" the proposed measure through Congress. The fact, too, that in all previous anti-Catholic movements the demagogues who openly identified themselves with those movements almost invariably dug their own political graves, had also no doubt a restraining effect.

Another reason, also, probably had no inconsiderable influence. Catholics do not constitute a political party in the United States, never have done so. There are no reasons why they should attempt to form a party, but many and strong ones why they should not.

¹ The number of official places under the control of the Executive Department of the Federal Government now amounts to nearly fifty thousand. Let this be still further increased by the immense addition that would be made to it by "nationalizing," as it is called, the education of the country, and the peril growing out of this concentration of power at Washington, already great, must become incalculably greater. Of late years, too, the tendency of "national politics" to control the action of the people on purely local questions, and determine the selection of persons for positions that have not, and ought not to have, any relation whatever to the measures of the Federal Government, has made great and lamentable progress.

Nor do Catholics adhere exclusively and unanimously to either of the political parties into which the American people are divided. As *Catholics* they have nothing to expect from either of these parties. If a Catholic member of either party occasionally obtains an important office it is not because he is a Catholic, but rather in spite of it.

The questions and measures upon which the American people are divided into parties are generally of purely political character, not religious; and there is no more reason why Catholics, as Catholics, should belong to one party in preference to the other, than there is for them to engage, as *Catholics*, in the construction of railroads, the building of steamships, the spinning of cotton, or the manufacture of iron. And although it is true that in previous years a greater number of Catholics were members of one of the political parties than of the other, it was not from reasons referring in any way to religion, but from reasons analogous to those which caused the German population of the United States to occupy a similar position. This has come to be generally understood by the American people, and, though the cry of "priestly influence" is still occasionally raised by some demagogue, or fourth-rate newspaper, trying to swim into temporary influence on the little ripple of excitement thus created, it is regarded by sensible citizens generally as simply a cry gotten up for a purpose, and it influences none but the ignorant and the utterly prejudiced. While Protestant ministers do not scruple to introduce partisan politics into their discourses, Catholic priests rigidly abstain from it. Valuing as highly as other men their rights as citizens, they, with few exceptions, from regard for the sacred duties and functions of the priesthood, take no part whatever in political affairs. These facts are well known to the intelligent portion of the American people. Hence, it became a question, with politicians, which there was little trouble in deciding negatively, whether it would be politic needlessly to alienate, by an open assault upon their religion, the thousands of Catholics who were in the ranks of the Republican party, and, along with them, numbers of non-Catholics whose sense of right would make them indignant at the outrage.

From the force of these and other reasons no openly organized assault was made upon the religion of Catholics during the recent Presidential canvass. Yet while the idea of an open attack upon Catholics was given up, the assault itself was only changed from an open to a covert one. Secret anti-Catholic organizations were encouraged, and pamphlets containing most slanderous misrepresentations of Catholicity were circulated secretly among those whose fears or prejudices, it was supposed, could be excited and thus won over from the support of the Democratic ticket, or stimu-

lated, if they were already adherents of the Republican party, to greater efforts in its behalf. Some of these pamphlets are beneath notice, and carry the antidote to their own poison with them to the minds of all sensible, unprejudiced persons. But others are more skilfully conceived and composed, and doubtless have not failed to influence well-meaning persons not sufficiently acquainted with the subjects referred to, to enable them to perceive the untruthfulness of the statements made and the fallacies of the arguments employed.

A pamphlet of this latter character, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article, lies before us. It is evidently the production of a writer of no mean ability. Its assertions are specious, and the argument is conducted with considerable skill. There is nothing new in it, either in statement or in thought. Yet repetitions of old falsehoods have to be met with repetitions of truths still older, and as the pamphlet may be fairly regarded as an exponent of impressions, false yet widely prevalent, respecting the bearing of the doctrines of the Catholic Church upon civil rights and duties, we deem it well to notice it.

The design of the pamphlet may be seen by a discriminating reader all through its pages, but it comes out towards its close so clearly as to be unmistakable. The following may be taken as a fair specimen :

"There is a movement on foot not yet crystallized into a policy . . . but sufficiently defined in its object to excite in the minds of our citizens apprehension if not alarm. We refer to that alliance of Church and party, which in certain localities is so marked as to leave no doubt of its purpose. . . . Our Catholic clergy have a perfect right to labor and vote for the Democratic party, but they have no right to use the discipline of the Church to force those who believe in their faith, but not in their politics, to unite with them at the ballot-box. Yet the coercive policy is the one now adopted. The discipline of the Church is to be brought to bear upon its followers, and the Romish Church, . . . is to make common cause with Democracy to overthrow the Republican party. . . . This accomplished the door is open, . . . through a national triumph of the party to which the Church is allied, to a radical change of our form of government.

"These possibilities should arouse intelligent American citizens of all creeds, whether of native or foreign birth, to the danger that threatens our country if the Ultramontane element of the Church, through the success of Democracy, should obtain control of our national affairs."

It is hard to exercise patience while reading such villanous insinuations, and to find conventional language strong enough to characterize them. What has the Catholic Church to gain by allying itself with the Democratic party, or any other party? What political party has ever had courage to look beyond the seeming expediencies of the hour, and stand firmly on the ground of principle, except so far as it supposed that it might thus win, or preserve, the favor of the populace, or those who were believed to lead and control it? What are parties but organizations, as changeable and

unreliable as the sands of the seashore or the currents of the air? They spring up in a day, and they seldom last for the space of even one generation. What has the Church, who counts her age by centuries, and has an abiding faith that she will continue as long as the world endures, to do with such ephemeral existences? The Church has long ago learned from experience as well as from divine revelation, not to "put trust in princes," whether they sit upon thrones and wear crowns, or manage "primary meetings" and "caucuses," and rule popular assemblies. What has the Democratic party ever done for the Church, that the Church should labor to secure "the success" of that party "at the ballot-box?" Why should the Church descend into the arena of partisan strife, and soil her pure robes with its dust and mire? When has any political party in this country dared to make even a show of doing scant justice to the civil rights of Catholic citizens, or as a party to lift a voice in their favor? What have the Catholic citizens of the United States, *as Catholics*, to expect from either party?

The Catholic Church teaches that civil governments have rights which no citizen can conspire against without sin. Is it likely that she, the unchangeableness of whose teaching her enemies have ever reproached her with, should set the example to her own members and children of disregarding that teaching, by engaging herself in a conspiracy (for that is what the writer means in plain English) to overthrow the American Government? Is the history of the Church, which shows that she has lived on terms of amity and peace with governments of every kind and form, and uniformly rendered to the State the things that are the State's, whether the authority of the State was represented by emperor, sultan, czar, king, director, president, or popular assembly, and has never asked from the State aught but the liberty of rendering to God "the things that are God's"—is this to be forgotten that room may be made for credence of a gratuitous and malicious falsehood? Are the immense and beneficent services which the Church rendered to mankind in re-establishing civil order in Europe, and building it upon the foundations of right, equity, and freedom, after it had been utterly destroyed by the convulsions that attended the dissolution of the old pagan Roman empire, and the invasions of the barbarians of Asia and the North of Europe—the work the Church did in fostering everywhere the principles which form the only enduring basis of our own civil liberty, in curbing the tyranny of feudal lords, kings, and emperors, defending the rights of the people, breaking the yoke from off the necks of serfs and bondmen, and encouraging everywhere through Europe the establishment of republics and free cities and municipalities, to be forgotten or ignored? Are there not countless testimonies on record, of non-Catholic writers as well

as Catholic, who have deeply studied the past history of the Church and of civil liberty, to the fact that her genius, her spirit, and the religious truths she inculcated, exert a most potent influence always and everywhere against lawlessness, tyranny, despotism, and in favor of the rights of the individual and in favor of civil liberty? Might not numerous instances be recounted from history where by her influence she has mitigated the severity of kingly rule, where she has rebuked the oppressions of tyrants and firmly advocated and defended the rights of peoples, while not one instance can be cited of her ever having espoused the side of absolutism? Is the Church so happily circumstanced in countries under kingly or imperial rule, is her freedom to fulfil her glorious mission so carefully respected and protected in those countries, that she should desire to exchange the wide liberty she enjoys here for the hampering restrictions she must submit to in some of those countries, and the persecutions she must endure in others?

Or, to come home at once to our own country's history, is the unswerving loyalty and acknowledged patriotism of Catholics in the days antecedent to the war for Independence, when they counselled and labored, hand in hand, with men of different beliefs religiously, but of one mind as regards their civil rights, to mature measures for resisting tyranny; when subsequently they united in making that memorable Declaration, and in defence of it Catholics contributed their money and shed their blood not less freely than citizens of other creeds; and thence on from those days to the present, is the loyalty and patriotism of Catholics in every crisis and struggle through which the country has passed, all to go for nothing? And are the countless splendid testimonies of American statesmen, and generals, and presidents, and governors, from Washington down, to the value of the services rendered to the country by Catholics, to their fidelity, their stanch loyalty, their pure patriotism, all to be set aside in order to make room for vile insinuations gotten up for partisan purposes?

"The coercive policy (says the pamphlet) is the one to be adopted! The discipline of the Church is to be brought to bear upon its followers . . . to make common cause with the Democracy!!!"

Here is the stale, senseless cry of "priestly coercion" again. Where is the man who knows anything either of the discipline of the Catholic Church, or of the manner in which Catholic citizens who live around him and come into close and constant contact with him in society, in business, and in public affairs, act and vote in political matters, that believes this infamous falsehood? Where is the Catholic citizen who ever admitted the truth of the slanderous

charge here made? Have all the Catholics of our country gags upon their mouths? Are all of them so obedient and faithful in fulfilling the obligations of their religion, and so submissive to "the discipline of the Church," that not even one can be found who would complain loudly enough to be heard, if any *such* "discipline" not to speak of "coercion," were attempted? The Catholic Church has in her communion men of every stamp and character, not only the submissive and devout, but many who are careless of their duties and rebellious in their dispositions. Of these latter there are those who complain of and sometimes resist her discipline as regards matters purely religious, and who endeavor to defend their contumacy in the most public manner; in some instances in journals especially established for the purpose. Is it credible that, if the clergy of the Catholic Church could so far forget their sacred duties (and their ecclesiastical superiors allow them) as to undertake to exercise "discipline," or the slightest "coercion" upon their members as regards political matters, the fact would not become notorious? And would not men who do not hesitate, at times, to despise counsel and resist "discipline" in religious matters, be still more bold in resisting if "coercion" were attempted in political matters? To ask these questions is to answer them. The insinuation is absurd upon its face as well as malicious.

In pursuance of his design, the author of the pamphlet refers to Germany, and does not hesitate to hold up the policy inaugurated there by Bismarck and the German infidels, as an example for the American people to follow. He says:

"If knowledge of what has been done in Germany through priestism will awaken our people to the designs of the same power in the United States, the firm stand of Bismarck has not been taken an hour too soon?"

This idea runs through the whole pamphlet, and forms the staple of its argument. Its writer is evidently an ardent admirer of the absolutism, which under the forms of law is depriving the citizens of Germany of all freedom, civil and religious, which denies to them even the right to have a conscience,¹ and is reducing them in fact, to mere atoms of the body politic, with no personal rights,—mere machines controlled by the will of the State.

¹ The declaration of Bismarck that "the subjective conscience cannot be allowed to set itself up against the objective law," is clear enough evidence of the ideas that underlie his movements. It is absolutism pure and simple. It leaves to the individual no liberty, civil or religious, and makes the State supreme, as regards both civil affairs and religion.

The Catholic Church teaches that no human authority can oblige an individual to act against his conscience. Bismarck—in this in perfect accord with the ideas of the advanced infidels of the day—declares that the State may and can. Who are the true upholders of personal liberty and the rights of man? Bismarck and his infidel co-workers, or the Catholic Church?

In view of the utter untruthfulness which characterizes the statements generally of the writer of the pamphlet, and also of his admiration of absolutism in government, it is not at all surprising that he should declare, what few others would have the hardihood to assert, that

"The present attitude of Germany towards Rome is not one of hostility to the Roman Catholic Church as a spiritual power, but as a temporal one assuming authority above the State."

The boldness of this statement is equalled only by its falsity, yet that very boldness gives it the semblance of truth to the ignorant and unreflecting. What, now, really is the fact? It is simply this:

1. The Catholic Church has no temporal power whatever. She never claimed, as a divine organization, to have authority in purely temporal matters anywhere or at any time.¹ Where her prelates during the Middle Ages exercised any jurisdiction in political or

¹ That this is not the writer's mere say-so, but the general belief of Catholics, and a doctrine which is expressly declared by the theologians of the Church, we refer to Cardinal Manning. He says:

"The authority which the Church has from God . . . is not *temporal* but *spiritual* (the italics are Cardinal Manning's). Again he says: "In all things which are purely temporal, and lie *extra finem ecclesiæ*, outside of the end of the Church, it neither claims nor has jurisdiction. . . . In all things which promote, or hinder, the eternal happiness of men, the Church has a power to judge and to enforce." . . .

To go farther back and to higher authority, Pope Innocent III., in the Bull *Novit Ille* (A. D. 1200), expressly declares that he did *not* undertake "to judge respecting the *fief*" (which was in dispute between the kings of France and of England), but "to decide upon *the sin*" committed.

Bishop Fessler, Secretary-General to the Vatican Council, Cardinal Manning, Bishop Ullathorne, and others, quote the Bull of Boniface VIII., *Unam Sanctam* (the Bull upon which the enemies of the Church constantly harp as establishing that Boniface VIII. did claim, in 1302, supreme temporal authority), as evidence that he did *not* claim temporal but *spiritual* authority. Their argument is that the declaration "*subesse Romano Pontifici omni creatura*," it is necessary "for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff," is explained by the qualifying phrase "*de necessitate salutis*," "necessary to salvation," and that consequently there is no reference whatever in this declaration of Boniface VIII. to temporal power. They refer also to Ballerini and Suarez, and to the Bull, *Meruit*, of Clement V., as sustaining their interpretation.

Suarez says that "the Sovereign Pontiff's authority is spiritual, except in the territory over which he is the temporal Prince; and that even his spiritual power is indirect as regards temporal things, and extends no farther than they affect the salvation of men, or involve sin." De Legibus, lib. iii., c. vi.

Suarez says also (after speaking of "the power of the Keys," Matt. xvi. 19), "In no other place did Christ imply that He gave to Peter or to the Church temporal dominion, . . . nor does Ecclesiastical tradition show this, but rather the reverse. Defensio Fidei, lib. iii., cap. v., sect. 14.

Bellarmino says that "when temporal princes come into the family of Christ they lose neither their princely power nor jurisdiction, but become subject to him (the Sovereign Pontiff) whom Christ has set over His family, *in those things which lead unto eternal life*." De Potestate Summi Pontificis, cap. i., p. 848.

civil matters, as some of them did, it was because the public law of Europe invested them with it. And the power generally was so notoriously used in a beneficent way that it became a proverb: "Better live under the shadow of a monastery than in a fortified castle;" "Better bear the weight of a bishop's thigh than of a baron's little finger." And this temporal power thus acquired and thus exercised, civil rulers frequently insisted on prelates exercising, in order that they might claim from them vassalage and the services due from feudal dependants to their feudal superiors. The arrangement was one which furnished plausible ground to kings and nobles to claim the right of nominating bishops, and, after they were inducted into office, exercising authority over them (just as the German government now claims), in things spiritual as well as temporal.

But it is not to this the writer of the pamphlet refers. He evidently has no objection whatever to a connection between Church and State, which places the Church under the State. For he alludes with manifest approval in his pamphlet, to the "ecclesiastical laws" of the German empire, by which both the Catholic Church and the Protestant "Churches" are subjected to the control of the State. What the pamphleteer insinuates, or rather plainly charges, is that the Catholic Church, "Rome," assumes authority as a temporal power above the State. He broadly asserts that

"The Papal authority in its organized form is a system arrogating to itself the divine right of governing, both in politics and religion, the whole domain of Catholic Christendom."

Catholics and most non-Catholics of any intelligence know that this is utterly untrue. We repeat that the Church does not claim for herself political authority anywhere. And the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, or Pope, as he is commonly called, claims for himself temporal authority nowhere whatever on the face of the earth, except in the city of Rome and the adjacent country, commonly called "the States of the Church," now temporarily wrested from him by infidel revolutionists. The spiritual authority of the Roman Pontiff is universal, unlimited by nationality, by geographical or political boundaries. His temporal sovereignty has always been confined within certain geographical limits. Catholics, therefore, universally, the world over, do not believe that the Pope has any temporal authority over them, unless they reside within the limits, in Italy, of his temporal dominions. Nor has a claim of universal temporal sovereignty ever been made by any one of the two hundred and fifty-seven pontiffs who have occupied St. Peter's chair.

Catholics believe that the Pope should be entirely independent

of all temporal rulers, in order that he may be entirely unembarrassed and free in the exercise of his spiritual authority. They believe that, to secure and maintain this freedom, he should be the temporal ruler of the city in which, by the Providence of God, his Chair has been placed, and the adjacent country known to Catholics as the "Patrimony of Blessed Peter," and his title to which, even in a purely human point of view, rests on stronger grounds than those which support the oldest governments of Europe.

That the Pope's independence of all political potentates is necessary to the free exercise of the powers and the unembarrassed discharge of the duties of his Spiritual Office, is a fact so patent, that even European governments opposed to the Catholic religion, but regarding the interests of their Catholic subjects or citizens, admit it and frequently have acted upon it. It would be hard to find statesmen more decidedly hostile to Catholicity than Castlereagh, Palmerston, Peel, Russell, Derby, and Thiers, and yet each in turn actively interposed to secure the political independence of the Popes, when it was temporarily destroyed, or defend it when it was endangered by political changes in Europe. And until a few years back, if not still to-day, scarcely a nation in Europe would look with complacency upon the Pope being made dependent upon any temporal government.

This is a simple statement of the whole matter as regards the temporal power of the Pope, and of the belief of all Catholics respecting it. The Sovereign Pontiff no more claims or seeks to exercise temporal dominion in Germany, the United States, or any other country, except what is usually called by Catholics "the Patrimony of Blessed Peter" (Rome and the adjacent country), than he claims the right of exercising temporal power in the moon.

It may, however, not be amiss to say something further in regard to the words "assuming authority above the State." Strike out the false assertion that this authority is claimed by Rome as a *temporal* power, and for *authority* substitute *spiritual authority* and the assertion from a bare falsehood would be changed to a statement of the truth. "Rome" does claim, and does exercise, supreme spiritual authority, and all Catholics believe that the claim is valid and of divine origin, delegated expressly by Christ to Peter, and that the exercise of this authority is not only legitimate, but necessary to the salvation of men. It does not belong to our subject to vindicate the validity of this claim. But we freely say that we not only believe in its validity, but that all Catholics believe it, all persons who are in the unity of the faith and communion of the holy Catholic Church. To deny it is to deny the unbroken tradition of the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles down to the present day, and to be outside of the obedi-

ence of faith. And the fact that this tradition goes back to the earliest ages of the Church most learned and candid Protestants admit, though they have not the grace to submit to it. Scarcely a Protestant now can be found, possessed of any real knowledge of Church history, who pretends that this tradition is of mediæval origin. They trace it back to the days of Cyprian and Irenæus; and back still of them to the time of Polycarp and Ignatius and Clement of Rome,¹ who all received the deposit of faith immediately from the lips of the Apostles, were ordained and consecrated by them as priests and bishops, and were their fellow-laborers in building up the Church. And with impious blasphemy some of these learned Protestants adduce the fact of the existence of this tradition at that time as evidence that even then, as soon as the Apostles fell asleep, and indeed even before some of them had entered into their rest, the Church of Christ began to be corrupt, and the very Martyrs and Confessors who had learned the doctrines of Christ from His Apostles, and whom the Apostles appointed as their successors, employed their authority to initiate this process of corruption. The exposure of this horrible idea does not enter into our subject. Of its falsity, its impiety, its downright blasphemy, we have, now and here, nothing to say.

Returning directly to our intended course of argument, we say that though Protestants deny to the "Church of Rome" the exercise of this supreme spiritual authority, they nevertheless strenuously claim its existence; and they, as well as Catholics, claim that it is "above the State," and that the State may not interfere with it. This claim is so universal among so-called "orthodox" Protestants, that nothing but sheer malice or ignorance can have suggested the bringing of it as a charge against Catholics exclusively.

In the "Confession of Faith of the Reformed Dutch Church," revised in "the Synod held at Dordrecht in the years 1618 and 1619," and still held to be binding, both in Holland and in the United States, by the adherents of that sect, occurs the following language:

"We believe, since this holy congregation (the Church) is an assembly of those who are saved, and that out of it there is no salvation, that no person of whatsoever state or condition he may be, ought to withdraw himself to live in a separate state from it, but that all men are in duty bound to join and unite with it, *submitting themselves to the doctrine and discipline thereof.* And that this may be the more effectually observed it is the duty of all believers, according to the word of God, to separate themselves from all those who do not belong to the Church, and to join themselves to this

¹ Isaac Taylor of England, is an instance in point. His extensive erudition and research into the belief and practice of the Christians of the first ages of the Church are indisputable. Milner, the Anglican Church historian, is another. And Dr. John W. Nevins, of this country, is another. Many others might be mentioned.

congregation, *wheresoever God has established it, EVEN THOUGH THE MAGISTRATES AND EDICTS OF PRINCES WERE AGAINST IT.*"¹

And in the "Heidelberg Catechism," which is in force in all the "Reformed" (in contradistinction to the Lutheran sects) in the United States, and in the scanty fragments which remain of them in France, Germany, and Switzerland, the "Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven" are defined to be "the preaching of the Gospel and Christian Discipline." And in answer to the question, "How is the Kingdom of Heaven shut and opened by Christian Discipline?" the answer as regards exclusion is, that

"Those who under the name of Christians maintain doctrines or practices inconsistent therewith . . . are complained of to the Church or to those who are thereto appointed by the Church, . . . and are by them *forbid the sacraments, whereby they are excluded from the Christian Church, and by God Himself from the Kingdom of Christ.*"

In the "Westminster Confession," still professedly believed by all Presbyterians in England, Scotland, Ireland, and the United States, the following statement is made:

"The Lord Jesus Christ, as King and head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of Church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate.

"To these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue whereof they have power respectively to retain and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent, both by the word and censures, and open it unto penitent sinners by the ministry of the gospel and by absolution from censures as occasion requires."

"IT BELONGETH *to synods and councils*, ministerially, to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God and government of His Church, to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and *authoritatively to determine the same*; which decrees and determinations . . . are to be received with reverence and submission . . . as being an ordinance of God." . . .

"Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the King of heaven; or in the least interfere in matters of faith."

In the first chapter of the Second Book of Discipline of the "Church of Scotland," under the title, "The Kirk's Jurisdiction is of God, and is grounded on His word," it is said:

¹ As showing clearly the belief of the "Reformed" (or Calvinistic) "churches" (we use the title by which they designate themselves in contradistinction to Lutherans), in regard to the character and source of the authority which they claim to exercise, we quote an extract from the "Form of Excommunication," of the "Reformed Dutch Church of North America:—"

. . . "Therefore, we, the ministers and rulers of the Church of God, being here assembled in the name and authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, declare before you all, that, for the aforesaid reasons, we have excommunicated, and by these do excommunicate N. from the Church of God, and from fellowship with Christ and the Holy Sacraments, and from all the spiritual blessings and benefits which God promises to and bestows upon His Church, so long as he obstinately and impenitently persists in his sins; and he is therefore to be accounted by you as a heathen man and a publican, according to the command of Christ, Matt. xviii., who saith, that whatsoever his ministers shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven."

"The Kirk . . . has a certain power granted by God, according to which it uses a proper jurisdiction and government exercised to the comfort of the whole Kirk. This power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the Mediator Jesus Christ unto his Kirk gathered, and has its ground in the word of God, to be put in execution by them unto whom the spiritual government of the Kirk . . . is committed."

Under the title of "The Difference Betwixt the Spiritual and Civil Jurisdiction," there is the following:

"This power and policy ecclesiastical is different and distinct in its own nature from that power and policy which is called the civil power, and appertains to the civil government of the commonwealth, albeit they be both of God. For this power ecclesiastical of law is immediately from the Mediator Jesus Christ, and is spiritual. . . . The civil magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacraments, nor execute the censures of the Kirk, nor yet prescribe any rule how it ought to be done."

The "Confession" of the French Protestants says:

"We believe that the true Church ought to be governed by that policy or discipline which our Lord Jesus Christ established. . . . We believe that all true pastors are endowed with . . . power by the Supreme Universal Bishop, Jesus Christ."

In the "Book of Common Prayer" of the "Established Church" of England, in the "Thirty-nine Articles," occurs the following:

"The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith." . . . Art. xx.

"The power of the civil magistrate extendeth to all men, as well clergy as laity, in all things temporal, but hath no authority in things purely spiritual." Art. xxxvii.

And, to go further back, in the preamble to the Act of Parliament 24 Henry VIII., the very Act by which that tyrant and his subservient tools attempted to lay a foundation for the man-made Church of England, it is said:

"The body spiritual having power when any cause of the Law Divine happened to come in question, or of spiritual learning, that it be declared, interpreted and showed by that part of the body politic called the Spirituality, now being usually called the 'English Church.'"

In the collection of confessions, apologies, catechisms, and explanations of the Lutherans, strangely styled by them "The Book of Concord," are many declarations that the Spiritual Power is "above the State." The following will serve as a specimen:

"Wherefore the Episcopal office, according to divine appointment, is to preach the Gospel, to remit sins, to judge of doctrine, to reject the doctrine which is contrary to the Gospel, and to exclude from the Christian community the wicked, whose impious conduct is manifest, . . . and in that case the parishioners and churches are under obligation to be obedient to the bishop, agreeably to the declaration of Christ (Luke x. 16), 'He that heareth you heareth Me.'"

"The keys are an office and power in the Church, given by Christ to bind and to loose sins, not only such as are gross and manifest, but also subtle and secret sins, which God alone perceives."

. . . . "Therefore the churches undoubtedly retain the authority to call, to elect, and ordain ministers, and this authority is a privilege which God has given especially to the Church, and it *cannot be taken away from the Church by any human power* as St. Paul testifies (Eph. iv. 8, 11, 12)."

We have thus examined the declarations of belief of all the leading sects which grew out of the "Reformation," and we might continue the examination *ad infinitum* through all their countless divisions and subdivisions with a like result. In no instance is there any acknowledgment whatever of any spiritual authority in the State. That authority in all cases is either expressly declared, or by implication assumed, *not* to belong to the State. Where the State is referred to at all, it is to declare that it ought to use its power to uphold and defend with "the sword of the magistrate" the rights of the Church, and protect Christians in the practice of religion from the impious and profane.¹

In a number of instances Protestants (as we might show from their own writings and from their actions, as in Scotland, in Switzerland, France, England, and Massachusetts, if it belonged to our subject) have held that the State had no independent sphere of its own whatever, but is or ought to be, in temporal as well as spiritual matters, a mere bureau or department of the Church. In this Catholics differ widely from them. For Catholics hold, in accordance with the teachings of the Church, that the State is a divine institution in the natural order, having its own proper sphere and end; and that, in that sphere and for that end, its authority rests upon divine sanctions. And this, no matter what may be the form of the government which represents and discharges the functions of the State—whether it be imperial, kingly, or republican.

It may be well to say that if we have not quoted from Methodist, or Baptist writings, or those of Congregationalists, or Unitarians, it is not because numerous citations might not be made from them, denying all spiritual authority to the State and claiming that there *is* a spiritual authority which rules and ought to rule men, and which is "above the State." The Congregationalists differ from the Presbyterians in regard to forms of church government, but not, or but slightly, in regard to professed doctrinal belief. The power which they deny to Synods and General Assemblies, however, they do not regard as belonging to the State, but place it in the single congregations or societies which their members form, or in a council of all the "churches," or else in the conscience of each individual member. The Baptists, as regards their ideas of spiritual authority, held and hold ideas similar to those of the Con-

¹ The "Westminster Confession" says: "Yet as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the Church of our common Lord."

The "Confession" of the Presbyterians of Scotland says: "Moreover we affirm that kings, princes, governors, and magistrates are first and especially (*imprimis et potissimum*) for the preservation of religion, and that therefore they have been ordained of God not only on account of civil polity, but also for the preservation of true religion."

The "Confession" of the French Protestants says: "Therefore also God has given the sword into the hands of magistrates for the repressing of crimes, not only against the Second Table (of the Commandments) but also those committed against the First."

gregationalists or Independents. The Methodists and Unitarians place the spiritual authority in their "conferences" or "councils," or in the individual consciences of the members of their societies. Generally, in practice among these latter sects, there is less distinct profession of belief in the authority of "churches," "conferences," or "councils," but not even an appearance of yielding to the State authority over religion. What they do not concede to their "councils" or "conferences" or to each particular "church," they professedly place in the "Law of God,"¹ or in the conscience of each individual. In actual practice the private judgment of each individual is made the last and highest court of appeal in things spiritual.

We need not dwell further upon this point. Suffice it to say that no Christian society or Christian man can get rid of the conviction that there is a spiritual authority on earth which is supreme, and, therefore, "above the State," without denying Christianity itself. If he denies this authority he becomes in denying it un-Christian and, in fact, anti-Christian. For Christ expressly claimed to possess this authority and has expressly delegated it. If it does not exist, then the Christian religion is a mischievous myth, a monstrous system of superstition and imposture. The alternative is plain: either there is lodged somewhere; in the Catholic Church as Catholics believe; or in the "churches," "convocations," "assemblies," "synods," "conferences," or "congregations," or in the conscience of each individual, a supreme spiritual authority and power, "above the State," and with the exercise of which the State may not interfere, and whenever it does interfere becomes guilty of sacrilegious usurpation; or else Christianity is a false religion, nay, more, a pernicious delusion!

And not only this. If the State possesses supreme power over religion, there is no room whatever for the exercise of individual conscience. Bismarck and the modern infidels of Europe then are correct; the individual has no right to a conscience; the highest arbiter of right and wrong is the State, and the individual must wait upon the decisions of civil tribunals to determine what right is, what the true principles of morality are, and what are the doctrines of religion—if there be a religion. Even our American freethinkers, we are of the opinion, are not prepared for this monstrous conclusion.²

¹ This expression—"the Law of God"—as used by Protestants is an evasion, a mere play upon words. A law is no superior; nor has it any real authority without a judge to expound and apply it. The interpretation and application of the law, in order that the law may have any real force and effect, must be either in an official person, or in a collective body, or in the individual conscience.

² It is pertinent here to refer to the "higher law" doctrine enunciated by the Abolition party of the United States during the anti-slavery excitement. They scouted as absurd, as a direct attack upon personal right and as a sheer usurpation upon the part

In charging upon Catholics, therefore, as a wrong done to the State, that they hold that the Church has in its own sphere an authority which is above the State, this pamphlet attacks the convictions of all who have faith in a divine revelation, and believe in a divine religion.

And it goes still further. The position assumed that the State is supreme in all things, and that there is no authority in any sphere higher than that of the State attacks the belief even of those who believe simply in natural religion. Every man, who believes in the inviolability of conscience, no matter on what his belief is based, is deprived of all right to his own convictions. There can be, under this theory, no such thing as an individual conscience; speaking authoritatively as regards right and wrong. All—right, duty, conscience—are swallowed up and absorbed in the authority of the State.

The author of the pamphlet, in order to give the color of truth to his false assertion that the Pope claims supreme power over the State in purely temporal affairs, refers to the action of Popes during the Middle Ages, in absolving, on certain occasions and in certain countries, subjects from their oaths of allegiance to wicked and tyrannical kings and emperors, and pronouncing upon them sentences of deposition.

Now, we have to say to this :

1st. That in doing this the Pope exercised no more authority than Protestant sects *claim* can be exercised by the councils, synods, etc., that represent the highest ecclesiastical power in those sects respectively, and no more power than others claim on the ground of Sacred Scripture for each person individually, and no more power than Liberals and disbelievers in a divine revelation claim for each person individually on the ground of natural right.

Look into the "confessions" and "symbolical books" of Protestant sects, and into the writings of the founders of those sects, still held to be of force, and you will find countless declarations that Christians are absolved in conscience from all allegiance to wicked and tyrannical rulers, that such rulers may be rightfully resisted and deposed. And this doctrine holds among them to this day. What does the expression—a favorite one in the mouths of liber-

of the State, to insist that because the General Government of the United States enacted certain laws, therefore American citizens were under any moral obligation to obey them, if in their consciences they disapproved them.

The resistance made to the Fugitive Slave Act, and the reprobation which the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous Dred Scott case met with, are not yet forgotten. It was insisted then that so far from the State having authority to determine principles of religion and morals, and the relations of men to each other growing out of those principles, the State was guilty of usurpation and tyranny, was attempting to support a system of wrong, and that there was no obligation to obey laws or judicial decisions based upon that wrong.

alists to-day—"the sacred right of revolution" mean, but that there are times and circumstances when the obligations of civil allegiance to tyrannical rulers cease, and those rulers may be deposed?

The Popes, therefore, of the Middle Ages exercised no greater and no more extensive authority and power as regards this matter than Protestants claim for themselves, either individually or for each sect in its collective capacity, and no more and no greater power than disbelievers in divine revelation, appealing simply to natural law, claim for themselves individually.

2d. But there is a great difference between the extent of the power exercised by the Popes during the Middle Ages and that claimed by Protestants and by deniers of divine revelation. The claim of the former is not near so extensive or unlimited as that of the latter.

No Pope has ever claimed to exercise, or attempted to exercise, this power except in relation to countries confessedly Catholic, and where both kings and peoples acknowledged themselves to be subject to the authority of the Catholic Church, and where by the public, organic law, the Catholic religion was recognized as forming part of the law of the realm. In no instance was this authority ever claimed, or ever attempted to be exercised, in countries whose people and rulers were outside of the Catholic Church. And not only this, but all such authority in non-Catholic countries, is formally disclaimed on the principle laid down by St. Paul (I. Cor. v. 12): "What have I to do to judge those that are without?" For further proofs see the evidence in the note we append.¹

Moreover, this authority was never claimed or exercised on account of the action of civil rulers in regard to things purely temporal. On the contrary all authority in regard to those matters is expressly disclaimed by Catholic theologians.²

¹ "The supreme judicial power of the Church has no jurisdiction over those that are not Christians, and the entire weight of its authority, if it were applied at all to such a State, would be applied to confirm the natural rights of sovereignty and to enforce the natural duty of allegiance; and that upon the principle that the supernatural power of the Church is for edification, not for destruction, that is to build up and to perfect the order of nature, not to pull down a stone in the symmetry of the natural society of man." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Dec.*, 52.)

"Power and authority are established by human right; the distinction between the faithful and those who do not believe is by divine right. But the divine right, which comes by grace, does not destroy the human right which is in the order of nature." (St. Thomas, 2^a 2^e, 2^a 2^e, quest. x., art. 10.)

² "Boniface VIII., in this very Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, expressly declares that the power given to Peter was the 'Suprema SPIRITUALIS Potestas,' not the temporal or a mixed power, but purely spiritual." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Dec.*, p. 66.)

"In things temporal, and in respect to the temporal end of government, the Church has no power in civil society." (Cardinal Tarquini, *Juris Eccl. Publici Institutiones*, p. 57.)

Cardinal Manning commenting upon this says: "The proof of this proposition is

3d. There is an immense difference, too, between the manner in which this absolving power was exercised by Popes, and the manner in which the claim of right to throw off civil allegiance and resist civil authority has been put forth, and often maintained by force of arms by non-Catholics.

According to the non-Catholic theory, a particular religious sect, or a person acting purely on his own individual judgment, may raise at any time the question of obligation to the civil power, charge it with usurpation or an attack upon conscience, summarily condemn it at the tribunal of private judgment, and make the sword the only arbiter of right. History shows what the result has been under this theory,—countless rebellions, social revolutions, and seas of blood.¹

But the deposing power exercised by Popes has always been exercised judicially, after patient and careful investigation and examination, conducted according to clearly settled and acknowledged principles and well-established rules,² and exercised, too, only in

that all things merely temporal are beside or outside of the end of the Church. It is a general rule that no society has power in those things which are out of its own proper end."

... "The civil society, even though every member of it be Catholic, is not subject to the Church, but plainly independent in temporal things which regard its temporal end." (Tarquini, *Juris Eccl. Institutiones*, p. 55.)

"Canonists affirm that the whole world is the territory of the Pontiff. But they do so in answering the objection, that where the Pontiff acts spiritually in the territory of any temporal prince, he is invading the territory of another. The meaning is evident, namely, that the Pontiff has universal jurisdiction over the whole world. But this does not say that his jurisdiction is temporal; it merely affirms that it is universal, and the same writers assert that it is only spiritual." (Cardinal Manning, *Vat. Decrees*, p. 74.)

¹ A French writer sums these up as follows for the last eighty years: 45 thrones overthrown, 25 royal families driven into exile, 34 charters and constitutions drawn up, sworn to, and then destroyed.

² We quote a few proofs from many which might be adduced. Dr. Döllinger in his work entitled "*The Church and the Churches*," says:

"Outside of the Catholic Church it has become almost a common form of speech to brand the Papal power as being boundless, as being absolute, as one which recognizes no law capable of controlling it. There is a great deal of talk of 'Romish omnipotence,' or of one with a never-ceasing pretension to universal dominion. All these representations and accusations are untrue and unjust. The Papal power is, in one respect, the most restricted that can be imagined; for its determinate purpose is manifest to all persons; and is (as the Popes themselves have innumerable times openly declared) 'to maintain laws and ordinances of the Church, and to prevent any infringement of them.' The Church has long since had its established ordinances and its legislation determined on, even to the most minute points. The Papal See is thus, then, before all others, called upon to give an example of the most rigid adherence to Church tenets; and it is only upon this condition that it can rely upon obedience to itself on the part of individual churches, or calculate upon the respect of the faithful."

Count De Maistre pithily says:

"What can restrain the Pope? Everything—canons, laws, national customs, monarchs, tribunals, national assemblies, prescriptions, remonstrances, negotiations, duty, fear, obedience, and especially public opinion, the Queen of the world."

extreme cases and after long and patient and repeated expostulations, and every other possible remedy had been tried and proved ineffectual. Under the non-Catholic views (both Protestant and rationalistic), therefore, of the relation of the "Law of God" and of the natural rights of men to the civil power, the good order and peace of society are far more subject to disturbance; and collisions with the civil power are likely to be far more frequent than under the Catholic view. History fully confirms this statement. For one instance that can be cited of subjects absolved by a Pope from their allegiance to a civil ruler, twenty can be cited of rebellions and insurrections against the civil power, and political revolutions made by non-Catholics on the ground of their private interpretations of the "Law of God" or of the law of natural right.¹

Whenever this deposing power was exercised by Popes during

Now let us hear what Pius VII says in an official document quoted by Dr. Döllinger:

"The Pope is bound by the nature and the institutions of the Catholic Church, whose head he is, within certain limits, which he dare not overstep, without violating his conscience and abusing that supreme power which Jesus Christ has confided to him. . . . Although in the Catholic Church faith has always been regarded as unalterable, but discipline as alterable, yet the Roman bishops have with respect even to discipline in their actual conduct always held certain limits sacred, although by this means they acknowledge the obligation never to undertake any novelty in certain things, and also not to subject other parts of discipline to alterations, except upon the most important and impregnable grounds."

A pastoral of the Swiss bishops, published in 1871, just one year after the Vatican Council was held, speaks not less plainly on this subject. It carries with it the more weight, inasmuch as it has been referred to in terms of approval by Pope Pius IX.:

"It in no way depends upon the caprice of the Pope, or upon his good pleasure, to make such and such a doctrine the object of a dogmatic definition. He is tied up and limited to the divine revelation, and to the truths which that revelation contains. He is tied up and limited by the creeds, already in existence, and by the preceding definitions of the Church. He is tied up and limited by the divine law, and by the constitution of the Church. Lastly, he is tied up and limited by that doctrine, divinely revealed, which affirms that alongside religious society there is civil society, that alongside the ecclesiastical hierarchy, there is the power of temporal magistrates, invested in their own domain with a full sovereignty, and to whom we owe obedience in conscience, and respect in all things morally permitted, and belonging to the domain of civil society."

¹ It seems passing strange with what facility non-Catholics can reconcile themselves to the idea that every individual may set up a plea, on the slightest pretext, that civil authority is violating his rights of conscience, and that, therefore, he may resist it without moral guilt, yet they cannot understand how the Pope, in his official capacity, as the Visible Head of the Church, can rightfully exercise an authority no greater than what the non-Catholic theories claim for each individual. Protestant preachers and infidel lecturers may boldly instruct their audiences that the State, in a certain instance, is violating their natural rights or their religious rights, and urge them to resistance, and their followers may blindly obey them; and men look on complacently, and if the result is rebellion, they call it a struggle for liberty, civil or religious, as the case may happen to be. But when reference is made to the power exercised in a few instances, not a dozen in all, by the Popes during the Middle Ages (a power never exercised in modern times), of absolving subjects from allegiance to civil rulers guilty of outrageous tyranny and violation of rights, both civil and religious, then these sticklers for liberty at once raise the cry of "papal arrogance and assumption."

the Middle Ages, it was exercised in the interests of civil liberty and order, and never, not in any one instance, against them. We say what we have here further to say in the words of Cardinal Manning:

"Nothing is more certain upon the face of history, and no one has proved it more abundantly than Dr. Döllinger, that in every case of deposition, as of Philip le Bel, Henry IV. of Germany, Frederick II., and the like, the sentence of the Electors, press, states, and people, and the public opinion and voice of nations had already pronounced sentence of rejection upon those tyrants, before the Pontiffs pronounced the sentence of excommunication and deposition. It was only by the faith and free will of nations that they became socially subject to this jurisprudence; it was by their free will that it was maintained in vigor, and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs. Their free sentence preceded the Pontifical sentence. It was at their prayer and in their behalf that it was pronounced. The moral condition of spontaneous acceptance, and the material conditions of execution, were alike present, rendering Pontifical acts legitimate, right, lawful, wise, and salutary."

No Catholic theologian or prelate has ever been more outspoken in regard to the rights and authority of the Holy Roman See, and none more firm and courageous in insisting upon them and defending them than Cardinal Manning. We have, therefore, in the words just quoted, the testimony of one who, to use a cant phrase, is "an Ultramontane of Ultramontanes," as to how far that authority extends, and where and when and how it is limited. He also anticipates and answers an objection that is sometimes foolishly raised by non-Catholics in the United States as well as in Europe, which runs as follows:

"Catholics justify the deposition of princes by the Popes of the Middle Ages: to be consistent they would have to justify the Pope now if he would pronounce sentence of deposition on Queen Victoria" or the President of the United States.

Cardinal Manning's answer, and the answer of all Catholics is:

"I affirm that the depositions of Henry VIII. and Frederick II. of Germany were legitimate, right, and lawful; and I affirm that a deposition of Queen Victoria (or a President of the United States) would not be legitimate nor right nor lawful, because the moral conditions which were present to justify the depositions of the Emperors of Germany are absent in the case of Queen Victoria (and of the President of the United States), and therefore such an act could not be done."

What these "moral conditions" are, which justify the exercise by Popes in mediæval times, of the right to depose civil rulers, and the absence of which now entirely prevents any such action on the part of the Roman Pontiff, Cardinal Manning explicitly states:

"The moral conditions which justified and demanded the deposition of tyrannical princes, when the mediæval world was both Christian and Catholic, have absolutely ceased to exist, now that the world has ceased to be Catholic, and has ceased even to be Christian. It has withdrawn itself socially and as a whole, and in the public life of nations, from the unity and the jurisdiction of the Christian Church. . . . Not only is every moral condition which could justify such an act absent, but every moral condition which would render such an act unjustifiable is present."

Nor is this a mere personal opinion of Cardinal Manning's,¹ nor

¹ Dr. Newman says substantially the same thing, and says, moreover, in reference to the *jus publicum*, which is one of the conditions, without the presence of which this

even a mere opinion of Catholic theologians; the present Sovereign Pontiff, Pius IX., has spoken in unmistakable words on this very point. In an address to a deputation of the "Academy of the Catholic Religion," June 20th, 1871, after declaring that it is "a pernicious error" to represent that the infallibility (of the Pope) comprehends in itself the right to dethrone temporal sovereigns or absolve subjects from their oaths of allegiance, he continues:

"This right has indeed been exercised by Popes in extreme cases, but the right has absolutely nothing in common with Papal infallibility. It was a result of the *jus publicum* then in force by the consent of Christian nations, who recognized in the Pope the supreme judge of Christendom, and constituted him judge over princes and peoples even in temporal matters. The present situation is quite different. Nothing but bad faith could confound things so different and ages so dissimilar, as if an infallible judgment, delivered upon some revealed truth, had any analogy with a prerogative which the Popes, solicited by the desire of the people, had to exercise when the public weal demanded it! Such statements are nothing but a mere pretext to excite civil rulers against the Church!"

It is vain, therefore, to attempt to justify the attack made in this insidious pamphlet upon the Catholic Church, and specially upon Catholic citizens of the United States, by reference to the acts of Popes in mediæval times. The rightfulness of those acts is not a matter of Catholic faith, but we know of none which cannot be successfully defended. And almost all really erudite and candid non-Catholic as well as Catholic historians now look upon them as generally, if not universally, entirely justifiable; as done in defence of right, and in the interests not only of morality and religion, but of civil liberty and civilization. But those acts belong to another age, and to circumstances and conditions entirely different from those of our time; we therefore dismiss them from further comment.

The pamphleteer himself seems to be aware that he must find other ground on which to base his charges. Consequently, after doing his best, or worst rather, to create false impressions in regard to the mediæval Church, he refers to the Decree of the Vatican Council defining the infallibility of the Holy Roman Pontiff, and attempts to make that Decree an excuse for his assault upon Catholic American citizens, and a reason for commending the action of the German imperial government in persecuting the Catholics of Germany. He says that the German government, in at-

right cannot be exercised: "It was no consent which is merely local, as if of one country, . . . if that were probable, but a united consent of the various nations, . . . as a commonwealth of which the Pope was the head."

In a letter from the Cardinals, of the Congregation of the Propaganda, by order of His Holiness Pius VI., addressed to the Roman Catholic Bishops of Ireland, dated Rome, June 23d, 1791, like principles are set forth.

Bishop Fessler, Secretary-General of the Vatican Council, expresses himself to the same effect in his work entitled *True and False Infallibility of the Popes*, p. 146, and refers to Ballerini: *De vi et ratione Romani Pontificis*, ch. xv., § x., n. 38 and 41.

tacking the Catholic Church in Germany, avowedly because the Vatican Council declared and defined the infallibility of the Pope, "*is simply asserting its own supremacy in matters of state,*" and that "*the question is a political one.*"

The terms of the definition have become so well known by repeated publication that it seems almost unnecessary to quote them. Yet its scope and meaning continue to be so persistently misrepresented, that we give its language with sufficient fulness to show clearly its bearing on the point under consideration:

"Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, . . . We teach and define that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he *defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals* to be held by the Universal Church, . . . is possessed by Divine assistance of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding *faith or morals.*"

Now here note three points:

1st. The Vatican Council makes no new claim of privilege or power in behalf of the Pope. It adheres to the tradition of the Church, a tradition not only believed by Catholics, but known to be believed by them, by all non-Catholics. For this very tradition and belief has been a favorite point of attack by the enemies of Catholicity for the last three centuries.

2d. No other and no more extensive infallibility is claimed for the Roman Pontiff than that which has always been claimed for the Church: the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is defined as *that infallibility* "with which the Blessed Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed." Now here we simply say that if the infallibility of the Church, which has ever been held and known to be held as an article of faith by all Catholics, did not interfere with the supremacy in matters of state of the government of Germany previous to the decree of the Vatican Council, the assumption is entirely gratuitous that the definition of the infallibility of the Holy Roman Pontiff furnishes any ground for interference now. The relation of the Church to civil governments is precisely the same now as before. That subject is not touched upon, not referred to, not even in the most distant way, in the Acts of the Vatican Council; and the infallibility predicated of the Holy Roman Pontiff is identical with that predicated of the Church.

3d. The infallibility, both of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff, are expressly limited to faith and morals. These terms, *faith or morals*, are twice repeated in the definition. Does the State in Germany, or anywhere else, possess any jurisdiction over the faith of individuals? Can the State undertake to teach faith or morals, or to define a doctrine respecting either? If not, how can the dogma of infallibility affect "the supremacy of the German

Empire in matters of state?" And how can this pamphleteer represent the attack of the German government, confessedly based upon this dogma, as "not a movement against religion?"

Unless, therefore, questions of "faith and morals" are not religious questions, it follows by necessary consequence that, the attempt of the German government to assert supremacy in those matters is a monstrous usurpation, meriting nothing but indignant denunciation on the part of every Christian, nay, of every lover of human freedom, be his religious opinions what they may.

Let us now look more closely at the action of the German government. It undertakes avowedly to exercise supreme jurisdiction over every right and power and function of the Church.

The right and power of administering discipline is necessary to the free action, and existence indeed, of every human independent society and organization. The moment it is deprived of this right it must either cease to exist or lose its independence. This is a plain principle both of law and common sense.

Infinitely higher is the necessity that the Church exercise discipline with entire freedom and independence. She would not be free if her discipline were subject to the supervision of any other power. This truth has been frequently recognized and acted on by our civil courts. They have uniformly refused to exercise any revisory or supervisory power over the disciplinary action of religious societies, when members of those societies appealed to the civil law. They based their refusal on the ground that it was absolutely necessary to the autonomy and freedom of religious societies that they should be judges of their own doctrine, and have the exercise of discipline over their own members, without dependence upon or subordination to any other power. The Church is a society having officers of its own who have functions delegated to them, not by the State, nor by any human power whatever.

Moreover the Church was not only endowed by Christ with this disciplinary power which it cannot give up, or make subject to any potentate or power, of this world, but it is itself a divine organization instituted by Christ, and by Him made independent of every earthly potentate in the discharge and fulfilment of *all* its functions. In its own sphere and for its own end it is supreme. Nor can it learn from any human source what that sphere and that end comprehend. To be subject in any of these respects to the direction or oversight or limitation of any human power whatever, would be at once to surrender the liberty with which Christ has made His Church free, and the authority with which He has endowed it.¹

¹ "By its very nature, therefore, it (the Church) is a supernatural constitution, a truly real and abiding fact in the world, and yet, at the same time, a fact not dependent accordingly on the laws and conditions that reign in 'this present evil world,' and not at its mercy in any way. . . . As a supernatural presence among men

Our Divine Lord declared to His Apostles :

"All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. He that heareth you heareth me." "And I will give to thee (Peter) the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed also in heaven." And to all the Apostles He subsequently declared, "Amen, I say to you whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."

Thus the Commission runs, a Divine Commission, unlimited, unqualified, resting on no earthly basis whatever. What, now, has the German government been doing? It has undertaken to limit the clergy and hierarchy of the Church in regard to the exercise of every power and function which the Commission comprehends. Priests and bishops are prohibited under grievous penalties from exercising "the power of the keys," the power of binding and loosing in the Sacrament of Penance, the power of teaching, the power of baptizing and of discharging any duty or function whatever belonging to their offices, without the permission of the German government. If they visit the sick or shrive the dying, baptize a child, preach, or even say Mass privately, without the permission of civil functionaries, they are subject to fine, imprisonment, or exile. The religious orders of the Church have been banished. Her bishops are prohibited from ordaining priests or appointing them to parishes, and the clergy from disciplining the laity, unless under conditions

in any such constant and really historical way as the gift and presence of Christ seem necessarily to imply, the Holy Spirit must have His own supernatural sphere, in distinction from the order of nature, within which to carry forward His operations as the power of a new-creation ever against the vanity and misery of the old. . . . It is not of the first creation like the art and science and political institutions of mankind in every other view. It holds directly from Christ in His capacity of glorified superiority to the universal order of nature." . . .

"On this ground it is that we declare the Church to be higher and greater than the State. Patriotism; after all, is not the first virtue of man, if we are to understand by it devotion to the will of the State regarded as an absolute end. To make this will the absolute measure of truth and duty; to find in it the last idea of right and wrong; to denounce the conception of a real jurisdiction on the part of the Church that shall be taken as owing no subordination whatever to the State (in the style of some who carry on the war blindly with the Church of Rome), is in fact to betray Christ into the hands of Cæsar, and to treat the whole mystery of His Ascension as a cunningly devised fable.

"Governments have no right to place themselves at the head of Church, or over it, in its own sphere, converting it into a department of state, as in Prussia, or making the civil power the source and fountain of ecclesiastical authority, as since the days of Henry the Eighth and Cranmer in England. What can be more monstrous than the conception of such a pretended headship of the Church? . . . But if it be monstrous for any civil power to usurp this sort of lordship over God's heritage, affecting to play the part of sovereign in the sphere of powers that belong not to this world, can it be less monstrous to think of making these powers dependent on the constitution of the simply natural world in any other view?" Dr. John W. Nevin, *Mercersburg Review*, January, 1855, vol. vii., pp. 76 and 77.

that imply absolute, unconditional submission to the State in matters spiritual as well as civil. Their salaries, derived from Church property tyrannically taken from the Church by the State, are withheld unless this submission is made, a submission no Christian man ought to make, or can make consistently with his belief in Christianity as a divine religion; and parishioners dare not even make voluntary donations to their priest, unless he is recognized as a priest by the civil authorities. Their church edifices have been taken from them and turned over to little squads of so-called "Old Catholics," consisting in many instances of Jews, infidels, and persons who habitually do not attend any religious services, while the thousands of Catholics who own those churches and worshipped in them are deprived of any place of worship. For they are not allowed to build, even with their own money, a new church edifice without government permission. The supervision of the government extends over doctrinal teaching. Neither a schoolmaster, a priest, nor a bishop, is allowed by the new ecclesiastical laws of the German government to teach or preach the doctrines of the Catholic faith as the Church defines them. The religious instruction imparted in schools is under government supervision. Theological seminaries must submit to the direction and supervision of State officials, or dismiss their students and close their doors; and candidates for the sacred office of the priesthood must study in State universities, where some of the professors are infidels and rationalists, and others are Protestants, and must pass an examination on philosophy, history, theology, etc., conducted by examiners irreligious, or of non-Catholic belief. And, as regards laymen, they cannot form even a Rosary Society or a Sodality without incurring legal penalties, unless civil functionaries first grant permission.

Yet the pamphleteer asserts that the German government's attack upon the liberty of Catholics and the rights and authority of the Church has nothing to do with religion, but is "simply the German government asserting its supremacy in matters of state." On the ground of this barefaced falsehood, Bismarck is held up to American citizens as an apostle of freedom, civil and religious, and the action of the German government is not only defended but extolled. On this ground, too, the effort to inflame passion and excite prejudice against Catholics, and subject them to an indirect, if not to an open and direct persecution, is justified.

Do we hold the members of the Republican party generally responsible for this infamous assault upon the Catholics of the United States, and not only upon them, but upon the Catholic Church as a religious organization? We distinctly say no. We have too much confidence in the good sense and sound judgment of the people of the United States, whether Republicans or Democrats, to

believe that they would approve any such action. But we do hold the "Union Republican Congressional Executive Committee," which published and circulated this vile pamphlet, responsible. It has proved that those who compose it are utterly unworthy of the trust reposed in them by those who placed them in power, and that they are using that power not for the best interests of the people of the United States, and not to promote peace and civil order, but for their own base, selfish purposes, to deceive and delude those whom they may succeed in deceiving and deluding into a movement that would array American citizens one against the other, and infuse distrust, suspicion, enmity, and, it might be, create riot and bloodshed, where all ought to be peace, harmony, and good will. Is it not time for the people of the United States to throw off the fetters of party rule? It is a despotism which has made slaves of them under the forms of a free government.

In conclusion, we say that the people of the United States are in no danger of having their civil institutions destroyed by Catholics. The danger will come from another direction. The danger is that the rapid spread of Liberalism, which is but another name for the rule of infidel revolution, and is always godless, blood-thirsty, and despotic in the end, however fair it may seem in its first aspects, will bring unspeakable calamities to the people of America. God in His mercy grant that this danger may be averted.

EDITORIAL NOTE, REFERRING TO NOTE 2 ON PAGE 37.

[This is not the fault of the Catholic Church, but (as the writer of the article sufficiently implies) of preachers, who will not listen to her admonitions and precepts. Nothing can be plainer or more reasonable than the language of the Council of Trent. Sess. XXV., Decret. de Purgator. "Sanam de purgatorio doctrinam a sanctis Patribus et sacris Conciliis traditam a Christi fidelibus credi, teneri, doceri et ubique prædicari diligenter studeant. Apud rudem vero plebem difficiliore ac subtiliores quæstiones, quæque ad ædificationem non faciunt, et ex quibus plerumque nulla sit pietatis accessio, a popularibus concionibus secludantur. Incerta item vel quæ specie falsi laborant evulgari ac tractari non permittant. Ea vero quæ ad curiositatem quandam . . . spectant . . . tanquam scandala et fidelium offendicula prohibeant."]

BOOK NOTICES.

THE AMERICAN STATE AND AMERICAN STATESMEN. By *William Giles Dix*. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1876. 12mo., pp. 171.

This is a remarkable book, and (apart from its ultimate conclusions, with which we can have no sympathy) is not only well written and able in argument, but shows likewise a deep insight into the present wretched condition of the country. It is only in providing the remedy, that the author has failed. He is a man of strong convictions, and filled with a deep sense of the necessity of religion as the chief support and safeguard of national prosperity. We cannot sufficiently commend the chapters, in which he proposes and proves this part of his subject. They are the fifth, sixth, and seventh, and are headed respectively, "Christianity, the Inspirer of Nations," "Materialism the Curse of America," and "America a Christian Power." And what makes these views more remarkable is, that they were written while Mr. Dix was yet outside of the Catholic Church.

We regret that we cannot speak thus favorably of two other chapters, and especially of one, which is a painful specimen of hero-worship. Heroes are not created by the clamor of angry passions, nor by the hollow applause of interested partisans. Their right to the title must be awarded, or confirmed at least, by the cool, calm judgment of posterity. Yet we must say, to the credit of Mr. Dix, that he knows how to rise occasionally above the level of mere partisanship and sectional feeling. He vindicates in noble words of praise the great statesman whose name is unpopular, but less for his politics than his principle; not so much for his advocacy of State Rights as for his incorruptible integrity, which would not turn aside from the path of honor and duty for the sake of any dignity, even the highest the country could offer. His memory is a standing reproach to the venal herd that sits in our legislative halls or busies itself with the more congenial task of official pillage. What wonder that they should hate it!

The author's theory regarding American nationality and the origin of its Christian State, though none can deny it to be ingenious, will be regarded by many as finespun and fanciful. He considers Columbus as the first founder of the American State which, though not avowedly Christian, is yet such by right and obligation; and he maintains that our national life is derived from Christian Europe through Spain, not through England. The sovereignty of the Christian State in America may be traced back through Spain to that Christian sovereignty, which was inaugurated by Constantine in the civilized world, and which came down through the nations that grew out of the wreck of the Roman Empire. It was a germ or new shoot of this principle that Columbus brought with him to the shores of the New World; and if others besides Spaniards followed him it can make no difference. They might bring with them their special institutions; they could not sow or plant what another had already sown and planted; they could neither do nor undo what had been done already. The people of the New World were not of necessity to be under Spanish or French or English dominion. But they had received the inalienable right and the peremptory obligation to establish civil society and national power on the basis of the Christian Faith. This is briefly the author's theory; and it has, no doubt, a certain basis of truth. For if Christ came to found a religion upon

earth, it surely was His Divine will that States as well as individuals should be bound by the New Law. A State that does not recognize God and His revelation, may at times be preferable as a choice of evils; it never can be the model or perfect State in the eyes of a Christian believer. We have no space to discuss further this theory of the author, nor to examine how far it is subordinate to the main purpose of his book.

The leading idea of Mr. Dix, the object in fact for which his book was written, is to propose and recommend that the substance of our government, without altering its forms, be radically changed, in fact subverted. He does not use, it is true, and would probably disclaim any such expression. He contends that the change would simply correct an error, would give henceforth meaning and consistency to a government that now does not correspond to the first great principle that underlies it. That principle he frankly acknowledges is not in the Constitution but outside of it. It may be thus expressed: we are a nation, therefore we should have a national government. Outside of the national government there is no sovereignty, no power. Away then with State Sovereignty, State Rights, and every vestige of a merely Federal union. Let them be consigned to oblivion as errors and follies of the past; and if they dare show themselves again, let them be punished as crimes. If the States prefer it, they may elect their governors; but these shall have no authority until they have received, like *Préfets* of *Départements* in France, their commission from the central government. Thus the States being turned, as is proper, into mere satrapies or provinces, the only hindrance to perfect "union" will be removed; the national government, without domestic foes to frustrate its designs, will bring about a new golden era of peace and prosperity, and its invincible ruler will have it in his power to march unimpeded to the conquest of the entire continent. This is substantially the author's theory, though not expressed precisely in his own words. One might say, that merely to state this theory will suffice to refute it. But if Mr. Dix reads the daily papers, and keeps note of current events, he must ere this have had the satisfaction of learning, that something very like a part of his programme has been not only attempted but actually carried out, and (what should gratify him still more) has been approved and sanctioned to all appearances by a great portion of the American people.

There can be no doubt that it was the intention of those who framed the American government one hundred years ago, that we should never have *irresponsible* rulers. Responsibility to the people seemed to them the best curb on those intrusted with power; and to secure this, the whole machinery of government was cautiously and wisely constructed. The careful apportioning of powers between the Federal and State governments, the equality of the States in the higher legislative body without reference to size or population, the limiting of the Supreme Court's decisions to Federal cases, the thorough separation of the executive, judicial, and law-making powers,—all these checks plainly show the anxiety of the founders of the Republic, lest despotism should find a hiding-place in Congress, or rear its head in the Presidential chair. But, from the very beginning, there was a party that chafed under these restraints, prompted partly by the fear that the government as constituted was too weak to achieve national greatness, partly by base motives. Even before the close of the Revolutionary War there were complaints, to which actual circumstances lent a color, of the government's inefficiency; and the venal pen of the notorious Tom Paine was employed to urge upon the people the necessity of a strong central government. But it was chiefly under the first Presidential administra-

tion that Hamilton labored to develop this idea, and give life and vigor to the party that had adopted it. From that day to this, under various names and disguises, that party grew stronger and stronger by degrees, until at last it reached the acmé of its hopes and got possession of the government. Its history is before the country and the world, and it is not pleasant to look things in the face and see how successful the party has been, how much it has accomplished. Since it began, scarcely a year has passed, and during the last fifteen or twenty years, scarcely a month or a week that does not bear witness to the wisdom of those old statesmen, and to the reality of those dangers against which they strove to make provision.

What is the condition of the country at the present time? Is there anything in it to afford a hope that a central despotism or (to use its euphemistic name) a strong government, such as Mr. Dix recommends, will be a source of lasting prosperity or even of temporary relief? In a government of the people, the people must be virtuous; there must be a standard of public morality, before which all must bow or bear the penalty. And if this moral standard is fast vanishing from the country, it might be an argument for those who contend that we ought to lose our liberties because we are no longer worthy to possess them. But to have good government under rulers who are not responsible to the people, it is necessary that the rulers should be good men, that they should come up at least to the pagan standard of political morality.

Where are such men to be found? Look at those of our public men—it is unnecessary to name them—who are likely to become our irresponsible masters in Mr. Dix's promised millennium. No one can look without shuddering. Such shameless venality, lying, perjury, fraud, and robbery have been seldom seen under the sun; the atmosphere of Washington is reeking with the stench of political corruption, that extends from the highest to the lowest; the judge on the bench is as ready to quibble and prevaricate and crush justice, as the hireling in the jury-box, or the very culprit in the dock; even the military uniform of the officer is no longer what we remember it to have once been, a sure pledge of the honesty, honor, and truth of him who wears it. How would the country fare under the arbitrary rule of such men? We should have a Sylla or a Catiline in Washington, and a Verres in each province or State, so-called, with a host of brutal troopers to crush out the "bandits" who dare talk of their rights to life and property.

And what would be the condition of Catholics under the new regime? Have we any special reason to sigh for the new, glorious era, prophesied by Mr. Dix? We think not; though this may be for some pious souls an incentive to hasten its advent. In all probability we should see revived in succession the persecuting days of Shaftesbury and Titus Oates, of Robespierre, of Bismarck, and the cowardly Liberals of Southern Europe. But would there not be Catholics in the new government, who would protect their brothers in religion? We can only repeat with Anchises:

Di, prohibete minas! Di, talem avertite casum!

May God save us from this threatened protection, and from the chance of ever needing it! There have been, and are now Catholics, so-called, among our lawgivers, and in other high places of honor and trust, but who are not a whit less corrupt and dishonest than their non-Catholic or infidel associates; whose word or even oath, where party was concerned, no prudent man would believe; with whom no honest man, that is guided by the good old-fashioned laws of social intercourse,

could conscientiously shake hands. Such Catholics would, no doubt, have their fitting, well-earned places in the new government, and when persecuting measures would come up in Congress, we should have more than one of these Catholic Freemasons crying out, like the vile Earl of Bristol in the Parliament of Charles II., "My religion is Catholic; but not the religion of the court of Rome."

It frequently happens that good men become so disgusted with the selfish greed of office, with the dishonesty of candidates, and voters, and the political wickedness generally which surrounds them, that they fall insensibly into the persuasion, that a strong government, a mild despotism would be an enviable refuge from the turmoil of political tumult, and the wicked strife of conflicting parties. They are good themselves, and disposed to hope for the best in the future, if they can only get rid in any way of the moral evils that sadden them at present. Mr. Dix belongs to this class, or its aspirations have found an echo in his book. But their hope, their line of policy, however natural, is selfish and short-sighted. An Augustus will always be a relief after the angry broils of Cæsarian and Pompeian factions; and his gentle sway will seem a happy exchange for the bloody proscriptions of the Triumvirate. But sooner or later the mild Augustus will give way to the ruthless Tiberius, the ferocious Caligula, and the monster Nero. We may never have the luck to see Augustus; but, judging from the present aspect of things, we are pretty sure to have Sejanus in the cabinet and Tiberius on the throne.

The fate of the country is even now trembling in the balance, and though the crisis may not arrive in a few months, as some apprehend, yet a few years at the utmost will solve the problem, whether government by the people for the good of the people on this side of the Atlantic be a possibility or a chimera. We have habitually sneered at Mexico and her periodical anarchy, but if some men amongst us are allowed to have their way much longer, Mexicanism threatens to be our next condition. If these unprincipled men are not put down by the good sense and firm attitude of the American people, by their clearly expressed determination not to surrender their real freedom for the nominal triumph of party, the republic is not only in danger, but on the very verge of ruin. It may be by process of disintegration; it may be by the absorption of power, to be held henceforth by the dictator or military adventurer. The former seems to be the ultimate, the latter the immediate point to which we are tending. We shall learn by bitter experience at home, the horrors of chronic disorder, which we have derided in our Mexican neighbors. There is already no lack of bold unprincipled men in high places, who will be the Diazes, Lerdoes, and Escobedos, of the new state of things; and, even if we had not a stock on hand, the demand would bring about the supply.

Perhaps, owing to our sins as individuals and as a community, our blind party spirit that makes us do wrong, connive at wrong, and even defend the wrong in books and newspapers, in public assemblies, in legislative halls, and even in courts of justice, our iniquitous secret societies, our atrocious treatment of the poor Indians, and other national crimes, we have aroused the just anger of Him who raises up States or casts them down as He wills and as they may deserve. We have abused our freedom; perhaps it will be taken away in punishment. We would not serve God; perhaps He will hand us over to taskmasters of our own making, who have grown up out of our sins. It may be that undisguised despotism or the fate of Mexico awaits us. But, if come it must, let it come as the penalty of our offence; let it come at the hands of Him who knows how to temper mercy with justice. Let us not of our own accord hasten its

coming by singing the praises of the rod that is to scourge us, and by shouts of encouragement and welcome to the avenger who is to wield it.

LETTERS, AND SOCIAL AIMS. By *Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston; James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. Pp. 314.

This book is made up of the lectures and essays which the author had been delivering and writing in the past five years. It will not be the least popular of Emerson's works. Some of the essays are charming. On the whole, the book is less marred by the author's paradoxes and sphinx-like sayings than any other of his productions. Then, the style is so toned down, so severely classic, that it is a great pleasure to read it in these days of inflated utterances and bad writing. Emerson speaks only when he has something to say worth listening to. He is not loud-mouthed as is Carlyle, to whom he is sometimes compared. Because a greater thinker than Carlyle, he is less of a croaker; indeed, he is no croaker. The great fault with him is, he does not find fault enough. He presses everything into his system as an essential part. If he does not express it in so many words, he at least implies that things are facts, and facts could not have been otherwise. "A point of education," he says, "that I can never too much insist upon is this tenet, that every individual man has a bias which he must obey, and that it is only as he feels and obeys this that he rightly develops and attains his legitimate power in the world" (p. 274). This is due in a great measure to the company his thoughts keep. He finds everything in Swedenborg and Spinoza. Raised in the tenets of Puritanism, he felt within its pale like a man suffocating in a small and crowded room. He, so to speak, leaped through the window into the open air of free thought, and so pleased was he with the change, so gladly did his heart beat under the feeling of living and thinking, above all, so full of himself did he become, that he cast off all forms of church doctrines. Taking that which pressed so hard upon his soul, as a type and excellent specimen of all others, he refused to look elsewhere; and he now lives content in the reflection that all creeds are only so many forms of thought, and that thought alone is life and the reason for existence here and hereafter.

In Emerson the style reveals the man. His mind is as peculiar as his expression. He does not give the reader a continuous course of reasoning on any topic. He does not intend to reason syllogistically. "We use semblances of logic," he says in the volume under review, "until experience puts us in possession of real logic" (p. 9). Like Bacon in his *Novum Organon*, he is satisfied with asserting a truth in forcible language. He does not believe in talking any man into his way of thinking. He considers it sufficient to give the hint or make the suggestion; he then leaves it to others to follow out the argument. And herein lies the chief power of Emerson. He has no system. He is not the founder of a school. He has had to create his own audience, as did Kant and Wordsworth. The time is not so long past when he was the laughing-stock of all but a few discerning minds. But he is a thinker and a suggester of thought. He himself—his inner life and experience—is so bound up with his thought that did this book come before the public with no name, it could by no possibility be attributed to any other living writer. He tells us: "A man's action is only a picture-book of his creed. He does after what he believes. Your condition, your employment, is the fable of *you*" (p. 20). So, when in another place (p. 50) he tells us that "the philosopher is the

failed poet," he means Ralph Waldo Emerson. No essayist, since Montaigne wrote, has more individual personality in his essays—and he is pre-eminently an essayist—than Emerson. He possesses it, too, without the egotism of the French skeptic. But we may have occasion in some future number of the *REVIEW* to develop this estimate of the philosopher of Concord. Let us now dip into the book under notice.

The most charming and satisfactory essay in the book is that on "Social Aims." It is replete with such hints and observations as only a skilled and acute observer of society could have made. It is an essay on manners, written by one who has been a ruler in society and who knows whereof he speaks. "It is even true," he says (p. 71), "that grace is more beautiful than beauty." He finds a good word for the intellectual man, so good and so true that we transcribe it: "It is a commonplace of romances to show the ungainly manners of the pedant who has lived too long in college. Intellectual men pass for vulgar and are timid and heavy with the elegant. But if the elegant are also intellectual, instantly the hesitating scholar is inspired, transformed, and exhibits the best style of manners. An intellectual man, though of feeble spirit, is instantly reinforced by being put into the company of scholars, and to the surprise of everybody, becomes a lawgiver. We think a man unable and desponding. It is only that he is misplaced. Put him with new companions and they will find in him excellent qualities, unsuspected accomplishments, and the joy of life. 'Tis a great point in a gallery how you hang pictures; and not less in society, how you seat your party. The circumstance of circumstance is time and placing" (p. 74). Again, himself a man of sincerity, he finds no sympathy for the insincere, the person of affectation, the sentimentalist. As an illustration of the Socratic irony with which he can speak, when occasion requires, we give the following on the sentimentalist: "Now society in towns is infested by persons who, seeing that the sentiments please, counterfeit the expression of them. These we call sentimentalists—talkers who mistake the description for the thing, saying for having. They have, they tell you, an intense love of nature; poetry, O, they adore poetry, and roses, and the moon, and the cavalry regiment, and the governors; they love liberty, 'dear liberty!' they worship virtue, 'dear virtue!' Yes, they adopt whatever merit is in good repute, and almost make it hateful with their praise. The warmer their expressions, the colder we feel; we shiver with cold" (p. 94).

Of the other essays in this book the two most noteworthy are the first, on "Poetry and Imagination," and the last, on "Immortality." Poetry is that nameless something which the poet feels, better than he can define, and which he who is not a poet can only talk about. Therefore, as Emerson has felt poetic inspiration and occasionally written some genuine poetry, he is entitled to a careful hearing on the subject. He wrote upon it frequently before; but this is his last and most mature essay on the subject. He begins by distinguishing between what he calls first sight and second sight. First sight is the perception of matter—that common sense or common ground upon which all agree. Second sight is matter viewed as a symbol of thought, and belongs in a pre-eminent degree to the poet. He is the seer. He it is who really knows the meaning of things. To him the brooks speak and all nature reveals her secrets. Hence he defines poetry to be "the perpetual endeavor to express the spirit of the thing, to pass the brute body, and search the life and reason which causes it to exist; to see that the object is always flowing away, whilst the spirit or necessity which causes it subsists. Its essential mark is that it betrays in every word instant activity of mind,

shown in new uses of every fact and image—in preternatural quickness or perception of relations. All its words are poems. It is a presence of mind that gives a miraculous command of all means of uttering the thought and feeling of the moment. The poet squanders on the hour an amount of life that would furnish the seventy years of the man that stands next him" (p. 15). This is rather description than definition, but it is characteristic of Emerson's conception of things.

Emerson thinks in such a peculiar groove of his own, it is impossible for the ordinary listener or reader always to understand him. About five or six years ago we heard him deliver this lecture or essay on "Poetry and Imagination" to an intelligent audience. In the centre of the hall was an old man who evidently was enthusiastic over the lecturer, but who as evidently understood little of what he said; for he broke in with applause so frequently—and generally in the wrong place—that he became a source of distraction to the audience and annoyance to the lecturer. It has been the fate of Emerson to be so misunderstood,—to be applauded where he least deserves it, and censured where he is most meritorious. Thus it is that his spirituality has been lauded and held up for admiration as an offset against the material principles of other philosophers. Transcendentalism is not materialism; but upon one issue at least is there a coincidence between them. They both identify matter and thought; the former by spiritualizing matter, and the latter by materializing thought. What else but this identity means Emerson in these words: "Mountains and oceans we think we understand: yes, so long as they are contented to be such, and are safe with the geologist; but when they are melted in Promethean alembics, and come out men, and then, melted again, come out words, without any abatement, but with an exaltation of power—" (p. 15). In the book under review are other passages equally strong, which have no meaning, to the reviewer at least, outside of this false doctrine of the identity of matter and thought. What becomes of personality in the light of such a teaching?

This reflection lands us at the weak point in Emerson's intensely absorbing essay on "Immortality." It is his denial of a physical resurrection and his doubting of a personal existence hereafter. Thus he asserts that the body rises again, is a doctrine of the past. "It was an affair of the body, and, narrowed again by the fury of sect; so that grounds were sprinkled with holy water to receive only orthodox dust; and to keep the body still more sacredly safe for resurrection, it was put into the walls of the church; and the churches of Europe are really sepulchres" (p. 292). And then, speaking of personality, he says: "I think all sound minds rest on a certain preliminary conviction, namely, that if it be best that conscious personal life shall continue, it will continue; if not best, then it will not; and we, if we saw the whole, should of course see that it was better so" (p. 294). In another place he is more positive of the failure of personality: "I confess," he says, "that everything connected with our personality fails. Nature never spares the individual. We are always balked of a complete success. No prosperity is promised to *that*. We have our indemnity only in the success of that to which we belong. *That* is immortal, and we only through that" (p. 306). This is unmistakable language. It means that the individual, the singular, exists not for itself, but for the general, the genus. Again, he tells us that our Lord "never preaches the personal immortality" (p. 311). It is evident that this question of the resurrection of the body is one Emerson has only treated in a flippant manner. So, too, with the question of personal identity

in a hereafter. Our Lord speaks of Dives recognizing Lazarus in the bosom of Abraham. And when the Sadducee asked Him about the woman who had several husbands, whose wife she should be in the other world, He said there was no marriage or giving in marriage there; for all would live as angels. That is, each would retain his individuality and personality. There would be no marriage; for men will have passed from the order of genesis to that of palingenesis. Here, of all places, would the Divine Wisdom set men's minds right upon that important issue, if there were aught to detract from the popular belief of a resurrection of soul and body. On the vital issues of life and death, Emerson is no wiser than the books he consults; not as wise as some; indeed, he is a man of half-utterances.

ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM. By *John Donoso Cortes*. Translated by Rev. William McDonald, S.T.L., Rector of the Irish College, Salamanca. Dublin: William B. Kelly, 1874.

It is at first a subject of wonder that such a book as this should have been written by a modern Spaniard, and one who during the greater part of his life had been attached to the Liberal party, a political and personal friend of Christina, a supporter of Narvaes, a promoter of the designs of Louis Philippe on Spain with regard to the Montpensier marriage, and the ardent advocate in the Cortes of measures of the modern school of politics.

The wonder ceases in a great degree when it is remembered that Cortes was a thorough Spaniard, and consequently a religious man. Of this he gave a manifest proof at the very beginning of his political career, when he resigned his position in the Mendizabal cabinet, because of his opposition to the suppression of Religious Orders. The change is great from the ardent liberalist and keen publicist at Madrid in 1840, to the writer of these Essays after the sudden and astounding European revolutions of 1848. But Cortes's eyes were wide open and his powerful brain actively at work. He perceived the culpable folly of Liberalism, the absurdity of many of the theories of modern politics, the sublime grandeur of the Church.

His Essays may be called, not improperly, a compendious cyclopedia of theology, history, and politics; for nearly all the great questions comprised in the scope of these three noble sciences are treated in them with masterly ability. Any one who is tempted to embrace the modern delusion that the action of the human intellect must be confined within the limits of the purely material world, should read this book. He will learn from it that there is another world immeasurably superior to the material world in interest and grandeur.

When a subject of history comes under the pen of Cortes, it is at once illumined by his genius. His wonderful historical insight, however, is much less surprising than the deep knowledge of Catholic theology which he exhibits throughout this admirable book. How a layman, occupied during his whole life with political questions, could so master the most difficult problems of heavenly and earthly things, and speak so accurately of the dogmas of the Trinity, Original Sin, Redemption, Grace, the Incarnation, etc., is almost inconceivable. We learn, it is true, from a short note placed at the head of the first chapter of the first book, that he submitted this part of his work—the main part certainly—to the revision of the Benedictines of Solesmes in France, and that “he adopted all their observations;” but the alterations suggested by them very probably were few and unimportant. The note informs us

that there is nothing in the work to which the strictest orthodoxy could object.

In point of fact, only one leading idea appeared to us likely to be misunderstood by some. The idea referred to is contained chiefly in the fifth chapter of the first book, where the author says:

"Prevaricating and fallen man was not made for the truth. . . . Between the truth and human reason, after the prevarication of man, God established a lasting repugnance, and an invincible repulsion. . . . On the contrary, between human reason and the absurd there is a secret affinity and a close relationship. Sin has united them with a bond of indissoluble matrimony."

This certainly has a tinge of Calvinism, and seems to make the fall, with regard to the natural aptitude of man for truth, greater than it actually was. It also seems to be suggestive of propositions condemned not long ago by the Holy See. But the harsh doctrine which *seems* to be involved in it, cannot have been the real meaning of Cortes; for if it had been, his friends at Solesmes would have corrected him. His great mind, moreover, knew well enough the true prerogatives of human reason, even after the fall of man. Surely the philosophical question of the possible infallibility of reason for reaching the truth was not here even thought of by Cortes. From what follows, it is clear that he merely meant to say that *abstractedly* truth cannot be *easily* reached by the intellect of man left to itself; and that, *concretely* and in point of fact, the most absurd systems are promptly and by a natural impulse embraced and adopted by fallen man; whilst on the contrary what is most reasonable and simple, is often rejected by the pretended upholders of the rights of reason. The present age is manifestly a glaring proof of this assertion; and the picture of the actual state of philosophy in the most rationalistic nations, given in the work with the author's usual pungency and *bris*, cannot be gainsaid, and is but too true.

We could not discover any other leading idea in the book which should give rise to any hesitation or doubt in the mind of Catholics. Many pages are brimful of metaphysical discussions; the author shows himself a thoroughbred Spaniard in his bent toward the abstract outlook of religious and philosophical questions. Like many of his great countrymen, he does not confine the world to its outward manifestations, but thinks, on the contrary, that the visible universe is only a material figure of the great unseen; that consequently to reach truth even in physics, the thinker must start from what is called Ontology in philosophy, and that only by the Christian dogmas studied metaphysically, the utmost heights of thought can be reached. Thus only, also, in his opinion, can the most solid basis be established both for the enlargement of the human mind, and the certainty of even its physical speculations. Donoso Cortes is not a scientist of the school of Mr. Huxley and his compeers. The reader is everywhere thrown into the midst of a scientific edifice of an infinitely higher construction. The reasoning is very close, and requires the most unwearied attention. But wherever we have stopped in the reading, and considered carefully the concatenation of thoughts, to bring on the final evolution of great truths, we could not but exclaim that the nineteenth century cannot be said to be altogether destitute of metaphysicians. Donoso Cortes alone would worthily represent a school formerly numerous and powerful, but repudiated in our age by the greatest number of writers, and regarded in general by thoughtless readers as at best of no consequence whatever, and as often engaged only in mere logomachies.

Donoso Cortes's thoughts on the physical world, spread here and

there, are best expressed in the sixth chapter of the first book, where he considers the action of God in nature as distinguished from His miraculous interposition; and also, and, we may say chiefly, in the fifth chapter of the second book.

History and metaphysics are for Donoso Cortes the two great auxiliaries for diving into the mysteries of religion, as far up or down as is possible for the human mind without danger. He knew well that unless one relies on the authority of the Church, *Scrutator Majestatis opprimetur a gloria*; and consequently he always takes good care, even in his highest flights of fancy, to rest his intellect wholly on the faith of the Catholic Church. In fact the book which some one has called, *The Demonstration of the Supernatural*, can be likewise said to be the most rigid demonstration of the divine origin of the Catholic Church that perhaps has ever been written; yet it is neither an apology nor a defence, nor yet an answer to objections. He merely holds up Catholicity to the astonished gaze of mankind, with its glories, its sublime truths, its incomparable beauties, its eternal splendors; and seems to ask you: "Who dares find fault with this great figure? Is it not the real offspring of God Himself? Where could it come from except from Heaven?"

If after having described Catholicity with all the eloquence the human pen or voice can use, he speaks of its antagonists in our ages, Liberalism and Socialism, it is not merely to compare terms so absolutely antagonistic, but to oblige the reader to recoil instinctively from these last, and embrace with ardor the first.

Yet with all this enthusiasm breathing in every page of the book, there is no attempt whatever at effect, no mere literary claptrap, no exhibition of sensational writing. The greatest simplicity of style is visible throughout, except where the sublime subject brings on suddenly and perforce the use of imagery and metaphor. Sometimes the irony of Cortes's caustic style shows that he is a master of all the resources of satire. But his noble mind evidently recoils from employing them, even in a good cause. There is, however, a passage (pages 170, sq.) where he descants at some length on the idiosyncrasy of the Liberal school, with a keenness of supreme mockery worthy of the pen of a Juvenal. He knew the school well, since he had long been an ardent supporter of its theories. Yet on this subject a remark ought to be made of real importance. The liberalism which he attacks and utterly demolishes is not the liberalism of our day, which is far more advanced. He himself distinguishes two schools of liberalism, represented by what was called in Spain, in his time, the *Progressista* and the *Moderado* parties. He says plainly that he will not discuss the first, already identified in his opinion with the radical party, and breaking out glaringly into open socialism. He confines himself, therefore, in his remarks, to the doctrines of the Spanish *Moderados*, of whom he had long been the most brilliant light. He says justly of them, that they admitted, at the origin of things and in the abstract, the sovereignty of God, but pretended that in politics God had in fact abdicated, and left the affairs of this world to the merciful guidance of the middle classes, the only ones able to unite liberty with order. The Liberals, whom he attacks, had, therefore, a sort of religion, and called themselves Catholics, and admitted that in an abstract sense, *omnis potestas a Deo est*. This, through a defect in the former English translation which we read long ago, led to some degree of confusion, which we attributed to hasty composition on the part of the great writer. But in this translation by Rev. Mr. McDonald, the confusion has entirely disappeared; and the connection of ideas, the crushing logic, the overpowering philosophical blows are

remarkable, even in so remarkable a work. But we cannot extend our comments further, and we leave the subject of socialism entirely untouched.

To come to a practical conclusion, we say that every educated Catholic ought to peruse the book attentively, to increase his faith and his attachment to the Church. As to the clergy, each and all of them ought to read it carefully, and oftener than once. They will find in its pages a deep mine of information on things human and divine, and they will be able to speak to their flocks after its careful perusal with renewed energy and zeal.

THE SWORD THAT DOTHT CUT: OR, THE WORD OF GOD. Extraordinary Fulfilment of Prophecies and Revelations concerning the Latter Days. By *Samuel*. Number I. New Orleans: Clark & Hofeline. 1875. 8vo., pp. 64.

THE SWORD THAT DOTHT CUT: OR, THE REVELATIONS OF PROPHECIES. The Present Extraordinary and Visible Fulfilment of the Prophecies of St. John. By *Samuel*. Number II. Same place and publishers. 1876. 8vo., pp. 117.

[We had received from a most estimable source a well-written and rather commendatory review of these two pamphlets, and were on the point of inserting it; but having since received a copy of the work, after a careful and impartial examination of its contents, we believe it due to justice and to the REVIEW, that we should substitute for the friendly notice our own candid opinion.—ED.]

The purpose of the author as it appears in these pages is good and praiseworthy, his orthodoxy unquestionable, his hits at sectarianism and infidelity happy and telling, and his explanations of prophecy often very ingenious, and, indeed, surprising in one circumstanced, as the author was, with regard to early education and calling in life. But when we have said this much, we have said all that our judgment and conscience will allow us to say in favor of these pamphlets.

His system of interpretation is new, as he acknowledges (No. I, p. 10); but novelty is not sufficient praise if truth be wanting. And what is there to guarantee the truth of this new style of interpretation? The assumption that "all inspired prophets, when speaking prophetically, have invariably used the same words in the same mystical and figurative sense" is quite gratuitous. To become a canon of biblical interpretation, this should either be self-evident or needs proof. This the author does not and cannot give. The object, from which a figurative sense is drawn, may be viewed under more aspects than one, and consequently may yield various mystical significations. One may be used for his purpose by one prophet; another by another, whose scope in writing is different. A *woman* may be the type of weakness, of motherhood, of secluded life, as well as of the Church. The *moon* may denote human fickleness or the baleful influences that reign by night (Ps. cxx. 6), just as well as "changeable doctrines." *Heaven* may be and is used for the Divine abode, or the portion of the world where the gospel is preached (as in the New Testament), or it may signify the Angels of God in opposition to the children of men, as appears from the canticle of Moses, from Isaiah, and other prophets. Why should its mystic meaning be *invariably* the "domain of spiritual things" as the author contends?

He does not try to prove his new rule, which would be impossible, but seeks to confirm it indirectly by illustrations, by exhibiting passages from the Old Testament, in which he claims that the "invariable" meaning of such words as Heaven, Sun, Moon, Stars, Sea, etc., is admirably suited to the context. Of all these passages there is not one,

we believe, that cannot be more easily and better understood by adhering to the literal sense, or (if a mystical sense be needed, or flow of itself from the literal) by adopting a figurative explanation, different from that of the author. Thus (No. I, p. 51), the words of Isaias lx. 5, "the multitude of the sea shall be converted to thee," do not mean "tumultuous nations (much less 'sects and isms') shall be converted to thee," but simply "the nations beyond the great sea, the Chittim, viz., the Greeks and Romans, shall become thy children." And this, to say nothing of the traditional interpretation, is confirmed by the parallel member that follows, "the strength of the Gentiles shall come to thee." The promised converts are described under two points of view, as is usual in the poetic parallelism. These are their nationality and their religion. They are strange peoples, they are idolaters ignorant of the true God; but they shall be gathered into the bosom of the new Israel, and with it form one people and have one religion. And this explanation is sanctioned by the Church, who, in the Mass of the Epiphany applies these words to the calling of the Gentiles, which is commemorated by that festival.

Another and (as the author calls it, No. I, p. 18), "wonderful illustration" of his meaning of the word *moon* is educed from Ps. lxxi. (Heb. and Angl. lxxii. 7), which he thus quotes: "In his days shall justice flourish and abundance of peace; *when the moon shall be taken away.*" On this he reasons as follows:

"Here is a very extraordinary passage, and it certainly could not be understood, unless the true figurative meaning of the word 'moon' was known. What could be meant by promising a time of justice and peace when the moon would be no more? In a literal sense, what has the moon to do with justice and peace on earth? But take it in the sense in which an All-wise Providence has intended it to be taken, and it becomes a most wonderful and intelligible passage, and this will be its meaning: 'In his days justice shall flourish and abundance of peace, when the changeable teachings and doctrines shall be taken away.'"

Now, all this reasoning is based on a mistranslation, and this being set aside, necessarily falls to the ground. What authority he can plead for this false rendering is hard to imagine. The second hemistich which he has italicized, should read as in the Douay Bible, "until the moon be taken away." In the Latin it is "donec auferatur luna." In the Septuagint, the Syriac, and the Hebrew original it is the same. In the last it is idiomatically expressed, "Until nought (*i. e.*, the failure or ceasing) of the moon." The Anglican version, heeding the sense rather than the words, translates "so long as the moon endureth." As the moon and other heavenly bodies are to last down to the end of time, it is equivalent to saying, "justice and peace shall endure forever." What room is there here for the arbitrary meaning assigned to "moon?" Its absurdity becomes evident the moment the passage is correctly translated.

We have no space to go over the fantastic as well as arbitrary meanings given by the author to such words as Earth, Land, World, Lamb, etc.; but merely remark in passing, that his change of the meaning of *καταβολή* (Ap. xiii. 8) from "foundation" to "overthrow," is no less unnecessary than opposed to all versions modern or ancient, including the Syriac, the oldest of them all. The apparent difficulty of the verse is caused only by the unusual collocation of the words *ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*. That there is here nothing more than a figure of hyperbaton, is plain from the parallel passage in chap. xvii. 8. of the same book. Placed in their natural order, the words would run thus: "All whose names were

not written from the beginning (or foundation) of the world in the Book of Life of the Lamb, who was slain in sacrifice." We might object also to the author's frequent use of the Anglican version, to his mixing it up at times with our own, to his spelling of proper names, such as Micah, Zechariah, Reemaliah, which does not accord with our recognized version. These are trifles, but there is in them some degree of irreverence, to say the least.

To return to the main point, even granting the author's unfounded postulate, that such terms as Heaven, Sea, Moon, Woman, Child, Lamb, etc., *when used in a mystical sense*, are invariable in their meaning, and granting further that he has guessed that meaning aright, what will it avail him unless he can show that they are *actually* used in that sense. Admitting that they *might be*, does it follow that they *are* so used? We may not argue *a posse ad esse*. Who is to decide that in all the passages alleged, this mystical sense must be adopted either side by side with the literal, or to the exclusion of the latter? Merely to assert this without further proof, would be dogmatism, which would scarcely be allowed to pass unchallenged, even in a biblical scholar of world-wide fame. There is no Catholic text-book of Sacred Scripture that does not lay down the principle that the greatest caution should be used in giving typical meanings to the sacred text, unless they be warranted by the testimony of Scripture itself, or by the tacit approval of the Church, which may be gathered from her holy fathers and standard interpreters. Another principle is, that the prudent investigation and moderate use of the typical sense may be allowed, not only with a view to foster Christian devotion, but also to illustrate the well-known teachings of the Church, whether in dogma or morals. But it must not be used as proof conclusive of her doctrines against heretics and unbelievers.¹ Still less should it be alleged in support of what is mere opinion, though nowise opposed to Catholic faith; nor for the decision of vexed Bible questions, whether they relate to the history or the prophecies of the sacred volume. An ardent, indiscreet investigation of the hidden meaning of those portions of Scripture which the Holy Ghost, their Author, has purposely left shrouded in obscurity is dangerous, and has often led men into manifold error. The fault is not in the Holy Book, but in the wayward imagination of the seeker, which makes him take wrong, false views of what is good and true in itself, however dark and enigmatical, or as St. Augustine forcibly expresses it, "*dum Scripturæ bonæ non intelliguntur bene*" (Tractat. 18, in Io). Nothing but the most profound childlike obedience to the Church, and a deep sense of humility, can save from danger him who boldly lifts his eyes to gaze on the Apocalyptic vision, and ventures to sport confidently with its perplexing intricacies.

And this is precisely what causes our apprehension for the writer of these pamphlets, and makes us regret the favor and encouragement that he has received in the Southwest. He claims that he has made an important, an extraordinary discovery, reserved for him by an All-wise Providence (Preface); that there is a key to prophecy, hitherto unknown, but revealed to him, as may be seen by the wonderful things that have been given him to unfold (p. 9). He fancies that the Woman's Child (Apoc. xii. 5) is the doctrine of infallibility, as defined in the Vatican

¹ "No argument," says St. Thomas, "can be drawn except from the literal sense, because nothing necessary to faith can be found under the spiritual (typical) sense, which Scripture does not reveal elsewhere through the literal sense." *Ex solo literali sensu posse trahi argumentum, quia nihil sub spirituali sensu continetur fidei necessarium, quod Scriptura per literalem sensum alicubi manifeste non tradat.* Summa, p. I, qu. I, art. 10.

Council, and boldly adds: "This child, which God has given me the eternal honor of naming, shall henceforth be called 'The Child of Infalibility'" (p. 35). He is in possession of a secret revealed to him, no doubt, from Heaven, touching the 1260 days; but he will not let it escape him as yet. "I have good reasons of my own," he says, "for not revealing this secret at present. But when the time comes I promise to make it known, and also to reveal to you, *Deo volente*, the meaning of those astonishing and wonderful 'Seventy Weeks' of Daniel. And who will believe our report? And to whom is the power of the Lord revealed? For yet 666 prophetic days from September 2d, 1875, and all will be fulfilled" (p. 39). We do not wish to characterize such language as it deserves; but it recalls forcibly the "*linguam magniloquam*" and the "*linguam nostram magnificabimus*" of the Psalmist. After this, it need surprise no one that he finds the Old Catholic schism in the second Beast (Apoc. xiii. 11), and identifies Bismarck with Antichrist. We rather think that this is doing quite too much honor to the wretched little handful of Dollingerites, and even to M. Bismarck, who, after all, is not so formidable an enemy to the Church of Christ as was the first Napoleon, or even the mean, cowardly ape of his name and empire in our own day. The Church has buried them, and she will bury in due time the semi-savage Pomeranian who now rules Germany with an iron rod. Yet he has done good, though with no good intention, to the German Church; and when in a happier season she shall have forgotten her present sufferings, she may remember, perhaps, with gratitude, that Bismarck was only a tool in the hand of God to sift her like wheat and to "separate the precious from the vile" (Jer. xv. 19).

As warm fancies are frequently apt to take a local coloring, it would not in the least have surprised us, had the author discovered some Apocalyptic woe in store for the Kelloggs, Packards, Caseys, Returning Boards, Bulldozers, and other wild "beasts," foreign and domestic, which have been preying on the life and substance of poor Louisiana for the last ten years.

We have no right to give spiritual advice to "Samuel;" but in the bond of Catholic charity we may exhort him to cherish a spirit of humility and of unconditional submission to the Church, the only representative on earth of Him who has the key of David, and to be more fervent in prayer than anxious in the investigation of Apocalyptic mystery. If God's providence has chosen him to deliver a message of truth, it will appear in His own good time; if not, like the rest of us, he can afford in hope and resignation to await that day, when we shall see no longer darkly, but face to face, and even the enigmatical scenes that passed before the astonished mind of the seer of Patmos will be made clear as noonday in the light of the Beatific Vision.

THE RACES OF MAN, AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION. From the German of *Oscar Peschel*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

Among the modern branches of natural science ethnology stands unquestionably one of the foremost and most important. The great questions of anthropology, namely, the unity of the human race, the place man holds in creation, the connection between human languages, the distinguishing characteristics of the civilized and the uncivilized races, and many other kindred questions, depend, in a great measure, upon the right direction given to ethnological studies.

When the races of man began to be studied with some care, it was expected that the new science of ethnology would furnish powerful

weapons against the doctrines of Christianity. It is now but little more than one hundred years since this study began to be systematically prosecuted, yet in this comparatively short space of time it is amazing to consider the many theories, most of them antagonistic to the Christian faith, that have been invented to explain and classify the varieties of our species. One of these writers, Luke Burke by name, claimed to have discovered no less than sixty-three chief races of man.

Strange to say, however, the great truth of the unity of mankind came forth from this ordeal brighter and stronger, so that scarcely any "advanced thinker" now dares to question it. The same result will be reached, no doubt, for all the other Christian truths connected with anthropology.

In order to draw proper conclusions from the innumerable facts comprehended in the new science, the inquiry must be carried on without any preconceived opinions on anthropological questions. The great truths of the unity of man, his position in creation, his origin, and the true source of his civilization, must be deduced from the facts of ethnology. The contrary mode of proceeding cannot lead to any reliable conclusions.

Now, unfortunately for the recent book of Mr. Peschel, it is precisely this contrary mode of proceeding that the author has chosen. With him ethnology has very little to do with solving the questions referred to, except, perhaps, so far as furnishing confirmatory examples. Of the 518 pages contained in the volume, the first 318 are concerned about the antiquity of man, his primitive savage state, the gradual development of his language, etc., all this independently of ethnology. Only the last 200 pages treat of the Races of Man. This is just the reverse of scientific method, and we might at once conclude from this that the work is a failure as a scientific treatise.

The book cannot be considered satisfactory either for the scientist or for the student. For the scientist it is entirely valueless, as it gives scarcely an idea of the science on which it professedly treats, and entirely omits to mention some of its most important branches. Not a word, for instance, is said of the Turanian races, called Allophylian by Prichard, which at this moment attract the attention of the whole scientific world, as the study of them is destined probably to open entirely new views on the most important subjects connected with the history of man. What reason the author could have for passing over entirely such a pregnant subject of inquiry we cannot even imagine. If he believes that the notions already entertained by many scientists on the almost universal Turanian stock are based only on misconceptions, let him say so, and prove it if he can. But to omit all mention even of so important a subject is fatal to the value of his work, and few scientists will care to place it on their shelves. Nor will it be useful to the student even as an elementary handbook. A handbook, of the kind, to be useful, must be clear, methodical, well systematized, complete in its way, and ought to contain numerous references to more copious works on the same subject, where the student may find the explanation of what may otherwise be obscure. No student of ethnology can expect to meet with these requisites in the two hundred pages of Mr. Peschel. The very classification he adopts is altogether unscientific.

As he, in what we may call the preliminaries of his book, strongly declares in favor of the primitive savage state of man, there is nothing surprising in the fact that he begins his inquiry with the Australians and ends it with the Europeans. This was natural on his part, and appears at first to be scientific, but on looking at the work more closely, the reader

is puzzled to find that the Australian is *not* considered by him as the lowest race of mankind, an opinion heretofore generally entertained. The author tries to reverse completely the common ideas on the subject, and finds, particularly in the Australian languages, a solid proof of high mental development. He does not appear to know that the languages of most of the uncivilized tribes offer the same peculiarity, and that it is a powerful proof that they are degraded from a former higher state.

But besides this want of reflection at the start, the remainder of his classification does not show any attempt at a rising scale, progressing from the lowest to the highest, since he speaks of the Mongolians and the Polynesians before he comes to the negroes, who are, in his scale, placed immediately before the Europeans. How can a student find in this clumsy arrangement solid instruction on this extensive topic? No one ought, therefore, to be surprised that the reader does not meet anywhere in the book with references to other more complete works, and is left altogether in the dark as to the authorities he can consult. The references at the bottom of the pages point merely to a large number of volumes where, we suppose, can be found, *in extenso*, the facts often irrelevantly mentioned in the text. It cannot be denied that Mr. Peschel has perused an immense number of books, chiefly of travels, but science has very little to do with that kind of erudition.

The first 318 pages of the volume under consideration we have called preliminary, and they might be called also fragments of anthropology. In this most comprehensive subject-matter the principles of the author are mainly those of the new school of scientists,—the prodigious antiquity of man; the theory of evolution, even for man himself; the primitive barbarism of the race; the origin of human language from mere animal ejaculations; the gradual progress of mankind through a natural process; the negation of the supernatural, which he calls *Shamanism* or priestcraft; the development of religion from Fetichism to the purest Monotheism; the Hebrew religion not differing from the others in this particular. The reader may judge what must be the opinions of the author in the sketch he pretends to give of the various religions of mankind: Brahminism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islamism, and Christianity. We pity indeed the poor young men who will try to find in this book a substratum for their religious belief, or their scientific opinions.

For none of his assertions does the author give any proofs worthy of the name. On the antiquity of man, admitting the calculations of Lyell and Sir John Lubbock, he gives no reasons; about the only fact on which he relies is the precious piece of pottery found by Mr. Horner, at the depth of thirty-nine feet, near the base of the statue of Rameses II, in Egypt, alluded to in *Gentilism*. On this subject Mr. James C. Southall, of Richmond, Va., ought to be read in his *Recent Origin of Man*. The reader may find in this most remarkable book (chapters iii and iv) a much more striking array of plausible reasons in favor of the antiquity of our race than Mr. Peschel, we are sure, can even imagine. But the gifted writer employs the remainder of his powerful volume in completely demolishing this plausible fabric which imagination only can raise. On evolution Mr. Peschel adopts the doctrines of Darwin and Huxley. Yet strange to say, he is obliged to confess that the "natural selection" and "sexual selection" of the author of the *Descent of Man* are not proven, although they may be said to be the main support of his theory. As to Mr. Huxley, Peschel could not even allude to the *demonstration* he gave lately of evolution before a New York audience.

When he hears of it in Germany, we wonder whether in his next edition he will consider it as a subject of triumph?

The same complete want of proof characterizes almost everything Mr. Peschel says on the primitive barbarism of man, on the development of religion, etc. Even when he advocates a good cause he does not know how to prove it. Thus he pronounces in favor of the unity of the human race, and almost the only reason he gives for it is the adaptability of man to all climates; thus, again, he does not reduce man to mere materialistic functions; he distinguishes him really from animals, and thus admits the moral order. But he does not even attempt to show how there can be a moral order in his system. On marriage, where he rebukes the grossness of the theories of Sir John Lubbock, he does not do it consistently; because, rejecting totally the supernatural, he is unable to assign the true and divine origin of that primitive institution.

Much more could be said, but we have no room for it. We only wonder if the author of this book ever heard of the modern palæontologists and anthropologists of France, such as Alcide d'Orbigny and De Quatrefages, or even of the celebrated ethnographer of England, James Cowles Prichard, without mentioning our American Charles Pickering, who gave to his book the very title Mr. Peschel adopted long afterwards for his own. Besides his master-work on the *Physical History of Mankind*, too large certainly to be put in the hands of a student, Prichard wrote the *Natural History of Man* in two volumes, of which Edwin Norris, of the Royal Asiatic Society, gave an edition with notes and illustrations. How is it that, with such a work in existence, which could be easily republished in smaller type and at less cost, the Messrs. Appleton, of New York, have thought it worth while to print the book of Peschel for their *International Scientific Series*? It is true that it is as valuable as several other publications in the same series; for instance, the *Consciousness* of Huxley, the *Brain* of Bastian, the *Conflict* of Draper, etc. It seems fated that books of mere trash, whose authors have adopted the pernicious but pet theories of the age, shall be given to the public as the latest and highest *dicta* of science. We suppose that those who protest against such an abuse as this will, of course, be counted among the partisans of darkness and the advocates of ignorance. If such be the case we ask to have our name inscribed at the very head of the list.

AN ESSAY, contributing to a Philosophy of Literature. By B. A. M. Second Revised Edition. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1876. 12mo., pp. 208.

Bad or worthless books, in which a little tinsel or pandering to the prejudice of the day takes the place of genuine merit, run too often a prosperous course, that does no credit to the reading public, or to the boasted century in which we live. They are lauded by the press, devoured by multitudes, and, sustained as they are by popularity and the love of gain, they find eager publishers and pass through repeated editions. On the contrary, many a good, deserving book, after a struggle between the author's modesty or poverty and the publisher's thrifty cautiousness, contrives to get through the press, receives a few grains of faint praise, and after a few months, however worthy of circulation and reprint, is heard of no more. It is, therefore, a matter of sincere congratulation, that the essay before us, which is not only a good but an admirable book, has had the good fortune to be not only warmly welcomed and highly praised by competent judges, but also to be so exten-

sively read as to call for a second edition. This the author has now given us with his revision and additions. But it is to its own singular merits, rather than to good fortune, that this excellent book is indebted for its popularity and its success.

Literature in its most general aspect may be considered as the expression of the affections produced in man by his contact with whatever can act upon his rational or sentient nature. He may hold communion with himself; he has, outside of him, relations with his individual fellow-man, with the world, material and moral, that surrounds him, the world of nature and of man, with the infinite Maker of all, who has been pleased to reveal Himself in the natural and supernatural. It is coextensive with thought and with science, ranging as it does through every form of being, from the inmost depth of consciousness in the soul to the farthest and highest point outside of it, which is God, the author of all being. It differs from thought not only in form, being its outward expression, and as it were its garment, but also because to thought it adds feeling; it differs from science, because it seeks to realize not only the true, but likewise the beautiful.

Our author does not attempt to trace literature through every path of its vast domain, but wisely deals with it only in its most general relations. After explaining its fundamental principles and chief function, its origin and its medium of expression (language), he proceeds to show the influences exercised on literature by certain epochs or phases of human society, from the earliest times down to the *Rénaissance* and what is called the Reformation. Among these agencies are enumerated the School of Alexandria, the Fathers, the irruption of Northern Barbarians, the Scholastics, etc. We consider worthy of special attention the author's judicious observations on the philosophy of Aristotle and its use among the Scholastics (p. 67), the tendency of the *Miracle-plays* (p. 73), and the rationalistic character, so little understood even by Catholics, of the great revival of letters known as the *Rénaissance*. On p. 54, instead of mentioning that graceless pagan courtier, Claudian, we should have preferred that the author had not overlooked the claims of Prudentius, the prince, if not the father of early Christian poetry, and who, if not older than Claudian, was at least his contemporary. In spite of the Calvinist Boëthius, we cannot believe that the epigram to "*Dux Iacobus*" (part of which is given in the note to p. 54) is genuine, no more than that Claudian was a Christian, as the same writer contends.

The chapter on "*Literature and the Reformation*" is well worth reading by those who still imagine that there was any legitimate connection between the revival of letters and the great revolt of the sixteenth century against the divine authority of Christ perpetually present in His Church. One might as well argue that Satan rebelled against his Maker, because he was a spirit of more than ordinary intelligence. But there is even here some difference. Though Lucifer rebelled in spite of his wisdom, yet after his fall he retained his wisdom, or enough of it to enhance his punishment; whereas, the Reformation, conceived, like all rebellions against Divine Truth, in pride of intellect, far from promoting or preserving letters and science, had a contrary tendency. And had it not been for counteracting agencies outside of itself, the Reformation would have proved to be what a keen observer proclaimed it from the beginning, *interitus literarum*. To the average non-Catholic reader of books, this sounds strange; but he may thank his reading and education. If he were better taught he would discover what a shameful paradox had been forced upon his credulity. But delusions purposely set afloat to poison the public mind, pertinaciously repeated for three

centuries, and, in the case of individuals, cherished from infancy, are not easily removed. They cannot be brushed away like cobwebs in a moment even by the strong hand of reason. It needs time as well as evidence to dispel them. Yet in the case of a sincere inquirer after truth, the testimony of an eye-witness like Erasmus might be supposed sufficient to outweigh the assertions of newspapers and text-books of the Sunday-school and even of the public school order. Let any one, who wishes to think for himself, read our author's brief but sufficiently comprehensive statement of the case. It is candid enough, for it tells the plain truth on both sides of the question.

In this connection we would recommend also another chapter, entitled "Bacon and Modern Thought," in which the so-called Baconian philosophy is fairly judged, and its pretensions brought down to their proper level. It is there shown that the fundamental points of Lord Bacon's *Novum Organon* had been anticipated centuries before by his namesake, the friar Roger Bacon. The sly Anglican chancellor appropriated and disguised in more modern speech the grand ideas of the humble Franciscan; but we could not expect "the meanest of mankind" to disclose the name of his benefactor or indicate the source to which he was indebted. From Bacon the author passes to other modern schools of philosophy, those of Comte, Spencer, and Hegel, and shows how hurtful must necessarily be their influence on literature. Two other chapters have pleased us very much, one on "The Religious Basis of Literature," the other on "Literary Morality." We are sure that they will enlist the attention and excite the admiration of every intelligent reader.

We have endeavored briefly to give some idea of this book, which does honor to our time and country. The good religious, who conceals himself under the modest initials B. A. M., is one of whom Catholic literature in America may well be proud. He is the lineal descendant and representative amongst us of those good and great men who for centuries have nursed and kept alive the lamp of science and letters in the cloistered shades of Europe. His book must be read to be properly appreciated. It is not easy to analyze, for there is in it a great deal more than appears on the surface. Almost every word and sentence furnish material for new thought. The style, we may add, is faultless—terse, luminous, and almost epigrammatic. Yet, it always conforms to the tranquil dignity of the best English models, and does not seek, as some are doing, to introduce into our language the painful straining after effect, the false glare, and the affected sententious brevity of the Senecas and their French imitators.

LECTURES ON SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. By F. John Cornoldi, S. J. Part I. Logic. London: Burns & Oates. 1876. Pp. 98.

There seems to be a general tendency among Catholic philosophers to return to scholastic philosophy. The movement is a good one, for it is in the right direction. We cannot dispense with St. Thomas. But we must not blindly follow his philosophy. As he reasoned with an eye upon the prevailing errors of his day, so ought we discuss issues that are playing havoc in our own time, and let the dead past bury its dead. This seems to be F. Cornoldi's idea in the popular course of lectures, of which the present is the first English instalment. The book gives only the essentials of logic. It does not pretend to be a complete treatise. It is rather an introduction to the main subject. As a rule the author's definitions are good. There is no better test of a philosopher than his defining power. John Henry Newman says that it were as easy to create

as define well. The author does not define genius and species; but he tells us what a generic term and a specific term are. "A *specific* term," he says, p. 22, "is that which indicates the whole essence of the objects to which it is applied. . . . A *generic* term is that which indicates that part only of the essence which is conceived as undetermined and determinable." These definitions are much clearer than those laid down by Branchereau, who shows rare philosophic grasp in defining. The latter says that essences can be distinguished from mere nothingness, and from one another. Genus is that note by which an essence is distinguished from mere nothingness—*illa nota qua essentia distinguitur a mero nihilo*; and species is that by which one essence is distinguished from another—*illud per quod essentia quævis ab aliis essentiis seceratur*.—*Praelectiones Philosophicæ, Ontologia*, p. 10.

But we do not see any improvement whatever in the author's innovation on the time-honored manner of designating the various figures and modes of the syllogism. "Barbara" is as easily remembered as "Malaga." In Lecture IX., on page 51, there is a serious error. The author is giving rules for finding the middle term. If a particular affirmative is to be demonstrated, he tells us: "The middle term will disagree with the subject, and be the antecedent to the predicate, and thus the syllogism will come under Assizi." We think not. If there is disagreement expressed between the subject and predicate of any proposition, its natural form will be a negative. But with a negative in the premises the conclusion must also be negative, for it will follow the weaker premise. Both premises must necessarily be affirmative, or expressive of agreement, in order to give an affirmative conclusion. And according as the middle term is antecedent or consequent of predicate and subject, will the syllogism fall under "Datisi" or "Darii." Not having the original, we know not whether this error is due to the translator or the author.

In England, since the publication of Whately's treatise on the subject, logic has assumed a formidable appearance in the works of Sir William Hamilton, De Morgan, Bain, and John Stuart Mill. A work of similar scope bearing directly upon these writers, especially upon Hamilton and Mill, is greatly to be desired, and he who would write such a book would prove himself a lasting benefactor to our Catholic youth. Will this hint remain unheeded?

POEMS OF PLACES. Edited by *Henry W. Longfellow*. Vols. I to 4, England and Wales; vol. 5, Ireland. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1876. 16mo.

Poetry has a charm that extends even to the places of which the poet sings. He reveals in them beauties of which our duller nature might not otherwise dream. Even places which are the mere coinage of his fancy, or which we can never hope to see, please and delight us when pointed out by the magic wand of his muse. Whose imagination has not revelled in Homer's lovely Western isle of the old Phæacians, or in Tasso's enchanted gardens of Armida, or in Milton's "blissful bower" of Eden, which made "Hesperian fables true?" The poet entwining our sympathies with his own draws them on irresistibly, localizes them, and compels us to behold each spot and scene with eyes of affection or dislike, as he pleases. He will make for us hallowed ground of the rude forest under the Alban mount, that witnessed the death-struggle of the two bosom friends, Nisus and Euryalus; or he will force us, in spite of ourselves, to share the feelings of the Trojan fugitive as he sailed by Ithaca, and with him to curse the land that bore cruel Ulysses.

The object of the present compilation is thus explained in his preface by Mr. Longfellow. "This collection of *Poems of Places* has been

made partly for the pleasure of making it, and partly for the pleasure I hope it may give those who shall read its pages. It is the voice of the poets expressing their delight in the scenes of nature, and, like the song of birds, surrounding the earth with music. For myself, I confess that these poems have an indescribable charm, as showing how the affections of men have gone forth to their favorite haunts and consecrated them forever." At the close of the preface, the editor promises that the series of volumes will be continued, until the imagination of the reader shall have been enabled to make the circuit of the whole world.

The poets whom Mr. Longfellow has pressed into his service in the volumes describing England and Wales, are principally those of the last eighty or a hundred years; and amongst them, as might be expected, the name of Wordsworth recurs most frequently. Yet even those more ancient, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare, Drayton, no less than Cowper, Southey, and Tennyson contribute their share to the reader's delight.

The fifth volume of the series is devoted to Ireland, and seems to us more lively and animated than the preceding volumes. This may be partly from the greater natural warmth of the Irish poetic heart, partly because the scenes are illustrated as freely by legend and patriotic reminiscence, as by mere description of river, mountain, and forest shade. The writers who have thrown the charm of song around the places of the Green Isle mentioned in this volume are familiar, and many of them illustrious names: Thomas Moore, Davis, T. D'Arcy McGee, the two De Veres, Sir Aubrey and his son, Clarence Mangan, Gerald Griffin, Father Prout, etc.

THE ETHICS OF BENEDICT SPINOZA. From the Latin. New York; D. Van Nostrand, Publisher. 1876.

This is a questionable boon to the English-reading public. It is placing in the hands of intellectual children an edged tool. But there are so many such, one more or less does not materially change the course of affairs. And perhaps, when we come to consider the loose manner of reasoning indulged in by the leading writers of the day, it will prove a benefit to some of their readers by showing them how to reason cogently and logically, and therefore how to detect the inconsistencies of these more brilliant but less logical writers. For Spinoza is at least a logician. And this sums up his good qualities. He is no better a metaphysician than is Mr. Darwin or Mr. Mill. He is a poor definer; his conceptions of things are very inadequate; he introduces into his reasoning elements of thought, the inadequacy of which a small share of common sense would have sufficed to detect. But the work is too important to pass by with a summary notice, especially as all our readers have now an opportunity of examining it for themselves. We will, therefore, leave it for the present, and confine ourselves to a remark on the translator. He seems to have done his work faithfully, almost to literalness. It was evidently a labor of love. The tone of his preface shows him to be as greatly in sympathy with Spinoza as he is hostile to Christianity, especially to Catholicity. When he speaks of the Church he is flippant and insulting. But sometimes he misses his mark, and expresses compliments when he intended to censure. Thus he tells us: "It is only Rome that launches anathemas against his (Spinoza's) teachings" (p. 38). This amounts to the admission that it is only Rome that is the bulwark of Christianity and revealed religion, since it is only she who defines the proper relations between the finite and the infinite, substance and accident, matter and spirit. Thanks to D. D. S.

for his unintentional tribute. It is all the more welcome for being so. In a footnote to this assertion of his, the translator quotes some of the canons of the dogmatic decrees of the Vatican Council on substance and pantheism. That same council has defended human reason, and with admirable precision pointed out the boundary-line between reason and faith. Now, in the name of that infallible reason, does the writer not know that Spinozism and Christianity cannot dwell together in the same man's convictions; that they are incompatible; that to approve of one is to condemn the other? This being so, where is the reason for finding fault? We fear the Church is to D. D. S., of Englewood, N. J., what a red flag is to an enraged bull. Its very mention deprives him of all power of reasoning. In his "infallible ignorance" (p. 39), he can only assert his prejudices.

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF EDUCATION, an Introductory Lecture, and PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION, a Paper. By *Joseph Payne*. New York: E. Steiger. 1876. Pp. 24.

This is a short but able essay on a most important subject. It was read at the College of Preceptors, Queen Square, Bloomsburg, in 1874. The author has since died. This essay shows him to have been possessed of clear ideas of education both as a science and an art. He starts out with the idea that the science of education is a branch of psychology. This is only a partial truth. The intellectual part is based upon psychology, as the physical part is based upon physiology, and the moral part upon ethics. But in proper training of the child all three go hand in hand.

The principles put forward by the author are sound. He lays great stress on the fact that a teacher advances his pupils only in so far as he sympathizes with them. Then alone will he enter into the difficulties each mind encounters, and by dint of repetition and placing the same idea in various lights, endeavor to make all learn. He is in favor of the student's not being put at work beyond his ability, so that he may learn as much as possible by himself. He thinks that it is only the knowledge so gained that becomes for him real knowledge. For this reason he is opposed to "rote" and "cramming." But in his whole essay he does not once insist on the means best calculated to determine when the student learns and when he is simply cramming. That means is questioning. The essay is well worth reading by every parent and educator.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS, Novissimi Ecclesiae Doctoris *S. Alphonsi*, in compendium reducta et usui Ven. Cleri Americani accommodata, Auctore *A. Konings*, C. SS. R., Editio altera aucta et emendata. Neo-Eboraci: Benziger Fratres. Two vols., 8vo.

THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: BEING A PLAIN EXPOSITION AND VINDICATION OF THE CHURCH FOUNDED BY OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. By Rt. Rev. *James Gibbons*, Bishop of Richmond and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. London: R. Washbourne. 1877.

THE WELSH REDISCOVERY OF AMERICA AFTER THE NORSE AND BEFORE COLUMBUS. America discovered by the Welsh in 1170 A.D. By Rev. *Benjamin F. Bowen*. Y Gwir ynerbin y Byd. "The truth against the world." Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott & Co. 1876. 1 vol., 18mo., pp. 184.

CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION. An Essay on some recent Social Changes. By *St. George Mivart*. New York: Appleton & Co., 542 and 551 Broadway. 1876.

POEMS: DEVOTIONAL AND OCCASIONAL. By *Benjamin Dionysius Hill*, C.S.P. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1877.

We have been compelled, by want of space, to omit reviews of the abovenamed works. A number of other important books have reached us, and will receive attention in due time.

PERIODICAL

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THIS BOOK MAY NOT BE
TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

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